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 ABSTRACT 
 
The main purpose of this thesis is to introduce and examine a three-process 
model on evaluative priming which may account for evaluative priming effects 
(i.e., faster and more accurate responses to a target following an evaluatively 
congruent when compared with an incongruent prime) in various task settings. 
The model was developed with regard to theoretical interpretations of evaluative 
priming and on the basis of the empirical evidence of the evaluative priming 
effect. On the one hand, different variants of the evaluative priming paradigm 
(i.e., the S–R-based variant with the evaluative categories being task-relevant and 
the S–S-based variant with the evaluative categories being task-irrelevant) have 
remarkably different and partly conflicting requirements on the memory 
representation of evaluative connotations. On the other hand, the empirical 
evidence of evaluative priming effects beyond the S–R-based variant is highly 
ambiguous since positive, null, and even negatively signed effects have been 
published (see Klauer & Musch, 2003, for a review). 
Taking these inconsistencies into account, the three-process model 
suggests an interaction of three processes in any evaluative priming task. The first 
process characterizes the mutual facilitation of evaluatively congruent concepts 
which may result in facilitated target encoding on one hand (as it is necessary for 
the explanation of S–S-based evaluative priming) and maintained prime activation 
on the other (as it was suggested by Wentura & Rothermund, 2003); the second 
process describes the parallel activation of prime and target concepts (as it is a 
precondition for the explanation of S–R-based evaluative priming); finally, the 
third process takes the response-related interactions of prime and target concepts 
into account. Generally speaking, the three-process model postulates that the 
specific interaction and the relative size of the suggested processes determine the 
direction and magnitude of the evaluative priming effect. 
I conducted five experiments on evaluative priming in which both tasks 
and stimulus modalities varied. The main focus was to provide evidence of 
interaction of the three processes―as suggested by the three-process model―in 
an S–S-based variant of the evaluative priming paradigm, that is, with a 
nonevaluative primary task. As the facilitative component of maintained prime 
activation given evaluative congruency was largely neglected in previous 
 evaluative priming studies, I aimed to create experimental conditions that would 
increase the facilitative influence of an evaluatively congruent target on prime 
maintenance, while decreasing the facilitation of an evaluatively congruent prime 
on target encoding. For this, I applied a procedure with a negative stimulus-onset 
asynchrony (SOA), that is, the prime onset followed the target onset. Maintained 
prime activation in case of evaluative congruency was expected to yield a delayed 
target response given response-incompatibility between prime and target, thus, 
resulting in negatively signed evaluative priming effects. This was found precisely 
in the naming task (i.e., the target requires a naming response; Experiment 1) with 
response-incompatible prime and target pictures as well as in the semantic 
categorization task (i.e., the target requires a nonevaluative, semantic 
categorization response; Experiment 2a/b) with primes and targets from opposite 
semantic categories. In the respective conditions, without response conflict, small 
positive evaluative priming effects emerged. Further and more fine-grained 
corroboration of the suggested interaction of the three processes was searched for 
in event-related potential (ERP) correlates (Experiment 3). Priming effects in the 
N2 component (reflecting response conflict detection), the lateralized readiness 
potential (LRP; reflecting response preparation) and also within the P3 component 
(reflecting, among others, categorization effort) replicated the behavioral findings. 
Applying a negative and a positive SOA-procedure in different blocks of the same 
experiment (Experiment 4) influenced whether facilitated target encoding or 
maintained prime activation was the more dominant process in case of evaluative 
congruency. Compared with the negative SOA-procedure, a positive SOA led to a 
positive shift of the evaluative priming effects, indicating a larger influence of 
target-encoding facilitation in relation to prime-activation maintenance. 
Facilitated activation of evaluatively congruent stimuli seems to be no general 
phenomenon of same category membership, as no comparable facilitation effects 
were observed within the―when compared with the evaluative categories―rather 
cold semantic categories such as persons and animals (Experiment 5a/b). 
My experiments provide evidence for the idea that in a sequential 
evaluative priming task, evaluative congruency may support prime activation in a 
similar way as it facilitates target encoding. While the latter process was often 
considered accountable for S–S-based evaluative priming effects, the former 
process was rather neglected within previous evaluative priming research. Since 
the evaluative connotations of prime and target are activated and influence the 
 response process―even without task requirement―the evaluative features of 
semantic concepts seem to be processed in a prioritized manner. These findings 
create specific requirements for the memory representation of the evaluative 
connotations: An appropriate representation model should allow for mutual 
facilitation of evaluatively congruent concepts as well as simultaneous activation 
and potential response competition of these concepts. While facilitative activation 
of evaluatively congruent concepts may be realized by concept pre-activation, due 
to feature overlap, synchronous firing of all features belonging to the same 
concept may enable parallel activation of several concepts.  
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PREFACE 
 
In everyday life, there are numerous objects and events that bombard our 
senses at any given moment in time. However, only very few of these experiences 
arrive at the level of consciousness; otherwise, our cognitive system would be 
highly overloaded and could possibly collapse (e.g., Bargh, 1997). It is on one 
hand, nonetheless, very important and relevant for our survival that we 
continuously check our environment for potential dangers and threats while at the 
same time checking for advantages or potential benefits; otherwise, we could miss 
benefits or overlook dangers. This process of examining the environment for 
potential benefits and dangers indicates the process of evaluation. In fact, it is 
difficult to imagine objects that are not evaluated (e.g., Neumann, Förster, & 
Strack, 2003; Zajonc, 1980). In correlation to this subject, Duckworth, Bargh, 
Garcia, and Chaiken (2002, p. 518) concluded that “all experience is continually 
evaluated as either positive or negative, whether one ponders one’s feelings about 
it or not”. Thus, it is highly accepted that humans continuously evaluate their 
environment in regard to advantages and disadvantages. Evaluative processing 
encompasses the categorization of something as good or bad, positive or negative, 
pleasant or unpleasant. In this context, Frijda (1986, p. 207) claimed that “events, 
objects, and situations may possess positive and negative valence; that is, they 
may possess intrinsic attractiveness or aversiveness”. Evaluating something as 
good or bad activates the positive or negative attitude toward the specific person, 
object or event. According to Fazio (1989), attitudes can be comprised as a link 
between an attitude object in memory and the evaluation of this object. 
Numerous empirical findings substantiate the assumption of automatic 
attitude activation: when humans detect objects in the environment (e.g., Öhmann, 
Flykt, & Esteves, 2001), when they remember studied material in a recognition 
memory task (e.g., Zajonc, 1980) or even when they are confronted with new 
verbal or pictorial stimuli (see Duckworth et al., 2002), their positive and negative 
attitudes toward the relevant stimuli are almost automatically activated. Due to 
these findings, some researchers in the field of cognition and emotion postulated a 
prioritized processing of the evaluative meaning of semantic concepts in 
comparison with the semantic, non-evaluative meaning (e.g., Bargh, 1997; Bargh, 
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Chaiken, Raymond, & Hymes, 1996; Murphy & Zajonc, 1993; Öhmann et al., 
2001; Zajonc, 1980). 
Further corroboration for the privileged status of the evaluative features of 
semantic concepts comes from the development of the semantic differential by 
Osgood (1967). He defined the evaluative dimension as one of three major 
dimensions of semantic meaning, along with the dimensions activity (active – 
passive) and potency (strong – weak). In comparison to the two other dimensions, 
the evaluative dimension turned out to be the most important one. This was, for 
example, empirically shown in a priming task in which congruency and 
incongruency effects were reported for the evaluative dimension, but not for the 
two other dimensions (see Bargh, Raymond, & Chaiken, 1996, cited by Bargh, 
1997). Osgood (1967) also premised that the evaluative meaning allows for the 
immediate preparation of appropriate behavioral responses, as positive evaluation 
may be directly related to approach and negative evaluation to avoidance 
behavioral tendencies. Solarz (1960) was the first researcher to report empirical 
evidence for a relation between evaluation and behavioral responses: Participants 
were faster at pulling a lever in response to positive than negative words, while 
they were faster at pushing a lever in response to negative than positive words. 
Within recent years, different models were introduced that more precisely specify 
the relation between evaluation and behavioral responses (e.g., Eder & Klauer, 
2009; Eder, Müsseler, & Hommel 2011; Neumann et al., 2003). The automatic 
activation of the evaluative content of semantic concepts has a highly functional 
value as it informs the organism about the presence of positive and negative 
objects in the environment and supports an approaching behavior to positive and 
an avoiding behavior to negative objects (see Fazio, 2001; Wentura & 
Rothermund, 2003; Zajonc, 1980). 
One crucial research question regarding this matter is how the evaluative 
connotations are represented in the semantic memory so that favored processing 
of the evaluative features is enabled. To examine the activation and representation 
of the evaluative connotations of semantic concepts, various indirect measures 
have been developed which all commonly explore the mechanisms of evaluative 
processing without directly asking the participants. The evaluative responses are 
primarily inferred from the speed or accuracy of the responses to the experimental 
stimuli in speeded reaction time tasks (see, e.g., De Houwer, Teige-Mocigemba, 
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Spruyt, & Moors, 2009). One main advantage of indirect measures in comparison 
with direct measures is that the purpose of the former measures is less evident. 
While participants can easily guess the aim of direct measures―like verbal self-
reports or questionnaires―by which these measures are highly prone to strategical 
faking and social desirability (e.g., Dunton & Fazio, 1997; Fazio & Olson, 2003), 
indirect measures may be less vulnerable to such strategic behavior (see Fazio & 
Olson, 2003; Wittenbrink, 2007; but see Degner, 2009; Klauer & Teige-
Mocigemba, 2007; Teige-Mocigemba & Klauer, 2008 for counterevidence). 
Prominent examples of indirect measures on the dynamics and 
mechanisms of evaluative processing are the evaluative priming paradigm (see 
Fazio, Sanbonmatsu, Powell, and Kardes, 1986), the implicit association test 
(IAT; see Greenwald, McGhee, & Schwartz, 1998), the evaluative Simon task 
(see De Houwer & Eelen, 1998; De Houwer, Crombez, Baeyens, & Hermans, 
2001; Duscherer, Holender, & Molenaar, 2008), as well as the evaluative Stroop 
task (see Pratto & John, 1991; Williams, Mathews, & MacLeod, 1996). All of 
these tasks were developed to explore the processing of the evaluative 
connotations of positive and negative stimuli. Importantly, the evaluative 
connotations are not response-relevant in these tasks for either all used stimuli 
(i.e., in a variant of the evaluative priming paradigm with a non-evaluative task, in 
the evaluative Simon task, and in the evaluative Stroop task) or for a part of the 
employed stimuli (i.e., in a variant of the evaluative priming paradigm with an 
evaluative task and in the IAT). 
Since the purpose of my experiments was to examine the underlying 
mechanisms of the evaluative priming effect, I will constrain the detailed 
description on this paradigm. Concisely, the evaluative priming paradigm 
provides information about the representation of the evaluative connotations in 
semantic memory, via exploring the effect of evaluative congruency versus 
incongruency between two sequentially presented semantic concepts in speeded 
reaction time tasks. Since the seminal paper by Fazio and colleagues (1986) was 
published, different variants of the evaluative priming paradigm were introduced 
that require quite different interpretations concerning the evaluative processing. In 
the following sections I will give a short outline of my thesis.  
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Outline 
 
In Chapter I, I provide a theoretical overview of the specific characteristics 
of evaluative processing. Specifically, I characterize the evaluative priming 
paradigm with a special focus on the differentiation of the S–R-based and the S–
S-based variant of it, including the respective empirical evidence and the 
respective interpretation of evaluative priming effects. Additionally, I discuss the 
memory representation of the evaluative connotations with respect to different 
models of semantic memory. Accounting for the crucial inconsistencies 
concerning the explanation of evaluative priming effects in different variants of 
the evaluative priming paradigm, I introduce the three-process model of 
evaluative priming. Subsequently, I aim to apply the model assumptions to 
previously published findings in evaluative priming studies and derive the 
empirical hypotheses for my experiments. 
In Chapter II, I report the basic empirical finding of evaluative priming in 
the naming task (Experiment 1) and the semantic categorization task (Experiment 
2a/b). Basically, these studies showed that―due to the negative SOA-
procedure―evaluative congruency did not primarily facilitate target encoding, but 
mainly supported prime activation and increased subsequent response conflicts of 
prime and target. This resulted in negatively signed evaluative priming effects. If 
prime and target did not compete for response resources, evaluative congruency 
slightly facilitated the target response, yielding small positive evaluative priming 
effects.  
In Chapter III, I report further corroboration for the behavioral findings 
and the theoretically suggested processes in the event-related potential (ERP). In a 
fairly exact replication of Experiment 2b (Experiment 3), several theoretically 
relevant ERP correlates were analyzed; selectively, the N2 component, the P3 
component, as well as the lateralized readiness potential (LRP). Compared with 
the behavioral effects, a similar interaction of the evaluative and response factors 
emerged in the ERP correlates. 
Chapter IV deals with critical aspects of the basic finding. In Experiment 
4, I tested in how far the conditional priming effects could be manipulated by a 
SOA-variation. In Experiment 5a/b, the valence-specificity of the conditional 
priming effects was examined. For this, I applied the evaluation task instead of the 
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semantic categorization task, whereby the evaluative categories were made task-
relevant and the semantic categories, conversely, task-irrelevant. 
In Chapter V, I sum up my findings and discuss their theoretical relevance 
to the interpretation of evaluative priming. I argue that the three-process model is 
well suited to account for the present and previously published evaluative priming 
findings. Additionally, I consider crucial implications of my results and the main 
assumptions of the three-process model for the memory representation of the 
evaluative connotations. Finally, I address some limitations and critical aspects of 
the present experiments and close with a short conclusion.  
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1 Evaluation: Activation and Representation 
In the following sections, I will first characterize the evaluative priming 
paradigm and distinguish two of its broad variants which largely differ with 
regard to the underlying, cognitive processes. Thereafter, I will discuss the 
implications of evaluative priming effects in both variants for the memory 
representation of the evaluative connotations. Finally, I will introduce the three-
process model of evaluative priming that aims to provide an integrative 
explanation model for both variants of evaluative priming. 
1.1 Evaluative priming: One label – Two paradigms 
The evaluative priming paradigm represents a promising indirect measure 
of the processes underlying stimulus evaluation and describes an evaluative 
variant of the sequential semantic priming paradigm.1 This paradigm has been 
widely used when examining how semantic concepts are structured and processed 
in long-term memory (see Bargh & Chartrand, 2000) and was first applied in 
order to explore the semantic or associative relations between different semantic 
concepts (see McNamara, 2005; Neely, 1991). The evaluative priming paradigm, 
by analogy, examines the evaluative relation (i.e., congruency and incongruency) 
between evaluatively connoted concepts. First applied by Fazio and colleagues 
(1986), a positive or negative target is preceded by a positive or negative prime, 
while only the target requires a response. Typically, faster and more accurate 
target responses arise in evaluatively congruent conditions (e.g., both prime and 
target are positive) compared to incongruent conditions (e.g., the prime is positive 
and the target is negative; see, e.g., Bargh, Chaiken, Govender, & Pratto, 1992; 
Bargh et al., 1996; Degner, 2009; Eder, Leuthold, Rothermund, & Schweinberger, 
                                                 
1
 In previous studies, the term affective priming was often used instead of 
the term evaluative priming (see Wittenbrink, 2007). As the purpose of my 
experiments was to examine the processing of the evaluative features of semantic 
concepts and as I selected my experimental stimuli primarily with respect to their 
evaluative connotations (and not with respect to their affective content), I will 
term the kind of priming that I explored evaluative priming. By this notion, I aim 
to refer to the features good/bad, positive/negative or pleasant/unpleasant. 
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2011; Fazio et al., 1986; Greenwald, Klinger, & Liu, 1989; Hermans, De Houwer, 
& Eelen, 1994, 2001; Klauer et al., 1997; Teige-Mocigemba & Klauer, 2008). 
This difference in mean response times (RTs) and mean errors is labeled the 
evaluative priming effect. It indicates how far target processing is facilitated if the 
preceding prime shares the evaluative connotation with the target. On the basis of 
this basic effect, evaluative priming effects were examined in different variants of 
the paradigm (see Klauer & Musch, 2003 for a review). Several parameters were 
varied in order to test their influence on the evaluative priming effect. 
One of the most influential parameters represents the temporal distance of 
prime and target onset (i.e., the stimulus-onset asynchrony [SOA]). While most 
studies reported positive evaluative priming effects with SOAs between 150 and 
300 ms (see, e.g., Bargh et al., 1992, 1996; Degner, 2009; De Houwer et al., 1998; 
Eder et al., 2011; Fazio et al., 1986; Fockenberg, Koole, & Semin, 2006; Giner-
Sorolla, Garcia, & Bargh, 1999; Hermans et al., 1994; Hermans, Spruyt, & Eelen, 
2003; Klauer & Teige-Mocigemba, 2007; Teige-Mocigemba & Klauer, 2008; 
Wentura, 1999, 2000), studies using longer SOAs failed to find any evaluative 
priming effect (De Houwer et al., 1998; Fazio et al., 1986; Hermans et al., 1994, 
2001, 2003; Klauer et al., 1997). Therefore, the evaluative priming effect was 
interpreted as fast-acting and short-lived automatic process (e.g., Hermans et al., 
2001, 2003). Some authors examined evaluative priming even with negative 
SOA-procedures (i.e., the target precedes the prime) and reported positive 
(Fockenberg et al., 2006) or null evaluative priming effects (Hermans et al., 2001; 
Klauer et al., 1997), respectively. (Further information on this issue will be 
addressed latterly.) Fockenberg and colleagues (2006) interpreted their finding of 
a positive evaluative priming effect in such that stimulus evaluation represents a 
continuous process that does not end at target onset. Instead, it may serve adaptive 
functions and alert the individual to sudden critical changes, like the presentation 
of the following, evaluatively connoted prime. 
As a further parameter, the stimulus modality of the primes was varied 
across experiments: While most studies used written or spoken words (e.g., Bargh 
et al., 1992, 1996; Chaiken & Bargh, 1993; De Houwer, Hermans, Rothermund, 
& Wentura, 2002; Fazio et al., 1986; Hermans  et al., 1994; Klauer & Musch, 
2001), also pictures (e.g., Everaert, Spruyt, & De Houwer, 2011; Spruyt, 
Hermans, De Houwer, & Eelen, 2002, 2004; Wentura & Frings, 2008), line-
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drawings (Giner-Sorolla et al., 1999), photographs (Banse, 2001), and odours 
(Hermans, Baeyens, & Eelen, 1998) were applied as primes. In several studies, 
the prime presentation was even masked (e.g., Abrams & Greenwald, 2000; 
Banse, 2001; Draine & Greenwald, 1998; Greenwald, Draine, & Abrams, 1996). 
Of high relevance for the interpretation of the evaluative priming effect 
and for the implications concerning the memory representation of the evaluative 
connotations, there is a further characteristic of the evaluative priming paradigm, 
namely, the applied task. The tasks used in previous studies can roughly be 
categorized into two groups: tasks requiring an evaluative categorization of the 
target (i.e., the evaluation task) and tasks requiring no evaluative response. 
Prominent examples for the latter group of tasks are (a) the naming task that 
solely requires target naming, (b) the semantic categorization task, in which the 
target is categorized according to semantic, nonevaluative categories, and (c) the 
lexical decision task, which is associated with target categorizations according to 
their lexicality (e.g., word or nonword). Since the differentiation of these both 
broad groups of evaluative priming tasks plays an important role in my theoretical 
considerations regarding an account of evaluative priming, I will characterize both 
variants of the evaluative priming paradigm and discuss the empirical evidence 
for both variants. Referring to both kinds of the evaluative priming paradigm, I 
will use the terminology proposed by De Houwer (2003) that takes the level of 
processes that are responsible for the prime-target interaction into account. 
1.1.1 The S–R-based variant 
In this variant of the evaluative priming paradigm, the evaluative 
connotation of the target is task-relevant, that is, participants are required to 
categorize the target according to its valence (e.g., Bargh et al., 1992; Fazio et al., 
1986; Giner-Sorolla et al., 1999). As the prime also varies according to the 
evaluative dimension, it may also call for evaluative categorization that is, in turn, 
either compatible or incompatible with the target evaluation. Since evaluative 
congruency and response-compatibility of prime and target are directly 
interconnected, the evaluative priming effect in this case is typically explained by 
response-related processes: In evaluatively compatible trials (i.e., both target and 
prime are positive or negative, respectively), prime and target are associated with 
the same response category (i.e., categorization as positive or negative). In 
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contrast, within evaluatively incompatible trials, prime and target call for 
opposing responses. Hence, the prime either supports the correct target response 
or interferes with it (see Klauer et al., 1997; Wentura, 1999). As priming effects 
can be attributed to the similarity between stimulus and response features (i.e., the 
evaluative feature of the prime and the evaluative categorization of the target), 
this kind of evaluative priming is considered S–R-based priming (see De Houwer, 
2003). Note that the term response priming design was alternatively introduced to 
refer to the evaluative priming paradigm with the evaluation task (see Wentura & 
Degner, 2010). The reasons for this terminology are the structural analogy of the 
evaluation task with different non-evaluative response priming tasks (see Banaji 
& Hardin, 1996; Rosenbaum & Kornblum, 1982; Vorberg, Mattler, Heinecke, 
Schmidt, & Schwarzbach, 2003) and the fact that evaluative priming effects can 
be traced back to the similarity between prime and target responses. 
Fazio and colleagues (1986) claimed that the evaluative connotations of 
valenced objects are stored in a way that they are automatically activated by 
related stimuli. According to Fazio’s (1989) attitude theory, there are strong and 
direct associations between a given attitude object and its evaluation. In line with 
this theory, the mere activation of the attitude object automatically activates the 
corresponding evaluation, even if no evaluation is required. Thus, in a sequential 
evaluative priming task the evaluation that is associated with the prime should 
automatically be activated at prime onset and―in case of evaluative 
congruency―pre-activate the target evaluation. Given evaluative incongruency, 
the evaluation associated with the prime may hamper the target evaluation (see 
Klinger, Burton, & Pitts, 2000; Wentura, 1999). 
The S–R-based evaluative priming effect was reliably reported in a large 
number of studies (see, e.g., Bargh et al., 1992; De Houwer, Hermans, & Eelen, 
1998; Fazio et al., 1986; Greenwald et al., 1989; Hermans et al., 1998; Hermans, 
De Houwer, & Eelen, 1996) and was even found with subliminal prime 
presentation (Abrams & Greenwald, 2000; Draine & Greenwald, 1998; 
Greenwald et al., 1989). With long SOA-procedures around 1000 ms, no S–R-
based evaluative priming effects were reported (see De Houwer et al., 1998; 
Hermans et al., 2001; Klauer et al., 1997). These null findings speak for the short-
lived character of the S–R-based evaluative priming effect. 
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Several authors (e.g., De Houwer, 2003; Hermans et al., 1994; Klauer et 
al., 1997; Rothermund & Wentura, 1998; Wentura, 1999) related the S–R-based 
variant of the evaluative priming paradigm to the Stroop paradigm (i.e., the ink 
color of color words has to be named, while the color name has to be ignored; see 
Stroop, 1935; MacLeod, 1991) or the flanker paradigm (i.e., a centrally presented 
target stimulus is flanked by response-compatible or incompatible distractors; see 
Eriksen & Eriksen, 1974; Shaffer & LaBerge, 1979). In all these paradigms, a 
task-relevant stimulus (or a task-relevant stimulus feature in the Stroop task) 
requires a specific response, while a distractor (or a distracting feature in the 
Stroop task) activates a competing response. Thus, the S–R-based evaluative 
priming effect can easily be explained with a response-based account, that is, the 
prime either facilitates (in case of evaluative congruency) or hampers (in case of 
incongruency) the target response (see De Houwer et al., 2002; Klauer et al., 
1997; Klinger et al., 2000; Rothermund & Wentura, 1998; Wentura, 1999, 2000). 
Empirical corroboration for an analogy of the S–R-based evaluative 
priming effect with the Stroop effect came from different research lines. Musch 
and Klauer (2001) showed attentional influences on the S–R-based evaluative 
priming effect: If prime and target appeared at the same time and the target 
location was cued, no evaluative priming effect emerged. That means, since the 
attention was restricted to a single location, the prime could be successfully 
ignored. Similar attentional effects were reported in the Stroop task (e.g., Besner 
& Stolz, 1999). 
Further support was given by different studies with a negative priming 
variant of S–R-based evaluative priming (see Wentura, 1999; Frings & Wentura, 
2008). The target response in the current trial (i.e., the probe trial according to the 
terminology of the negative priming paradigm) was slowed down if the preceding 
trial (i.e., the prime trial according to the same terminology) was an evaluatively 
incongruent one and the target response in the current trial was congruent to the 
prime response in the preceding trial. This effect was interpreted in such that the 
prime-associated response in the preceding, incongruent trial had to be inhibited, 
yielding a residual inhibition in the current trial. This residual inhibition was 
observable if the inhibited response was the target-associated response in the 
current trial. As such sequential effects were also found with the flanker and the 
Stroop task (see Botvinick, Nystrom, Fissell, Carter, & Cohen, 1999; Frings & 
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Wentura, 2008; Greenwald & Rosenberg, 1978), these findings confirm the 
analogy of the S–R-based evaluative priming paradigm with these paradigms. 
Furthermore, strategic influences on the S–R-based evaluative priming 
effect were shown. Klauer and colleagues (1997), for example, reported 
significant influences of the proportion of evaluatively congruent trials on the S–
R-based evaluative priming effect: If at least half of the trials were evaluatively 
congruent the effect was significantly positive, while when the majority of the 
trials was incongruent, it broke down. In other studies, the S–R-based evaluative 
priming effect disappeared or even reversed if the participants were explicitly 
instructed how to respond in order to eliminate any positive effect (see Degner, 
2009; Klauer & Teige-Mocigemba, 2007; Teige-Mocigemba & Klauer, 2008). 
These findings suggest that strategic influences play an important role in the S–R-
based evaluative priming task and that positive effects do not occur 
unconditionally and automatically. 
Further evidence for the response-based account of S–R-based evaluative 
priming comes from event-related potential (ERP) studies that provided brain-
electrical correlates of the S–R-based evaluative priming effect in the activity of 
the motor cortex (see Bartholow, Riordan, Saults, & Lust, 2009; Eder et al., 
2011). 
Several authors examined S–R-based evaluative priming with a negative 
SOA-procedure. Yet only Fockenberg and colleagues (2006) reported positive 
effects with a SOA of -100 ms, while others failed to find any effect (Hermans et 
al., 2001; Klauer et al., 1997). Fockenberg and colleagues’ (2006) findings of a 
positive S–R-based evaluative priming effect correlates with the response-based 
account of S–R-based evaluative priming (see Klauer et al., 1997; Wentura, 
1999). Despite the negative SOA, the prime may appear before the target response 
preparation has been finished and, thereby, the prime can still interfere with the 
target response. If, however, the prime onset is too late after target onset and the 
target response preparation has progressed too much, the prime is no longer able 
to influence the target response. So, Fockenberg and colleagues (2006) found no 
S–R-based evaluative priming effect with SOAs longer than -100 ms (in 
particular, -250 and -400 ms). An explanation for the positive effect reported by 
Fockenberg, but the null effects in other studies (Hermans et al., 2001; Klauer et 
al., 1997) might be that in the former study, primes and targets were the same 
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stimuli, while in the latter studies, primes and targets were selected from different 
stimulus sets. This feature may have manipulated the prime response association 
and, thereby, the S–R-based evaluative priming effect. 
Given the response-based account for S–R-based evaluative priming, one 
implicitly accepts that both responses, that is, the response corresponding to the 
prime as well as the response corresponding to the target, are simultaneously 
activated. Since only if both responses are activated at the same time, can they 
either support (in case of evaluative congruency) or interfere (in case of evaluative 
incongruency) with each other. Further reference to this hidden assumption of S–
R-based evaluative priming will follow later as it is crucial for my theoretical 
considerations on the explanation of evaluative priming and the memory 
representation of the evaluative connotations. 
1.1.2 The S–S-based variant 
In the S–S-based variant of the evaluative priming paradigm, the 
evaluative connotation of the target is not task-relevant. Here, various conceivable 
tasks have this one thing in common; no response concerning the evaluative 
connotation of the target is required. One prominent example is the naming task, 
in which participants are simply required to name the target stimulus, while prime 
and target vary according to the evaluative dimension. An evaluative priming 
effect in this task means that participants are able to pronounce the target faster 
and more accurately if it is preceded by an evaluatively congruent prime 
(compared with an incongruent one), even though the evaluative connotations of 
both target and prime are task-irrelevant. As priming effects can be attributed to 
the similarity between stimulus features (rather than the similarity between prime 
and target responses), this kind of evaluative priming is considered S–S-based 
priming (see De Houwer, 2003). Alternatively, Wentura and Degner (2009) 
suggested the term semantic priming design referring to evaluative priming with 
tasks that do not require evaluative responses, as any evaluative priming effect in 
such tasks has to be traced back―analogous to semantic priming effects (see 
Neely, 1991; McNamara, 2005, for reviews)―to the prime-target relation with 
regard to their evaluative connotations in the sense of semantic features (rather 
than the prime-target relation with regard to their responses). 
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The most important difference between the S–S-based and the S–R-based 
variant of the evaluative priming paradigm represents the allowed interpretations 
of the evaluative priming effects. Since S–R-based evaluative priming effects can 
plausibly be explained with response-compatibility in case of evaluative 
congruency and incompatibility in case of incongruency, the evaluative feature 
could easily be exchanged by any other prime and target feature, while similar S–
R-based priming effects could still be anticipated (see, e.g., Klinger et al., 2000, 
Exp. 4). Thus, the S–R-based evaluative priming effect reflects no effect that is 
specific for the evaluative dimension. In contrast, S–S-based evaluative priming 
effects suggest an interaction of the evaluative connotations corresponding to the 
prime and the target concepts, since evaluatively congruent and incongruent 
prime-target pairs differ only with respect to their evaluative connotations (while 
the response-based prime-target relations vary independently from the evaluative 
relations). Thus, an evaluative priming effect in an S–S-based design indicates 
that valenced concepts are evaluated independent from an evaluative goal and that 
a currently activated concept facilitates the encoding of an evaluatively congruent 
one. 
In this sense, the S–S-based variant of evaluative priming can be related to 
the semantic priming paradigm. Here, the semantic or associative relatedness 
between prime and target has typically been examined in the naming or lexical 
decision task, in that the semantic meaning of the target is not task-relevant (see 
McNamara, 2005). Priming effects due to associative relatedness (e.g., the 
relatedness between the semantic concepts gardener and plant) have reliably been 
reported (see Neely, 1991) and have been explained with temporal contiguity in 
speech or text (McKoon & Ratcliff, 1992) or word co-occurrence within a 
proposition (McNamara, 1992). Furthermore, semantic priming effects due to 
pure semantic relatedness without associative relatedness (e.g., the relatedness 
between the semantic concepts tree and plant) have been reported (see Lucas, 
2000, for a review). 
Numerous studies on S–S-based evaluative priming applied the naming 
task, just as this task was often used in the field of semantic priming research (see 
Neely, 1991; McNamara, 2005). The popularity of the naming task in evaluative 
priming studies is due to the advantage of this task in which priming effects are 
not explainable with response-compatibility effects, since prime and target are 
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always associated with different responses, independent from evaluative 
congruency or incongruency. Instead, priming effects of naming responses are 
most plausibly explained with the assumption that an evaluatively congruent 
prime facilitates the encoding of the target (see, e.g., Bargh et al., 1996; De 
Houwer, Hermans, & Spruyt, 2001; De Houwer & Randell, 2004; Duckworth et 
al., 2002; Ferguson, Bargh, & Nayak, 2005; Spruyt et al., 2002). Before I turn to 
differently suggested interpretations of the S–S-based evaluative priming effect 
and the respective implications for the representation of evaluatively connoted 
concepts, I will discuss the empirical evidence of S–S-based evaluative priming 
effects. 
Compared with the reliable findings of S–R-based evaluative priming 
effects, the empirical evidence for evaluative priming with an S–S-based design 
has been rather inconsistent (see Klauer & Musch, 2003, for a review). With the 
naming task, for example, some studies reported reliable positive evaluative 
priming effects (e.g., Bargh et al., 1996; Giner-Sorolla et al., 1999; Hermans et al., 
1994; Spruyt & Hermans, 2008; Spruyt, Hermans, De Houwer, & Eelen, 2004; 
Spruyt, Hermans, De Houwer, Vandromme, & Eelen, 2007), while others failed to 
show any evaluative priming effect (e.g., Spruyt, Hermans, Pandelaere, De 
Houwer, & Eelen, 2004), even in almost exact replications (see Klauer & Musch, 
2001). Glaser and Banaji (1999) even reported negatively signed evaluative 
priming effects for extremely valenced prime words. Furthermore, several authors 
found evidence for evaluative priming effects with the naming task only under 
specific conditions (e.g., De Houwer, Hermans, & Spruyt, 2001; De Houwer & 
Randell, 2002, 2004; Everaert et al., 2011; Hermans et al., 2001; Spruyt, De 
Houwer, & Hermans, 2009; Spruyt, De Houwer, Everaert, & Hermans, 2012; 
Spruyt et al., 2002). Compared with the naming task, evidence for evaluative 
priming effects in the semantic categorization task (i.e. the target is categorized 
according to prespecified semantic, nonevaluative categories) is still less 
convincing. Some authors reported null effects (De Houwer et al., 2002; Klinger 
et al., 2000, Exp. 4), while others observed conditional positive effects (Spruyt, 
De Houwer, Hermans, & Eelen, 2007). Introducing the three-process model of 
evaluative priming in Section 1.3, I will provide possible reasons for this 
inconsistent pattern of S–S-based evaluative priming effects in the naming and the 
semantic categorization task. 
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For the sake of completeness, I would like to mention that a few studies 
examined evaluative priming in the lexical decision task (see Hill & Kemp-
Wheeler, 1989; Kemp-Wheeler & Hill, 1992; Wentura, 2000). In all of these 
studies, positive S–S-based evaluative priming effects were reported, implying 
faster target lexicality categorization (i.e., word or non-/pseudoword) if prime and 
target were evaluatively congruent compared to incongruent. Wentura proposed 
that specific mechanisms which are characterized in the judgmental tendency 
account by Klauer and Stern (1992; see also Klauer & Musch, 2002, who 
employed the term affective-matching mechanism) might be responsible for 
evaluative priming effects in the lexical decision task. Overall, this account 
postulates that producing a judging statement about the truth of a proposed 
relation between a specific attitude object and a specific trait (e.g., “The German 
chancellor Angela Merkel is competent.”) involves a three-component process. 
First, the evaluative connotations of both concepts chancellor and competent are 
separately activated. Second, both evaluations are compared with respect to 
congruency or incongruency, while the outcome of this comparison is a 
spontaneous feeling of plausibility or implausibility. This plausibility check serves 
to derive an a priori hypothesis. As a consequence, in the case of evaluative 
congruency a judgmental tendency to affirm is qualified, while in the case of 
incongruency the judgmental tendency is characterized by a rejecting response. 
These two components are supposed to be automatic. In contrast, the third 
component characterizes a controlled mechanism that uses the a priori hypothesis 
and the available information to create an appropriate judgmental statement about 
the relation of the attitude object and the trait. That is, a person who likes the 
chancellor evaluates her as positive. Since the trait competent is also positively 
connoted, both concepts are evaluatively congruent. This leads to a feeling of 
plausibility and a response tendency to affirm the statement “The chancellor 
Angela Merkel is competent”. This tendency will bias the judgmental statement 
that is produced in the third controlled processing step. 
Applying the judgmental tendency account to the lexical decision task, 
Wentura (2000) suggested that participants could interpret the lexical 
categorization of the target in the sense of an affirmative (i.e., “Yes, this is a 
word.”) or a refusing response (i.e., “No, this is not a word.”) toward the 
compound of prime and target. According to this logic, evaluative congruency 
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should facilitate an affirmative response, while evaluative incongruency should 
facilitate a refusing response. Wentura tested this interpretation of positive 
evaluative priming effects in the lexical decision task against the alternative 
interpretation of faster target encoding by an evaluatively congruent prime. For 
this, he labeled the target responses as yes- and no-responses and manipulated the 
assignment of the responses to words and pseudowords in a between-subjects 
design. For half of the participants, words required the yes-response and pseudo-
words the no-response, while for the other half of the participants, the response 
assignments to the target categories were the other way around. Target words 
associated with the yes-response elicited a positive evaluative priming effect, 
while target words associated with the no-response elicited a negative effect. The 
significant interaction of evaluative congruency and response assignment 
corroborated the judgmental tendency explanation for evaluative priming effects 
in the lexical decision task and did not support the explanation by facilitated target 
encoding in case of evaluative congruency. 
Thus, evaluative priming effects in the lexical decision task are most 
plausibly explained with processes at response instead of stimulus encoding level. 
Therefore, this task―just like the evaluation task―does not provide considerable 
information about the memory representation of the evaluative connotations. In 
contrast, evaluative priming effects in the naming and the semantic categorization 
tasks can hardly be explained with processes beyond the prime-target relation 
with respect to their evaluative connotations, wherefore these tasks rather allow 
exploring the memory representation of the evaluative connotations. 
In the next Section, I will characterize different models about the memory 
representation of the evaluative connotations and discuss how the respective 
models are suited to account for evaluative priming effects in the different 
variants of the evaluative priming paradigm. 
1.2 Memory representation of valence 
One reason for the popularity of the evaluative priming paradigm is 
justified by the allowed theoretical implications of evaluative priming effects on 
the memory representation of the evaluative connotations. Positive evaluative 
priming effects indicate two phenomena: the first being that valenced prime 
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stimuli seem to be evaluated immediately and without task requirement (as 
reflected in S–R-based evaluative priming effects); and the second being that 
valenced prime stimuli increase the accessibility and facilitate the processing of 
evaluatively congruent target stimuli (as reflected in S–S-based evaluative 
priming effects). These effects suggest that the evaluative features of semantic 
concepts have a privileged status of accessibility in the semantic memory. The 
question, however, remains as to how such a preferential status may be enabled in 
a model of semantic memory. 
In the next sections, I will characterize two broad groups of semantic 
memory models, namely, semantic network models and parallel distributed 
memory models, in which both allow for a privileged representation of the 
evaluative features, whereas both propose largely different manifestations of the 
semantic knowledge. I will first describe how the evaluative connotations may be 
represented in semantic network models and then continue with the representation 
of the evaluative connotations in parallel distributed memory models. 
1.2.1 Valence representation in semantic network models 
Semantic network models characterize the semantic memory as a network 
of the representations of a person’s knowledge and beliefs about semantic 
concepts and ideas (see, e.g., Anderson 1983; Collins & Loftus, 1975). The 
semantic concepts are assumed to be represented as interconnected nodes, while 
the strength of the connection between two nodes depends on the semantic 
relation between both corresponding concepts. Via these connections, the 
activation of one semantic concept is expected to spread to semantically related 
concepts, thereby increasing the accessibility of these concepts. This process is 
labeled spreading activation and has been taken into account for the interpretation 
of semantic priming effects (see, e.g., Anderson, 1983; Balota & Lorch, 1986; 
Shelton & Martin, 1992). Semantic priming effects―as explained by semantic 
network models―mean that the target concept is activated more easily if it is 
preceded by a semantically related prime concept when compared with an 
unrelated one. For example, the naming of the target word coffee may be 
facilitated if it is preceded by the semantically related prime word tea compared 
with the unrelated prime word soap. 
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Of special interest for the interpretation of evaluative priming effects is the 
adaptation of the semantic network model by Bower (1991) who considered the 
representation of the evaluative content of semantic concepts. He suggested an 
associative network model with additional nodes for positive and negative valence 
linked to all nodes representing positively and negatively connoted objects, 
respectively. In alignment with the assumption of valence nodes in Bower’s 
adaption of a semantic network model, several authors claimed the same 
representational status for evaluative connotations as for semantic features (e.g., 
De Houwer & Hermans, 1994; De Houwer & Randell, 2004). Bower developed 
his model on the basis of several empirical findings providing evidence for a 
direct influence of a positive or negative mood on the performance in memory 
tasks (see Bower, 1981, 1987; Bower & Mayer, 1989). For example, if 
participants were in a happy mood in the learning phase, they showed a better 
learning performance for positively connoted stimuli compared with negatively 
connoted ones. A comparably beneficial effect for negatively over positively 
connoted stimuli emerged if participants learned the stimuli in a negative mood 
(e.g., Bower, 1981, 1987). Similarly, the performance in the retrieval phase did 
profit from a match of the induced mood in the learning and the retrieval phase 
compared with mismatching mood inductions in both phases (e.g., Bower, 1981; 
Bower & Mayer, 1989; Bower, Monteiro, & Gilligan, 1978). Furthermore, mood-
congruent material was more attended to as well as more deeply processed (e.g., 
Forgas & Bower, 1987), and more mood-congruent than incongruent associations 
were stated in free associations to ambiguous words (e.g., the words future or life; 
see Bower, 1981). There is, however, also evidence against the preferential 
processing of mood-congruent material (see Bower & Forgas, 2001), so that 
various parameters like the personality and the motivation of the subjects (see 
Berkowitz, Jaffee, Jo, & Troccoli, 2000; Smith & Petty, 1995) or contextual 
factors (e.g., the complexity of the task; see Fiedler, 1991) have been shown to 
influence the impact of the participants’ mood on the behavior in the current task. 
Thus, the affective or evaluative content of a situation may not in general but 
under specific conditions influence the behavior in a current task, even if it is 
irrelevant for the task. 
Returning to the objective of evaluative priming, an interesting observation 
is that the associative network model by Bower (1991) is well suited to account 
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for S–S-based evaluative priming effects. According to the model, whenever a 
valenced object is activated, its activation may automatically spread via the linked 
valence node to all evaluatively congruent memory representations that may 
(mutually) facilitate their activation. In a sequential evaluative priming task, the 
current presentation of a negative prime word (e.g., enemy) may activate its 
corresponding node in the associative network. From this node, the activation may 
spread to the negative valence node and―from there―to all nodes corresponding 
to negatively connoted concepts. Thereby, a following negative target word (e.g., 
poor) may be pre-activated, whereas a positive target word (e.g., rich) may be 
rather inhibited by a preceding negative prime word. This difference in the level 
of pre-activation of an evaluatively congruent target compared with an 
incongruent one may yield a positive S–S-based evaluative priming effect. 
Analogously, the activation from a positive prime may spread to a positive target. 
Thus, Bower’s model prima facie provides a conclusive mechanism for the typical 
explanation of S–S-based evaluative priming effects: an evaluatively congruent 
prime is expected to facilitate target encoding (see Spruyt et al., 2002). 
However, there are considerable arguments that speak against the 
plausibility of spreading activation as the underlying mechanism of evaluative 
priming effects. First, a mechanism of spreading activation between evaluatively 
congruent concepts does not account for several empirical findings in evaluative 
priming studies with an S–R-based design. For example, it does not predict a 
significant influence of the evaluative priming effect by the proportion of 
evaluatively congruent and incongruent trials, as reported by Klauer and 
colleagues (1997). Moreover, the spreading activation mechanism is not suited to 
account for sequence effects (see Greenwald et al., 1996; Wentura, 1999) that 
have also been found in the evaluation task. Such effects were evidenced in 
slower target evaluations in the current trial if the previous trial was an 
incongruent one and the prime in the previous trial, as well as the target in the 
current trial, were evaluatively congruent. As previously mentioned, however, S–
R-based evaluative priming effects are most plausibly explained with response-
related processes, wherefore a mechanism like spreading activation―even if 
existent―might be superimposed by the more dominant response process. That is, 
the fact that specific evaluative priming phenomena in the evaluation task are not 
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explained by a spreading activation mechanism does not provide an argument 
against any impact of such a mechanism on S–R-based evaluative priming effects. 
An argument that yet markedly speaks against the explanation of 
evaluative priming effects with a spreading of activation mechanism is provided 
by the fan effect (see Anderson, 1974). This effect illustrates the phenomenon that 
one single concept or node, respectively, is the less activated the more the total 
activation in the network is distributed over different semantic concepts or nodes, 
respectively. Since the number of evaluatively connoted concepts is quite high, 
the activation that is left for a single valenced concept should be too low to yield a 
measurable priming effect (see Bargh et al., 1996; De Houwer & Randell, 2004; 
Ferguson & Bargh, 2003; Hermans et al., 1996; Spruyt et al., 2002; Wentura, 
1999). 
Moreover, further empirical findings are not compatible with a semantic 
network explanation of evaluative priming. For example, Duckworth and 
colleagues (2002) reported evaluative judgments of novel stimuli, for which 
neither memory representations nor associations with valence nodes had existed 
before. Interpreting their effects, the authors suggested that automatic evaluation 
does not require strongly accessible attitude representations, but may be driven by 
on-line evaluative processes. In other studies (e.g., Deacon, Hewitt, & Tamny, 
1998; Masson, 1991), the semantic priming effect was eliminated by the 
presentation of an intervening, unrelated stimulus between prime and target 
presentations. If the activation were to always spread automatically from the 
currently activated node to related ones, this should yield observable encoding 
facilitation of related concepts, independent from the presentation of an 
intervening, unrelated concept. Thus, such effects can hardly be explained with 
the mechanism of spreading activation. 
Due to these considerable difficulties which account for several empirical 
findings, spreading activation may not represent the only explanatory mechanism 
for evaluative priming effects. As a consequence, this, however, also challenges 
the suitability of semantic network models which deal with evaluative priming 
effects. A promising alternative to the rather outdated semantic network models is 
illustrated by adaptations of parallel distributed memory models to the objective 
of priming research (see Masson, 1991, 1995; McRae, de Sa, & Seidenberg, 
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1997). Following in Section 1.2.2, I will characterize the basic idea of these 
models and their appropriateness to account for evaluative priming effects. 
It should be noted that a memory model aiming to explain evaluative 
priming effects needs to provide a mechanism that allows for the enhanced 
accessibility of negative information by the processing of negative information 
and―in a comparable manner―for the enhanced accessibility of positive 
information by the processing of positive information, as it is allowed by Bower’s 
(1991) model. 
1.2.2 Valence representation in parallel distributed memory models 
In comparison with semantic network models, parallel distributed models 
of priming (see Masson, 1991, 1995; McRae et al., 1997) suggest a largely 
different structural organization of the semantic memory. Instead of allocating a 
single node to each semantic concept, the semantic knowledge is to be distributed 
over a multidimensional space of activation units displaying semantic features or 
micro-features. In order for this, each semantic concept is constituted by a specific 
pattern of activated units, while the number of shared activation units determines 
semantic relatedness between different concepts. Thus, semantic priming effects 
can be explained by a faster transition from the pattern corresponding to the prime 
concept to a semantically related than to an unrelated one (i.e., the pattern 
corresponding to the target) because the shared activation units are already in the 
appropriate mode of activation. Although this model was initially developed in 
order to interpret semantic priming effects (see McNamara, 2005, for a review), it 
is prima facie perfectly suited to account for S–S-based evaluative priming effects 
as well. It is sufficient to additionally assume that a considerable part of the 
activation pattern of a specific semantic concept corresponds to its evaluative 
connotation (see Spruyt et al., 2002; Wentura, 1999, 2000). Thereby, the 
activation patterns of evaluatively congruent concepts overlap in the activation 
units corresponding to their evaluative connotation. That means that in a 
sequential evaluative priming task, the transition from the prime pattern to the 
target pattern is facilitated in case of evaluative congruency, since the target 
pattern is partly pre-activated by the prime pattern. Thus, parallel distributed 
models provide an elegant mechanism for the explanation of S–S-based evaluative 
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priming effects as they allow for target-encoding facilitation by an evaluatively 
congruent prime (see, e.g., Wentura, 2000). 
At this point, it is important to go back a step in order to emphasize a 
hidden inconsistency in the interpretation and the understanding of evaluative 
priming. S–R-based evaluative priming effects have typically been explained with 
response-based processes, assuming that an evaluatively congruent prime 
facilitates the target evaluation, while an evaluatively incongruent prime interferes 
with the target evaluation. Such response-related processes have been made 
responsible for the emergence of positive S–R-based evaluative priming effects 
(see Klauer et al., 1997; Wentura, 1999). An observable interaction between 
prime and target responses, however, requires a simultaneous activation of both 
concepts or―at least―both responses. This raises the following question: Does 
the parallel distributed structure of semantic memory provide a mechanism for 
response-related processes between two concepts as well as the concomitant 
parallel activation of these concepts? 
In the distributed memory model―as it has been introduced by Masson 
(1991, 1995)―the activation of one semantic concept is necessarily accompanied 
by the activation of semantically related concepts because of shared activation 
units. Simultaneous activation of more than one concept is thereby, however, 
restricted to their overlapping parts and the completely activated pattern 
corresponding to one concept allows for only partial activation of related patterns. 
As previously mentioned, this aspect is yet crucial for the response-based 
explanation of S–R-based priming, since response facilitation and interference 
require the parallel activation of the activation units corresponding to prime and 
target responses, even if these activation units do not overlap in the response-
incompatible condition. Thus, the distributed organization of semantic memory 
conflicts with the response-based account of S–R-based evaluative priming, since 
no simultaneous activation of the full pattern of two distinct concepts is allowed. 
In contrast, the distributed memory model (Masson, 1991, 1995) provides a 
conclusive implementation accounting for S–S-based evaluative priming: a 
currently activated concept (i.e., the prime) facilitates the encoding of an 
evaluatively congruent concept (i.e., the target) via pre-activation of the 
overlapping activation units. 
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Since the S–R-based and the S–S-based variants of evaluative priming 
differ in the required task only, while the whole task setting is comparable, it is 
quite dissatisfying to assume largely different representational structures of the 
semantic memory including the evaluative connotations of the semantic concepts. 
I concede that evaluative priming effects in both variants of the paradigm 
implicitly involve different explanatory mechanisms: The response-based 
explanation is simply not applicable to the S–S-based variant of evaluative 
priming, while it is the more plausible and more parsimonious explanation of S–
R-based evaluative priming effects in comparison with the explanation when 
taking facilitated target encoding by evaluative congruency into account. 
Therefore, it is not necessary to create an overall explanation of evaluative 
priming effects, but it is crucial to search for a memory model that is compatible 
with evaluative priming in an S–S-based as well as in an S–R-based design. In 
Section 1.3, I will introduce the three-process model of evaluative priming that 
gives indications for the representation of the evaluative connotations in semantic 
memory and allows for both S–R-based and S–S-based evaluative priming. 
1.3 The three-process model: A mutual facilitation account on 
evaluative priming 
The objective of this Section is to characterize the three-process model of 
evaluative priming and to discuss its suitability to account for the inconsistent 
findings in prior S–S-based evaluative priming studies. I will first characterize the 
theoretical conception and the main claims of the three-process model. Thereafter, 
I will post-hoc interpret previously reported effects in prominent S–S-based 
evaluative priming studies with the naming and the semantic categorization task, 
applying the logic of the three-process model. Based on the theoretical conception 
of the three-process model and the findings in prior studies, I will derive the 
hypotheses for my experiments on S–S-based evaluative priming. 
1.3.1 Theoretical conception 
Until now, I had considered both variants of the evaluative priming 
paradigm, (i.e., the S–R-based and the S–S-based variant) to be separate entities. I 
decided to use for this a detached description of the evaluative priming variants in 
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order to elucidate the largely different cognitive processes that are involved in S–
R-based and S–S-based evaluative priming tasks. While response processes 
sufficiently explain S–R-based evaluative priming effects (see Klauer et al., 1997; 
Wentura, 1999), S–S-based effects require an interaction of the evaluative features 
of prime and target at the level of their semantic meanings, since response-
compatibility and evaluative congruency are not correlated in an S–S-based 
design. To allow for positive S–S-based evaluative priming effects, this 
interaction should affect target processing in the way that an evaluatively 
congruent, as opposed to an incongruent prime, facilitates target encoding. As 
described above, the distributed memory model (Masson, 1991, 1995) provides an 
elegant mechanism for facilitated target encoding in case of evaluative 
congruency. Even though the encoding facilitation interpretation may also account 
for S–R-based evaluative priming effects, the response-based explanation is 
theoretically more plausible and more parsimonious (see Frings & Wentura, 2008; 
Klauer et al., 1997; Musch, 2000; Musch & Klauer, 2001; Wentura, 1999). At 
first glance, these different interpretations of evaluative priming effects—the 
response-based explanation for S–R-based and the encoding-facilitation 
explanation for S–S-based priming effects—do not necessarily pose a problem, 
since the different variants of evaluative priming suggest different cognitive 
processes being involved. With regard to the activation of the evaluative features 
of prime and target concepts, however, there is an important discrepancy between 
both interpretations. This being that the explanation of S–R-based evaluative 
priming effects assumes that prime and target compete for response 
determination. While in compatible trials, the prime activates the same response 
category as the target, in incompatible trials, the prime activates the opposite 
response category compared with the target. For this, prime and target 
representations, in particular their response-relevant features, must be activated in 
parallel. By contrast, the explanation of S–S-based evaluative priming effects, 
applying the logic of the parallel distributed models, suggests that the prime 
representation transitions into the target representation and that the formation of 
the target representation is facilitated if a part of this representation is already in a 
pre-activated state. As in the case of evaluative congruency as opposed to 
incongruency, prime and target representations overlap in the evaluative part of 
their representational patterns, target encoding is facilitated. A hidden and crucial 
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consequence of this explanation implicates that all features of the prime that are 
not shared by the target (and which in principle interfere with the target response 
selection) are no longer active. Thus, while the interpretation of S–R-based 
evaluative priming requires the parallel activation of both prime and target 
representations, the S–S-based evaluative priming allows for parallel activation 
restricted to the shared parts of prime and target. 
Given that all parameters of the experimental setting (e.g., the sequential 
presentation of prime and target, the SOA), except the task-relevance of the 
evaluative categories, are comparable in S–R-based and S–S-based evaluative 
priming tasks, this seems to be an unacceptable discrepancy. I aim to resolve this 
discrepancy by proposing a general model of evaluative priming that accounts for 
evaluative priming effects in different variants of the paradigm. Such a model 
should have implemented mechanisms for all cognitive processes that are 
potentially relevant in evaluative priming tasks. 
Thinking back to the explanation of S–S-based evaluative priming 
effects―as suggested by the semantic network or the parallel distributed 
models―target encoding is assumed to be facilitated by an evaluatively congruent 
prime. This interpretation implicitly presupposes that the prime precedes the 
target and that it is, consequently, able to support the target encoding in case of 
evaluative congruency. Why should, however, the facilitative effect of evaluative 
congruency between prime and target be restricted to one direction? In other 
words, why should only the target processing, but not the prime processing, 
benefit from evaluative congruency? This idea was first considered by Wentura 
and Rothermund (2003): They claimed that if an evaluatively congruent prime 
may facilitate target encoding, the target may help maintain the activation of an 
evaluatively congruent prime as well. That is, evaluative congruency between 
prime and target may have a facilitative effect in both directions, namely, from the 
prime activation to target encoding and from the target activation to prime 
maintenance. According to this consideration, in the model of evaluative 
priming―I will characterize here―mutual facilitation of evaluatively congruent 
representations constitutes a crucial process. 
Looking back to the S–R-based variant of the evaluative priming paradigm 
and to the response-based explanation of S–R-based evaluative priming effects, it 
becomes evident that processes, other than mutual facilitation of evaluatively 
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congruent concepts, have to be involved in a model of evaluative priming as well. 
Initially, prime and target representations have to be activated in parallel. As a 
consequence, prime and target should compete for response execution. This 
response-based interaction of prime and target may yield largely different 
consequences, depending on the specific response association of prime and target: 
If both prime and target are associated with an unambiguous response, the 
responses may be either compatible or incompatible. Thus, the prime either 
facilitates the target response or conflicts with it. This is prototypically the case in 
any S–R-based priming paradigm. A third conceivable scenario arises if the prime 
is not associated with any task-relevant response; in this case, there is neither 
response facilitation nor response conflict. This is usually a tacit assumption in the 
S–S-based priming variant with the naming task and prime pictures that require no 
naming response (e.g., Spruyt et al., 2002; Spruyt, Hermans et al., 2007). This 
tacit assumption can, however, be challenged (e.g., Wentura & Frings, 2008). 
Thus―in order to account for S–R-based evaluative priming―a theoretical model 
should allow for parallel activation as well as response-associated processes 
between prime and target representations. 
All things considered, a model of evaluative priming that aims to account 
for evaluative priming effects in an S–R-based as well as in an S–S-based design 
should provide mechanisms that enable the three following processes: a mutual 
facilitation between evaluatively congruent prime and target representations (a 
precondition for S–S-based evaluative priming), a parallel activation of prime and 
target representations (a precondition for S–R-based evaluative priming), and an 
interaction of prime and target responses (a precondition for S–R-based evaluative 
priming). Therefore, this model is labeled the three-process model of evaluative 
priming, whereas the three processes are regarded as interactive processes in such 
a way that an increase or decrease of one of the three processes may affect the 
magnitude of the remaining processes. 
In this context, I do not want to ignore the fact that De Houwer and 
colleagues (2002) also considered possible loci of evaluative priming effects. 
They distinguished three levels of cognitive processes being potentially 
responsible for evaluative priming effects. At a subordinate level, an evaluatively 
congruent prime may facilitate the target identification by a pre-activation of all 
semantic representations corresponding to the target. This kind of process is 
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implemented in the mechanism of spreading activation, as it is suggested by 
semantic network models (see Bower, 1991; Collins & Loftus, 1975), or in the 
mechanism of facilitated transition from the prime to the target representation due 
to shared activation units, as it is suggested by the distributed memory model 
(Masson, 1995). At a superordinate level, an evaluatively congruent prime is 
assumed to pre-activate the evaluative features associated with the target, as 
opposed to the whole target concept. At response level, an evaluatively congruent 
prime may pre-activate the target response. Analogous to the distinct 
interpretations of S–R-based and S–S-based evaluative priming―as described 
above―processes at the subordinate level can account for S–S-based and S–R-
based evaluative priming effects, while processes at both higher levels are 
applicable to S–R-based evaluative priming only. 
Referring back to the considerations concerning the three-process model, I 
would like to emphasize that the specific impact of each individual process in a 
given evaluative priming task is a matter of empirical research. While 
differentially increasing and weakening the magnitude of the three processes, their 
influences may be manipulated. Before I report my experiments in Section 2, with 
which I simply aimed to test the existence and the impact of the three processes, I 
will apply the three-process model to previously reported, prominent findings 
from the evaluative priming literature. As mentioned above, the empirical 
evidence of S–S-based evaluative priming effects is largely inconsistent, since 
positive, null, and even negatively signed effects have been reported. Taking into 
account that the three suggested processes interact in any evaluative priming task 
and that the impact of every single process depends on the experimental 
conditions, differently signed evaluative priming effects may be explained with 
and predicted by the three-process model. 
Regarding the first assumed process of mutual facilitation given evaluative 
congruency, for example, it is highly relevant whether the first component of 
facilitated target encoding or the second component of maintained prime 
activation is the more influential one. The net effect of the first component is a 
positive evaluative priming effect, as facilitated target encoding may lead to a 
faster target processing and response; in contrast, the net effect of the second 
component is not as unambiguous, rather depends on the response association of 
prime and target: If prime and target are response-compatible, maintained prime 
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activation may not hamper the target response, whereas maintained prime 
activation given response-incompatibility may yield a negatively signed priming 
effect due to a prolonged response conflict. Roughly speaking, if the experimental 
setting mainly supports target-encoding facilitation (e.g., by the use of a positive 
SOA), a positive evaluative priming effect can be expected, while a rather 
negatively signed evaluative priming effect can be expected given an 
experimental setting that mainly supports prime-activation maintenance (e.g., by 
the use of a negative SOA). 
The specific manifestation of the second process, that is, parallel activation 
of prime and target representations, should also have a direct influence on the 
resulting priming effect. Evidently, the interaction of simultaneously activated 
prime and target may be pronounced to a larger extent in comparison with the 
interaction of prime and target that are not activated at the same time. I claim that 
this process can actively be manipulated by the experimental setting (e.g., the 
requirement to attend to the primes should increase the prime activation; see 
Spruyt, De Houwer et al. 2007). 
Similarly, the third response-associated process is expected to affect the 
resultant priming effect. While a response-compatible prime facilitates the target 
response and a response-incompatible one interferes with it, a prime that is not 
associated with any task-relevant response, should not influence the target 
response. The simplest form of manipulation within this process illustrates the 
selection of appropriate stimuli for primes and targets. 
1.3.2 Application to prior S–S-based evaluative priming results 
The three-process model may be suited to post-hoc account for the 
inconsistent pattern of positive, null, and negatively signed effects in prior S–S-
based evaluative priming studies. This does not imply that I am the first person 
who shed light on the puzzling empirical evidence of S–S-based evaluative 
priming. Of course, several authors have already considered the puzzling 
empirical findings and provided conclusive interpretations for some critical 
aspects of the mixed empirical evidence (see, e.g., De Houwer et al., 2002; Spruyt 
et al., 2009, 2012; Everaert et al., 2011; Wentura & Frings, 2008). I will discuss 
S–S-based evaluative priming effects of naming as well as semantic 
categorization responses in line with the three-process model, while these 
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explanations are not necessarily in conflict with the interpretations mentioned in 
prior publications. 
S–S-based evaluative priming in the naming task 
Positive effects and failures to replicate. Applying the naming task, 
Bargh and colleagues (1996) as well as Hermans and colleagues (1994) reported 
positive S–S-based evaluative priming effects with verbal stimuli. These positive 
findings, however, repeatedly failed to be replicated (see, e.g., Klauer & Musch, 
2001; Spruyt, Hermans, Pandelaere et al., 2004). Given the rationale of the three-
process model, the following processes are expected to be involved in the naming 
task with evaluatively connoted words as prime and target stimuli: mutual 
facilitation of evaluatively congruent prime and target (i.e., facilitated target 
encoding and maintained prime activation), parallel activation of both concepts, as 
well as response conflicts between the unique naming responses associated with 
prime and target words. While facilitated target encoding should yield a positive 
evaluative priming effect, maintained prime activation should prolong the 
response conflict between prime and target responses, thereby diminishing any 
positive priming effect. Therefore, in the experiments yielding positive effects 
(i.e., Bargh et al., 1996; Hermans et al. 1994) prime maintenance and response 
conflict must have been minimized, so that the positive effect of facilitated target 
encoding, in case of evaluative congruency, could fully unfold. In contrast, in the 
experiments with null effects (e.g., Klauer & Musch, 2001; Spruyt, Hermans, 
Pandelaere et al., 2004), prime maintenance and response conflict must have been 
more influential, so that these processes weakened the positive effect of facilitated 
target encoding given evaluative congruency. In this regard, it is important to 
remark that Bargh and colleagues found positive evaluative priming effects with 
English words, whereas Klauer and Musch (who used exactly the same procedure) 
failed to replicate these positive findings with German words. Linguistic 
differences between both languages may be responsible for the conflicting 
findings, since the English and the German language differ in their orthographical 
depth, that is, in the extent to which the orthography and the phonology of a word 
match. While German is an orthographically shallow language (i.e., specific 
phonemes correspond to specific graphemes in a direct and unambiguous 
manner), English is an orthographically deep language with a more opaque 
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correspondence between phonemes and graphemes (see Frost, Katz, & Bentin, 
1987). This might be associated with an immediate translation from the 
graphology to the phonology for German but not for English words. With regard 
to the processes in the evaluative priming paradigm with the naming task, one 
may consequentially predict that a prime might evoke a naming response more 
directly in German as compared with English that, hence, competes with the target 
response. According to the three-process model, this competition is primarily 
expected in the evaluatively congruent condition (due to increased prime 
maintenance), where it cancels out benefits of facilitated target encoding. Thus, 
null effects in the evaluative priming paradigm with the naming task might reflect 
an interaction of maintained prime activation and increased response conflict in 
case of evaluative congruency; in contrast, positive effects might arise as a 
consequence of facilitated target encoding given evaluative congruency without 
enhanced response conflict, since the prime does not immediately prepare a 
naming response. 
I should like to point out that the language issue has already been raised in 
prior studies (see Klauer & Musch, 2001; Spruyt, Hermans, Pandelaere et al., 
2004). These authors aimed to test the idea that S–S-based evaluative priming 
effects might have been found using English words (but not using German 
words), since the naming of English words requires a deep (i.e., semantic) 
processing, while German words can be named via the direct orthography-to-
phonology route. That means that a minimum amount of orthographical depth 
might be necessary for evaluative priming effects to occur; since, otherwise, a 
direct translation from the graphemes to the phonemes might allow for target 
naming without semantic and evaluative processing. Thus, so the authors argued, 
a process of encoding facilitation, which is located at the semantic level, might 
arise in English alone. In order to test this idea, Klauer and Musch conducted a 
study with English-German bilinguals, but they found evaluative priming effects 
for neither the English nor the German version of the task. Similarly, Spruyt, 
Hermans, Pandelaere, and colleagues reported a null effect in a nearly exact 
replication of the study by Bargh and colleagues (1996). In contrast, Hermans and 
colleagues (1994) found a positive evaluative priming effect in a Dutch version of 
the naming task, even though Dutch is a language with a shallow orthography (see 
Frost et al., 1987). In sum, these findings do not corroborate the interpretation that 
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S–S-based evaluative priming effects arise in English alone since words from 
orthographically shallow languages are not semantically processed. 
However, the findings in these studies apparently also speak against the 
post hoc explanation given by the three-process model. In line with this model, I 
postulate mutual facilitation of evaluatively congruent concepts that should arise 
independent from the orthographical depth of the language. The reason why 
mutual facilitation was observed in English only (by Bargh et al., 1996) lies in the 
less intense response conflict in the English version compared with the German 
version of the task. Since bilinguals might generally transfer habits from one 
language to the other, for my post hoc explanation of the null findings by Klauer 
and Musch (2001) it suffices to assume that the English-German bilinguals 
transferred the German habit to the reading of English words (see, Tzelgov, 
Henik, Sneg, & Baruch, 1996, for evidence concerning English-Hebrew 
bilinguals). This might well be the case for some participants who did not acquire 
English as their first language. That is, the bilinguals in Klauer and Musch’s study 
might have had a general tendency to directly transfer the graphemes to 
phonemes. Thereby, the prime, just like the target word, immediately evoked a 
naming response, resulting in a distinctive response competition. 
Comparing the studies by Bargh and colleagues (1996) and by Spruyt, 
Hermans, Pandelaere, and colleagues (2004), there were slight procedural changes 
that may have been responsible for the different findings. While Bargh and 
colleagues did not mention the irrelevance of the prime words, Spruyt, Hermans, 
Pandelaere, and colleagues explicitly instructed their participants to ignore the 
prime words. This may have reduced the attention to the primes and weakened the 
facilitative effect of evaluative congruency on target encoding. Furthermore, the 
participants in the study by Spruyt, Hermans, Pandelaere and colleagues were 
American English native speakers who studied in Belgium, whereby they differed 
from the participants in the study by Bargh and colleagues who were American 
English native speakers studying at an American university. Some participants in 
the former study have possibly acquired Dutch what might have changed their 
cognitive processes during reading and pronouncing even English words. 
Applying the interpretation provided by the three-process model, a single finding 
still remains difficult to explain: Hermans and colleagues (1994) reported a 
positive evaluative priming effect in a Dutch version of the naming task. In this 
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study, the facilitative effect of evaluative congruency on target encoding 
outweighed naming conflicts between prime and target, even though shallow 
language stimulus material was used. 
Conditional effects. Further studies were conducted in order to test the 
conditionality of S–S-based evaluative priming effects in the naming task. For 
example, Spruyt and colleagues (Spruyt & Hermans, 2008; Spruyt et al., 2002; 
Spruyt, Hermans et al., 2007; Spruyt, Hermans, Pandelaere et al., 2004) observed 
reliable positive evaluative priming effects with prime pictures but not with prime 
words. The authors explained the conditional evaluative priming effects by 
referring to the idea that picture naming requires semantic processing, while for 
word naming a pure lexical processing without any involvement of the semantic 
system is sufficient (see also Glaser, 1992; Glaser & Glaser, 1989). Assuming that 
the evaluative features of semantic concepts are stored in the semantic system 
(see, e.g., Bower, 1991; De Houwer & Hermans, 1994; De Houwer, & Randell, 
2004; Spruyt, Hermans, Pandelaere et al., 2004), evaluative priming effects may 
consequently be predicted using prime pictures but not using prime words. With 
regard to the three-process model, I alternatively argue that both prime pictures 
and prime words are semantically processed and activate their corresponding 
evaluative connotations (thereby facilitating the encoding of evaluatively 
congruent targets). Prime pictures, however, are not as strongly associated with a 
naming response as words are. Thus, since prime pictures do not evoke conflicting 
naming responses, target-encoding facilitation given evaluative congruency may 
lead to a positive net effect. In this regard, the finding by Wentura & Frings 
(2008) provides conclusive evidence. I would like to discuss this study in more 
detail at the end of this Section. 
There happens to be another instance of conditional evaluative priming 
effects in the naming task which was reported by De Houwer, Hermans, and 
Spruyt (2001). They observed a positive evaluative priming effect with degraded 
target presentation but not with undegraded targets. Taking the idea of a 
conditional involvement of semantic processing into account, the authors claimed 
that the phonological pattern of undegraded words can be easily derived from the 
corresponding orthographical pattern, while the distorted orthographical 
information of degraded words requires additional semantic processing in order to 
establish the phonological pattern. Here, again, the three-process model provides 
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an alternative interpretation: since the perception of a degraded target is 
hampered, the identification of a degraded target needs the facilitation by an 
evaluatively congruent prime to a larger extent than an undegraded target. This 
advantage for evaluatively congruent targets might outweigh potential naming 
response conflicts (see also Wentura & Rothermund, 2003). 
Salience effects. In recent years, several authors examined how far a 
certain degree of salience of the evaluative features is crucial for the occurrence of 
evaluative priming effects in the naming task (see Everaert et al., 2011; Spruyt et 
al., 2009, 2012). Everaert and colleagues, for example, aimed to manipulate the 
salience of the evaluative categories in a between-subjects design, varying the 
proportion of trials with evaluatively connoted and neutral stimuli: either in 100 % 
of the trials (high valence proportion group), evaluatively connoted prime pictures 
and target words were presented or only 25 % of the trials consisted of 
evaluatively connoted stimuli, while in the remaining 75 % of the trials neutral 
stimuli were used (low valence proportion group). RT analyses of the 25 % of 
trials with evaluatively connoted stimuli that were identical in both groups yielded 
a significantly positive S–S-based evaluative priming effect in the high valence 
proportion group, while the effect decreased to zero in the low valence proportion 
group. That is, if the salience of the evaluative dimension was attenuated by the 
frequent use of neutral stimuli, the positive S–S-based evaluative priming effect 
that was repeatedly found using prime pictures (see Spruyt & Hermans, 2008; 
Spruyt et al., 2002; Spruyt, Hermans et al., 2007; Spruyt, Hermans, Pandelaere et 
al., 2004) disappeared. Thus, evaluative processing of valenced concepts and 
mutual facilitation of evaluatively congruent concepts may demand a certain 
amount of salience of the evaluative features. The three-process model does not 
provide a plausible explanation for this finding. 
The objective of the study by Spruyt and colleagues (2009) was to 
manipulate the attention allocation to the evaluative categories and to provide 
corroborative evidence for the context-dependency of S–S based evaluative 
priming effects. Therefore, they mixed evaluative categorization and naming 
trials: either an evaluative categorization response was required in 75 % of trials 
(and a naming response in 25 % of trials) or a naming response was required in 75 
% of trials (and an evaluative categorization response in 25 % of trials). If in most 
trials the target word called for evaluative categorization (i.e., 75 % categorization 
34 
group), a positive evaluative priming effect emerged even still in the remaining 
naming trials. In contrast, if in most trials the target word called for naming (i.e., 
25 % categorization group), no evaluative priming effect emerged in the naming 
trials. It is important to note that the cue indicating the required response in a trial-
by-trial manner was presented simultaneously with target onset, that is, after the 
presentation of the prime word. Due to this temporal sequence, the more likely 
response (i.e., an evaluative categorization response in the 75 % categorization 
group and a naming response in the 25 % categorization group) was supposedly 
pre-activated before target onset. Empirical corroboration for this idea was 
reflected in significantly slower naming responses in the 75 % compared with the 
25 % categorization group. At this point, it becomes evident that the three-process 
model is well suited to post hoc account for the conditional S–S-based evaluative 
priming effect. In the 75 % categorization group, the preparation of a naming 
response by the prime word should have been attenuated, since evaluative 
categorization was the more probable response. Thereby, the facilitative effect of 
evaluative congruency on target encoding outweighed any naming response 
conflict, thus, resulting in a positive evaluative priming effect even in the naming 
trials. If, however, most trials required a naming response (i.e., 25 % 
categorization condition), the prime word should have evoked its corresponding 
naming response that was in conflict with the naming response corresponding to 
the target. Thus, mutual facilitation and enhanced naming conflict between 
evaluatively congruent prime and target canceled each other out and yielded a null 
effect. 
Negatively signed effects. There is one puzzling finding in the literature 
that was not yet convincingly solved but can be well explained by the three-
process model. Glaser and Banaji (1999) reported robust and replicable negatively 
signed evaluative priming effects in the naming task with verbal stimuli. The 
authors (see also Glaser, 2003) considered that extremely valenced primes may 
nonconsciously elicit an attempt to correct for the prime influence. Since such a 
correction may lead to an overcompensation of the prime impact, negatively 
signed evaluative priming effects may emerge for extremely valenced primes. It 
remains, however, unclear which mechanisms are responsible for automatic 
correction and overcompensation processes in a sequential evaluative priming 
task, even if several authors proposed different interpretations. 
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Fazio (2001) assumed that the extent of automatic correction processes 
may depend on the experimental instructions concerning the attention to the 
primes. According to this notion, the more participants see a reason to attend to 
the primes (e.g., memorizing the primes for a memory task after the priming task), 
the less automatic correction may occur, thus, resulting in positive evaluative 
priming effects. In contrast, the more participants try to ignore the primes and to 
overcome any prime influence, the more automatic correction may occur, 
resulting in negatively signed effects. This consideration is not corroborated by 
most evaluative priming findings, since in the majority of studies participants are 
not instructed to actively attend to the primes (exceptions are Fazio et al., 1986; 
Spruyt, De Houwer et al., 2007), but―nevertheless―negatively signed evaluative 
priming effects represent by far the minority of effects (see Klauer & Musch, 
2003, for a review). 
An alternative specification of a corrective mechanism with the objective 
to minimize the prime influence on target responding was considered by Klauer, 
Teige-Mocigemba, and Spruyt (2009; I will characterize the respective account in 
Section 5.2). To put it simply―accounting for S–R-based priming effects―they 
suggested two activation counters, that is, one counter for each possible response 
(e.g., the response counters positive and negative in the evaluation task), and 
assumed that the activation increase within a counter can be regarded either from 
prime onset or just from target onset onwards. Thereby, the activation being 
contributed to by the prime can be rather in- or excluded from target processing, 
leading to positively or negatively signed S–R-based evaluative priming effects, 
respectively. Such a mechanism may not easily be applied to evaluative priming 
in the naming task, since this would require an activation counter for each single 
target or its corresponding naming response, respectively. 
Chan, Ybarra, and Schwarz (2006) also proposed an explanation for Glaser 
and Banaji’s (1999) findings of negatively signed S–S-based evaluative priming 
effects. They claimed a change-in-affect mechanism that means―basically―that 
the identification of the valence corresponding to the target may be facilitated in 
case of evaluatively incongruent prime and target, since the evaluative input 
changes from prime to target which is, itself, informative. Chan and colleagues 
reported corroborative evidence for this mechanism by the findings of a 
negatively signed evaluative priming effect for highly frequent targets and a 
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positive effect for low frequent targets. Since highly frequent targets are assumed 
to be highly accessible, these targets elicited―according to the authors―a rapid 
evaluative response, so that in case of evaluative incongruency there was a fast 
change in the evaluative dimension from prime to target. In contrast, congruent 
targets did not yield a change in the evaluative dimension, wherefore an additional 
separation of the information corresponding to prime and target was necessary. 
Since low frequent (and, thereby, low accessible) targets did not elicit a rapid 
evaluative response, evaluatively congruent primes facilitated the target response 
to a larger extent than incongruent primes, resulting in a positive evaluative 
priming effect for low frequent targets. 
While Chan and colleagues (2006) examined evaluative priming in an S–
R-based design, they also aimed to apply the change-in-affect mechanism to 
Glaser and Banaji’s (1999) findings in the naming task. For this, they referred to 
the consideration by Wentura and Rothermund (2003) that target naming requires 
an unambiguous separation of prime and target information, which could reason 
that evaluative incongruency might help successfully distinguish the source of 
prime and target. Chan and colleagues reasoned that extreme primes may trigger 
an accuracy motive that may, in turn, increase the attention to the target and lead 
to a more pronounced change in the evaluative dimension given evaluative 
incongruency. Furthermore, extreme primes may―as compared to weakly 
valenced ones―directly elicit larger changes in the evaluative dimension given 
evaluative incongruency. Interpreting the findings of Glaser and Banaji according 
to the change-in-affect mechanism, as proposed by Chan and colleagues, would 
suggest (at least tendentially) more accurate target responses with extremely 
compared with weakly valenced primes, since extreme primes should support an 
accuracy motive. As Glaser and Banaji did not report mean accuracies, the 
explanation proposed by Chan and colleagues remains speculative and is a matter 
of future research. 
A further suggested interpretation of the findings by Glaser and Banaji 
(1999) illustrates the activation-dependent inhibition model by Maier, Berner, and 
Pekrun (2003; see also Berner & Maier, 2004). The authors replicated the results 
of Glaser and Banaji, but only in subgroups of highly anxious participants, and 
introduced the activation-dependent inhibition model in order to account for these 
effects. The main assumption of the model is that the activation spreading from 
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the prime to evaluatively congruent memory representations turns into inhibition 
if a certain threshold level of activation is exceeded. Since extremely valenced 
primes may engender more activation in comparison with moderate primes, the 
specific activation threshold may more easily exceeded by extremely valenced 
than moderate primes. Furthermore, highly anxious individuals may be more 
strongly activated by evaluatively connoted stimuli or they may even possess 
higher base activation levels of the evaluative features compared with individuals 
low in trait anxiety. Berner and Maier considered that such an activation-
dependent inhibition might specify the automatic over-correction mechanism, as it 
was suggested by Glaser and Banaji. Alternatively, they argued that an application 
of the interpretation by Glaser and Banaji to their own results would mean that 
highly anxious individuals have a higher engagement to automatically over-
correct the impact of extremely valenced primes in comparison with individuals 
with low trait anxiety. One result, however, that strongly speaks against the 
activation-dependent inhibition explanation was reported by Maier and colleagues 
(Exp. 2) who observed a negatively signed effect only for moderate primes in a 
subgroup of moderately anxious participants, thereby not replicating their own 
result. 
In summation, all explanations of the highly meaningful finding by Glaser 
and Banaji (1999) discussed so far are somehow problematic: they lack a concrete 
specification of the explanatory mechanism or are not compatible with the naming 
task or they are insufficiently corroborated by empirical results. As mentioned 
earlier, the three-process model provides a conclusive explanation of Glaser and 
Banaji’s negatively signed S–S-based evaluative priming effects for extremely 
valenced primes in the naming task. Please note that in the three-process model, 
negatively signed effects are expected if prime maintenance by an evaluatively 
congruent target, as well as response competition between primes and targets can 
plausibly be assumed. This raises the question of whether Glaser and Banaji 
applied experimental manipulations that maximized these processes in 
comparison with the process of target-encoding facilitation. One important 
manipulation was the selection of primes and targets from the same set of words, 
while prime and target were, of course, never the same word on a given trial. 
Since words were repeated throughout the trial sequence, primes had already been 
named (as targets) in preceding trials for large parts of the experiment. This aspect 
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may likely have enhanced the preparation of the naming response corresponding 
to the prime and, thereby, the response competition between prime and target. 
Such a response interference is―according to the three-process model―expected 
to be particularly pronounced for evaluatively congruent prime-target pairs, since 
the activation of an evaluatively congruent prime is maintained by the target. 
Consequentially, a negatively signed evaluative priming effect was found. 
Interestingly, when Glaser (2003) used the same procedure and stimuli as Bargh 
and colleagues (1996), that is, weakly and strongly valenced primes and targets 
from different word lists, he failed to replicate the negatively signed evaluative 
priming effect for strongly valenced primes. In fact, he replicated Bargh and 
colleagues’ finding of positive evaluative priming effects for both weak and 
strong primes. Thus―in correspondence with the three-process 
model―negatively signed evaluative priming effects of naming responses arise if 
the experimental setting supports a pronounced response competition between 
prime and target. 
S–S-based evaluative priming in the semantic categorization task 
Evaluative priming in the semantic categorization task was examined in 
only a few studies, in which either null effects (De Houwer et al., 2002; Klinger et 
al., 2000, Exp. 4) or conditional positive effects (Spruyt, De Houwer et al., 2007) 
were reported. Interpreting the null findings by Klinger and colleagues, it is 
important to note that they selected primes and targets from the same set of words. 
They varied the categories valence and animacy (i.e., animate vs. inanimate) 
orthogonally across primes and targets and manipulated the task-relevance of both 
dimensions as between-subjects factor. For both manifestations of the factor task-
relevance, they reported positive S–R-based priming effects (i.e., evaluative or 
animacy priming) but they failed to find any S–S-based evaluative priming effect 
(i.e., if animacy was task-relevant). This null effect may be a genuine null effect 
for the reason that, among others, the masked priming procedure might be 
responsible. However, as the authors did not report the S–S-based evaluative 
priming effect separately for the response-compatible and incompatible conditions 
(but only an overall evaluative priming effect), a positive effect may have in fact 
been emerged in case of response-compatibility and a null effect in case of 
incompatibility. Such a pattern of S–S-based evaluative priming effects would at 
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least suit very well with the idea of interactive processes, as suggested in the 
three-process model. I will explain this consideration in more detail: In line with 
the three-process model, mutual facilitation is assumed for evaluatively congruent 
prime and target, that is, facilitated target encoding and maintained prime 
activation. Since for response-incompatible prime and target the latter component 
results in a strong categorization (i.e., animacy categorization in the study by 
Klinger et al.) conflict, the facilitative effect of evaluative congruency may be 
canceled out by the pronounced categorization conflict. This should, 
consequentially, yield a null S–S-based evaluative priming effect. Since―in 
contrast―response-compatible prime and target are not in categorization conflict, 
the facilitation due to evaluative congruency should lead to a positive S–S-based 
evaluative priming effect given response-compatibility. 
Unlike Klinger and colleagues (2000), De Houwer and colleagues (2002) 
as well as Spruyt, De Houwer, and colleagues (2007) used primes that did not 
belong to the same semantic categories as the targets did; that is, the primes were 
neutral with regard to the response categories. Therefore, maintained prime 
activation by an evaluatively congruent target (as suggested in the three-process 
model) should be of no consequence for the interpretation of the results in these 
studies. Spruyt, De Houwer, and colleagues reported positive evaluative priming 
effects only if the valence dimension was attended to, whereby they elucidated the 
null finding by De Houwer and colleagues. The question remains as to why De 
Houwer and colleagues failed to find any S–S-based evaluative priming effect. 
One reason might be that attentional processing in the semantic categorization 
task is highly constrained to the task-relevant, semantic categories, with the result 
that concepts which do not belong to any of the task-relevant categories are not 
processed to a sufficiently deep degree. Consequentially, in the study by De 
Houwer and colleagues, the evaluatively connoted verbs (used as primes in Exp. 
1) or the abstract nouns (used as primes in Exp. 2) might have been incompletely 
processed, wherefore no S–S-based evaluative priming effect emerged. 
To which extent do the postulated processes of mutual facilitation, parallel 
activation, and response facilitation/competition interact in a specific evaluative 
priming task can be examined by differentially increasing and weakening their 
impact in order to disentangle them. In this sense, Wentura and Frings (2008) 
explored the influence of the response process on S–S-based evaluative priming, 
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inventing an S–S-based evaluative priming design with a manipulation of the 
response relationship between prime and target. In a naming task with target and 
prime pictures, half of the prime pictures were associated with a clear naming 
response (as were all target pictures), whereas the other half were not, thereby 
varying the primes’ response binding. Only the primes without response binding 
yielded a significant S–S-based evaluative priming effect, whereas for response-
bound primes no priming effect emerged. In order to interpret the interaction of 
prime response binding and evaluative congruency, the authors suggested that 
with nonresponse-bound primes, an evaluative priming effect was based purely on 
target-encoding facilitation by evaluatively congruent primes because maintained 
prime activation (by a congruent target) had no consequence for the target 
response. With response-bound primes, however, maintained prime activation led 
to a prolonged response conflict between prime and target naming. Thus, in case 
of evaluative congruency, two processes―namely, target-encoding facilitation 
and increased response conflict due to maintained prime activation―canceled 
each other out. There is, however, a more simple explanation for the null effect 
with response-bound primes: It might be that the naming conflict between 
response-bound prime and target—irrespective of evaluative congruency or 
incongruency—minimizes any advantage of target-encoding facilitation; hence, 
any positive S–S-based evaluative priming effect might be masked. 
In order to decide for one of both conflicting interpretations of the finding 
by Wentura and Frings (2008), they should be tested against each other. In order 
to achieve this, it is necessary to more thoroughly examine the process of mutual 
facilitation due to evaluative congruency, that is, the facilitative impact of 
evaluative congruency on target encoding on the one hand and prime maintenance 
with the potential of a subsequent response conflict on the other. For that purpose, 
I utilized a negative-SOA version of the evaluative priming task (i.e., prime onset 
is after target onset). This stimulus sequence implicates that an evaluatively 
congruent prime only minimally supports target encoding (as its appearance is 
after target onset), whereas the target maximally maintains the activation of an 
evaluatively congruent prime. Since the former facilitation is associated with a 
positive evaluative priming effect, but the latter leads to a negatively signed effect 
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due to prolonged response competition, overall I expected a negatively signed 
evaluative priming effect.2 
To sum up the characterization of the three-process model, I would like to 
point out that the three-process model aims to account for evaluative priming 
effects in different variants of the evaluative priming paradigm, assuming 
interactive processes between prime and target concepts at stimulus encoding, 
stimulus activation, as well as response level. Applying the three-process model to 
previously reported S–S-based evaluative priming effects indicated that the model 
suits well for the explanation of several findings in S–S-based evaluative priming 
studies. However, since post-hoc interpretations do not provide a comparable 
argumentation in favor of the three-process model, as correct predictions would 
do, I tested several hypotheses derived from the three-process model in different 
experiments. Beyond examining the main theoretical claims of the three-process 
model, I also aimed to elucidate the reasons for the puzzling findings in prior S–S-
based evaluative priming studies and to figure out the constraints for a model of 
the memory representations of valence. 
 
Overview of Experiments 
I conducted five studies with the aim to test the three-process model of 
evaluative priming. For this, I applied slightly different variants of the evaluative 
priming paradigm. One of the main postulates of the model is that facilitation by 
evaluative congruency can have an effect on target encoding as well as on prime 
activation, while experimental parameters are assumed to influence the relative 
magnitude of the facilitative components. As in a standard priming procedure with 
a positive SOA, the component of facilitated target encoding is typically favored 
and the more dominant one, I aimed to differentially manipulate the relative size 
of both components and enhance the component of maintained prime activation. 
Therefore, I mainly used a negative SOA-procedure in order to increase the 
facilitation on prime activation, and―simultaneously―to decrease the effect on 
                                                 
2
 As mentioned in Section 1.1, only few studies examined evaluative 
priming with a negative SOA-procedure (Fockenberg et al., 2006; Hermans et al., 
2001; Klauer et al., 1997). Since all these studies applied an S–R-based design 
that suggests the response-based explanation of evaluative priming effects (see 
Klauer et al., 1997; Wentura, 1999), these studies are not informative with regard 
to the assumption of mutual facilitation due to evaluative congruency. 
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target encoding. In one experiment (Experiment 4), I additionally applied a 
positive SOA-procedure and, thereby, varied the relative magnitude of the 
facilitative components in the same experiment. 
In order to test another important postulate of the three-process model 
which concerns the response processes in evaluative priming tasks, I varied the 
response relation between prime and target within and across the experiments. For 
this, in Experiment 1, I used the naming task (requiring the target to be named) 
with target and prime pictures. The response relation between prime and target 
was manipulated by associating all target and half of the prime pictures with a 
verbal label. Thus, in one half of the trials, prime and target elicited competitive 
naming responses, while in the other half of the trials, the primes were not 
associated with any verbal label, thereby not eliciting a competing naming 
response. In Experiments 2a/b, 3, and 4, I applied the semantic categorization task 
(requiring the target to be categorized as person or animal) in which the task-
relevant, semantic categories were varied orthogonally to the evaluative 
categories. 
Beside the use of different tasks, I varied the modality of the stimulus 
material across the experiments, employing pictures in Experiments 1, 2a, 4, and 
5a, and words in Experiments 2b, 3, and 5b. In Experiment 3, I additionally 
analyzed the brain-electrical activity in order to get a temporally more exact 
measurement of the cognitive processes which are involved in S–S-based 
evaluative priming tasks. In a replication of Experiment 2a/b (Experiment 5a/b), I 
searched for evidence of valence-specificity of the findings in the previous 
experiments. Therefore, I applied the evaluative instead of the semantic 
categorization task (thereby changing the task-relevant categories) and tested the 
influence of task-irrelevant, semantic congruency on evaluative categorization 
processes.  
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2 When the target helps and the prime distracts 
The three-process model postulates an interaction of processes at 
encoding, activation, and response level during any evaluative priming task, 
whose influences may―depending on the particular experimental setting―be 
differently large. As first suggested by Wentura and Rothermund (2003), mutual 
facilitation of evaluatively congruent prime and target represents one of the core 
theoretical assumptions of the three-process model. This process is assumed to 
consist of two components which are characterized as facilitated target encoding 
and maintained prime activation. As discussed earlier, the first component was 
taken into account for the explanation of S–S-based evaluative priming effects, 
while the second component was largely neglected in previous evaluative priming 
research. Thus, in order to test the influence of the second component on 
evaluative priming effects, I aimed to develop an evaluative priming design with a 
maximization of the second component and a simultaneous minimization of the 
first component. For this, I applied a negative SOA-procedure, that is, the prime 
onset followed the target onset. With this manipulation, I expected the prime 
appearing too late to be able to facilitate the encoding of an evaluatively 
congruent target. Instead, the target was predicted to support the prime activation. 
The prolonged prime activation given evaluative congruency should, in turn, lead 
to larger target response interference. In order to examine the generality of this 
interaction between evaluative congruency and response conflict, I applied 
different tasks and varied the modality of the stimulus material. In Experiment 1, 
evaluative priming was examined in the naming task with pictures as primes and 
targets; in Experiment 2a/b, I used the semantic categorization task with pictorial 
or verbal material, respectively. 
44 
2.1 Evaluative priming in the naming task (Experiment 1)3 
The purpose of Experiment 1 was to provide evidence for a facilitative 
effect of an evaluatively congruent target on prime activation in a comparable 
manner as an evaluatively congruent prime is supposed to facilitate target 
encoding, resulting in a positive S–S-based evaluative priming effect. For this, in 
Experiment 1 I replicated the study by Wentura and Frings (2008) with a negative 
SOA-procedure and aimed to disentangle the two alternative explanations of their 
findings. I used positively and negatively connoted pictures as primes and targets. 
While for half of the prime pictures (and all target pictures), participants first 
learned unequivocal naming responses, the other half of the prime pictures were 
not associated with an unambiguous response. This served to manipulate the 
degree of response conflict between target and prime. Thus, the evaluative 
relation and the existence of a response conflict of prime and target were 
orthogonally varied across trials. The negative SOA-procedure was predicted to 
minimize target-encoding facilitation (by an evaluatively congruent prime) and 
maximize prime-activation maintenance (by an evaluatively congruent target). 
Therefore, in case of response conflict (i.e., for response-bound primes) I 
expected this conflict being prolonged given evaluative congruency compared 
with incongruency. Regarding the S–S-based evaluative priming effects, I 
predicted a negatively signed effect for response-bound primes. For nonresponse-
bound primes, I predicted no (negatively signed) effect because prolonged prime 
activation should not influence target naming. If the prime would, however, still 
partially support the encoding of an evaluatively congruent target―despite its 
posttarget onset―I hypothesized a positive S–S-based evaluative priming effect 
for nonresponse-bound primes. 
                                                 
3
 Please note that Experiments 1, 2a/b, and 5a/b have been reported in 
Schmitz & Wentura (2012). Copyright © 2012 by the American Psychological 
Association. Adapted with permission. The official citation that should be used in 
referencing this material is Schmitz, M., & Wentura, D. (2012). Evaluative 
priming of naming and semantic categorization responses revisited: A mutual 
facilitation explanation. Journal of Experimental Psychology: Learning, Memory, 
and Cognition, 38, 984-1000. doi:10.1037/a0026779. No further reproduction or 
distribution is permitted without written permission from the American 
Psychological Association. 
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2.1.1 Method 
Participants. In all experiments reported in the present thesis, all 
participants were German native speakers and had normal or corrected-to-normal 
vision. At the beginning of every experiment, participants gave written informed 
consent and they were debriefed at the end of every experiment. For their 
participation, they were paid 8 €/hour or received course credit, respectively. 
In Experiment 1, 31 students (20 women; 11 men) participated; their 
median age was 22 years (range from 17 to 35 years). 
Design. I employed a 2 (prime response association) × 2 (prime valence) × 
2 (target valence) within-participants design. 
Material. Positive and negative pictures were selected from the 
International Affective Picture System (IAPS; Center for the Study of Emotion 
and Attention, 1994). IAPS numbers for all selected pictures are listed in 
Appendix A. 
Four positive and four negative pictures were used as targets. Mean 
valences for positive and negative pictures differed significantly, Mpositive = 7.96 
(SD = 0.55) and Mnegative = 3.59 (SD = 0.09; norm ratings for IAPS pictures are on 
a scale from 1 to 9), t(3) = 14.55, p < .001. Mean arousal values were matched as 
closely as possible and did not differ significantly, Mpositive = 4.38 (SD = 1.01) and 
Mnegative = 5.17 (SD = 0.52), t(3) = -1.79, p = .17. All target pictures showed 
concrete objects and were therefore associated with names that suggested 
themselves. 
Eight positive and eight negative pictures were used as primes. Mean 
valences for positive and negative pictures differed significantly, Mpositive = 7.27 
(SD = 0.52) and Mnegative = 2.56 (SD = 0.93), t(7) = 14.69, p < .001. Mean arousal 
values were matched as closely as possible and were not significantly different, 
Mpositive = 4.83 (SD = 1.04) and Mnegative = 5.37 (SD = 1.07), t(7) = -0.81, p = .45. 
Compared with target pictures, prime pictures portrayed more complex real life 
scenes and were not as unequivocally nameable with a single word. However, 
they could easily be associated with a naming response (e.g., family for a couple 
with a young child). I created two sets of prime pictures, each containing four 
positive and four negative pictures. The sets did not differ in regard to mean 
valence or arousal, MSet 1 = 4.96 (SD = 2.71) and MSet 2 = 4.87 (SD = 2.54), t(7) = 
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0.25, p = .81, for valence ratings, and MSet 1 = 5.17 (SD = 0.98) and MSet 2 = 5.03 
(SD = 1.19), t(7) = 0.27, p = .79, for arousal ratings. The assignment of the two 
sets to the conditions of the prime response association factor was 
counterbalanced across participants.  
Procedure. All experiments described in the thesis were run using the E-
Prime program (Psychology Software Tools, Version 2.0) with standard PCs. In 
all experiments―except from Experiment 3―participants were tested in groups 
consisting of maximally 5 participants and were seated in front of 15 in. CRT 
monitors at a distance of approximately 0.7 m. 
Experiment 1 consisted of a learning phase, a practice phase, and the 
evaluative priming task. At the beginning of every phase, participants received 
instructions written on the screen. In a first phase, participants learned to associate 
each target picture as well as one set of the prime pictures (the response-bound 
set) with a specific name. Each trial started with a fixation period of 470 ms, 
during which four points moved from the four edges of the screen toward the 
screen’s center, where they were replaced with a fixation cross displayed for 500 
ms. After a blank period of 500 ms, a picture (width = 16 cm and height = 12 cm) 
with a unicolored frame (blue, red, yellow, or green; randomly varying from trial 
to trial; width = 3 mm) was presented with its corresponding name written below 
the picture (black 36-point Courier New font). The prime pictures of the second 
(nonresponse-bound) set were presented as well to prevent any confound with 
regard to familiarity. They appeared with the particular frame color instead of the 
picture name written below the picture. Participants were instructed to read out 
the name or the color (whichever was presented beneath the picture) as quickly as 
possible, and to learn the association between picture and name. They were 
informed about the random assignment of pictures and frame colors and they were 
instructed―in case of a picture with color label―to simply learn the association 
of the picture with color-naming in general but not with a single color label. 
Thereby, the pictures from the nonresponse-bound prime set were not paired with 
an unequivocal naming response. After the participants’ vocal response, the 
picture disappeared, and the screen was cleared for 500 ms. Each picture was 
presented four times; that is, the learning phase comprised a total of 96 trials.  
In the next phase, the learned response associations were practiced. The 
pictures were presented in the same manner as in the learning phase but without 
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any labels. Participants were instructed to name the pictures with the learned 
names or their current frame color. Each response was registered by a voice key. 
The experimenter, who was sitting in front of a second screen displaying the 
correct responses, coded the accuracy of each response and monitored voice key 
triggering (to exclude accidental voice key activations). Each picture was 
presented five times, resulting in a total of 120 trials. If an error occurred, the 
picture with its particular label (name or frame color) was displayed again, and 
participants were required to give the correct response. If there were more than 
forty errors, the entire practice phase was repeated. 
The main part of the experiment was the evaluative priming task. Figure 1 
shows one typical trial of this task. Each trial started with a fixation period, as 
described previously. After a 500-ms blank screen, a target picture was presented 
in the middle of the screen (presentation mode was similar to the preceding phase; 
i.e., pictures appeared in the same size and with a colored frame). Eighty ms later 
(SOA = -80 ms), a prime picture (11 cm × 8 cm, without colored frame) appeared 
centrally on top of the target picture for 120 ms. Participants were instructed to 
name the large picture that appeared first as quickly and accurately as possible 
while ignoring the smaller picture. The target picture remained on the screen until 
a response was given, which was registered by a voice key and coded by the 
experimenter. The intertrial interval was 500 ms. 
 
FIGURE 1. 
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Example trial of the evaluative priming task (naming task) in Experiment 1. In the actual 
experiment, pictures from the International Affective Picture System (IAPS) were used; 
comparable pictures were selected for illustrative purposes in Figure 1. 
 
There were eight warm-up trials (i.e., each target appeared once), followed 
by the main phase comprising a total of 128 trials, with each prime-target 
combination featured once. The trial-sequence was randomized with the constraint 
that neither a target nor a prime picture was repeated in immediately successive 
trials. 
2.1.2 Results 
The average error rate across participants was 0.7 %. Mean RTs were 
derived from correct responses, and RTs shorter than 200 ms or longer than 1,500 
ms were discarded (0.2 % of trials). Mean RTs and error rates for all conditions 
are shown in Table 1. Unless otherwise noted, all effects referred to as statistically 
significant throughout the thesis are associated with p values less than .05, two-
tailed. 
A 2 (prime response association: response-bound vs. nonresponse-bound) 
× 2 (priming condition: congruent vs. incongruent) analysis of variance 
(ANOVA) on mean RTs yielded no significant main effects, F(1,30) = 1.02, p = 
.32, mean square error (MSE) = 351 for the main effect of prime response 
association and F < 1 for the main effect of priming condition. But the interaction 
was significant, F(1,30) = 9.95, p < .01, MSE = 340. As expected, the S–S-based 
evaluative priming effect for response-bound primes was significantly below zero, 
M = -11 ms (SD = 20 ms), t(30) = -3.08, p < .01, dz = -0.56, whereas the S–S-
based evaluative priming effect for nonresponse-bound primes was significantly 
positive, M = 10 ms (SD = 30 ms), t(30) = 1.80, p < .05 (one-tailed), dz = 0.32. An 
analogous ANOVA on error rates yielded no significant effects, all Fs < 1. 
 
TABLE 1. 
Mean RTs (in ms) as a Function of Priming Condition and Prime Type (Errors in % in 
Parentheses); Priming Effects for RTs (in ms; Standard errors in Brackets) (Experiment 1) 
 Priming  
 Congruent Incongruent S–S-based Evaluative 
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Priming Effect 
Prime Type    
Nonresponse-bound 656 (0.9) 665 (0.5) 10* [5] 
Response-bound 669 (0.7) 658 (0.7) -11** [4] 
Note: Priming scores are calculated by subtracting mean RTs for congruent priming from mean 
RTs for incongruent priming. Slight inconsistencies between the left and the right part of the table 
are due to rounding. 
* p < .05 (one-tailed), ** p < .01 
2.1.3 Discussion 
The results clearly support my hypotheses. Prime pictures—presented 80 
ms after target onset—that were strongly bound to a naming response led to a 
significant negatively signed S–S-based evaluative priming effect. This effect was 
not observed for prime pictures without response association. In fact, this 
condition yielded a positive S–S-based evaluative priming effect. The three-
process model is best suited to explain this finding. A negative SOA-procedure 
was used to weaken target-encoding facilitation and strengthen prime-activation 
maintenance. This prime maintenance had an observable effect on target response 
only if target and prime competed for response, that is, if both were associated 
with a unique naming response. Therefore, only response-bound primes yielded a 
negatively signed S–S-based evaluative priming effect. In contrast, nonresponse-
bound primes did not interfere with target naming and, hence, prolonged prime 
activation had no observable effect. The small positive S–S-based evaluative 
priming effect for nonresponse-bound primes is most likely based on residual 
target encoding (despite the negative SOA). Experiment 1 conceptually replicates 
and extends the study by Wentura and Frings (2008) who found the same 
interaction of priming condition (i.e., evaluative congruency or incongruency 
between prime and target) and prime response association. However, due to the 
use of a positive SOA, target-encoding facilitation presumably had a larger 
influence on the priming effect, yielding a positive effect in the nonresponse-
bound condition and (due to additional response conflict) a null effect in the 
response-bound condition. As explained earlier, this result was open to an 
alternative explanation. 
The purpose of Experiment 2a/b was to provide corroborative evidence for 
maintained prime activation given evaluative congruency with a manipulation of 
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response facilitation and conflict between prime and target. For this, I examined 
evaluative priming in the semantic categorization task with primes and targets 
being evaluatively connoted exemplars from the semantic categories persons and 
animals. While participants were required to categorize the targets according to 
the semantic categories, the evaluative connotations were orthogonally varied. I 
used this approach for two reasons. 
First, evidence for S–S-based evaluative priming effects in the semantic 
categorization task is even less convincing than in the naming task. As I reported 
earlier, some authors failed to find any evaluative priming effect (see De Houwer 
et al., 2002; Klinger et al., 2000, Exp. 4), while others showed conditional 
evaluative priming effects (Spruyt, De Houwer, et al., 2007). If target-encoding 
facilitation and prime maintenance are valid processes in evaluative priming 
designs, their effects should, however, be observable across various tasks. 
Second, the semantic categorization task is even better suited for my 
purposes because primes that vary not only with regard to the evaluative 
categories but also with regard to the semantic (i.e., task-relevant) categories can 
be used (see Klinger et al., 2000, Exp. 4, in contrast to De Houwer et al., 2002). 
This means that prime and target are either associated with the same 
categorization response (if they share the semantic category) or opposite 
categorization responses (if they are from different semantic categories). This 
allows for the examination of S–R-based semantic priming effects (i.e., faster 
categorization of a target following a semantically compatible vs. incompatible 
prime) in addition to S–S-based evaluative priming effects. S–R-based priming 
effects have been reliably found with semantic categorization tasks (see Banaji & 
Hardin, 1996; Klinger et al., 2000). 
On the basis of the theoretical assumption that a target helps to maintain 
the activation of an evaluatively congruent prime, I expected an evaluatively 
congruent prime to be activated strongly enough to interfere with the target 
response, yielding an S–R-based semantic priming effect. In contrast, I expected 
the activation of an evaluatively incongruent prime to be rather weak, inducing a 
reduced (or even no) response conflict and a reduced (or even no) S–R-based 
semantic priming effect. Thus, I predicted an interaction between semantic 
compatibility and evaluative congruency, that is, the S–R-based semantic priming 
effect should be larger in case of evaluative congruency than incongruency. 
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In terms of S–S-based evaluative priming effects, I expected the following: 
Semantic incompatibility (with regard to the task relevant semantic categories) 
between prime and target should be associated with response conflict. This 
response conflict should be larger and prolonged in case of evaluative 
congruency. Therefore, I predicted a negatively signed S–S-based evaluative 
priming effect given semantic incompatibility. By contrast, in case of semantic 
compatibility, prolonged prime activation should not interfere with the target 
response (in fact, it might even facilitate the response process). In addition, an 
evaluatively congruent prime might support target encoding despite its posttarget 
onset (see results of Experiment 1). Thus, for semantically compatible prime-
target pairs, I expected either a null or a positive S–S-based evaluative priming 
effect. 
2.2 Evaluative priming in the semantic categorization task 
(Experiment 2a/b) 
I examined S–S-based evaluative priming in the semantic categorization 
task. Primes and targets were positive and negative pictures (Exp. 2a) or words 
(Exp. 2b) representing members from the semantic categories persons or animals. 
Prime and target on any particular trial were associated with either the same or 
opposite responses, depending on their category membership (i.e., variation of 
response conflict). Thus, with regard to the semantic, task-relevant variation (i.e., 
person vs. animal), the experimental design constituted an S–R-based semantic 
priming design; with regard to the evaluative variation, the design constituted an 
S–S-based evaluative priming design. Analogous to Experiment 1, a negative 
SOA-procedure was used in order to maximize the facilitative effect of evaluative 
congruency on prime-activation maintenance, while minimizing the same effect 
on target encoding. 
2.2.1 Method 
Participants. In Experiment 2a, 30 students (25 women; 5 men) 
participated; their median age was 21 years (range from 19 to 28 years). In 
Experiment 2b, 34 students (22 women; 12 men) participated; their median age 
was 22 years (range from 19 to 37 years). 
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Design. I employed a 2 (prime semantic) × 2 (target semantic) × 2 (prime 
valence) × 2 (target valence) within-participants design. 
Material. The stimulus material was different in Experiment 2a and 2b. 
Experiment 2a. I selected ten positive (five depicting people and five 
depicting animals) and ten negative (five depicting people and five depicting 
animals) pictures from the IAPS (Center for the Study of Emotion and Attention, 
1994). IAPS numbers for all selected pictures are listed in Appendix A. Mean 
valences were M = 7.12 (SD = 0.73) and M = 8.09 (SD = 0.22) for positive person 
and animal pictures, respectively, and M = 2.70 (SD = 0.78) and M = 3.59 (SD = 
0.14) for negative person and animal pictures, respectively. Ratings for positive 
and negative pictures differed significantly, t(4) = 62.41, p < .001, for person 
pictures and t(4) = 91.11, p < .001, for animal pictures. The sets of person and 
animal pictures also differed significantly with regard to mean valence, t(9) = -
5.22, p < .001, due to significantly more positive ratings for animal pictures than 
for person pictures. Mean arousal values were M = 4.09 (SD = 0.64) and M = 5.59 
(SD = 0.91) for positive person and animal pictures, respectively, and M = 4.34 
(SD = 0.84) and M = 6.12 (SD = 0.84) for negative person and animal pictures, 
respectively. Arousal values were matched as closely as possible and did not 
differ between person and animal pictures, t(9) = -1.51, p = .17. Arousal values 
for positive and negative pictures were significantly different, t(9) = -4.11, p < 
.01, since ratings for negative pictures were more arousing than ratings for 
positive pictures. 
Experiment 2b. All stimuli were German words. I selected ten positive and 
ten negative exemplar names from the categories persons and animals, 
respectively (most of which were also used by De Houwer et al., 2002). A list of 
stimuli can be found in Appendix B. Mean valences—as rated by the participants 
after the experiment—were M = 7.60 (SD = 0.57) and M = 7.13 (SD = 0.79) for 
positive person and animal words, respectively, and were M = 4.13 (SD = 0.54) 
and M = 4.46 (SD = 1.02) for negative person and animal words, respectively (on 
a scale from 1 to 9). Ratings for positive and negative words differed 
significantly, t(9) = 4.09, p < .01, for person words and t(9) = 6.18, p < .001, for 
animal words. The sets of person and animal words did not differ with regard to 
mean valence, t(19) = 0.13, p = .90. Word length was balanced as closely as 
possible. 
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Procedure. The experiment consisted of a learning phase and the 
evaluative priming task. At the beginning of every phase, instructions were 
presented on the screen. In the initial learning phase, participants were 
familiarized with the semantic categories. The procedural details were the same as 
in Experiment 1. Participants were instructed to categorize centrally presented 
images (16 cm × 12 cm) in Experiment 2a and words (black 18-point Courier 
New font) in Experiment 2b, as depicting a person or an animal as quickly and 
accurately as possible. Participants made categorization responses via the keys c 
and m on a computer keyboard, using their left and right index fingers. A 500-ms 
blank screen followed a correct response; in case of an error, the participants 
received feedback and were required to press the correct key to proceed (“Wrong! 
Continue with the correct key.”). Each picture (Exp. 2a) or word (Exp. 2b), 
respectively, was presented once; that is, the learning phase comprised 20 trials in 
Experiment 2a and 40 trials in Experiment 2b in random sequences. If more than 
five (Exp. 2a) or ten (Exp. 2b) errors, respectively, occurred, the whole learning 
phase was repeated. The assignment of response keys to categories was 
counterbalanced across participants. 
The evaluative priming task in Experiment 2a also followed the procedure 
of Experiment 1, except that there were no colored frames, semantic 
categorization responses were given via keyboard, and feedback was given in case 
of inaccurate categorization. Figure 2 shows one typical trial of this task in 
Experiment 2a. Participants were instructed to categorize the large picture that 
appeared first as quickly and accurately as possible according to the semantic 
categories of either persons or animals while ignoring the smaller picture. There 
were 16 warm-up trials (i.e., four per condition). In the main phase, each picture 
featured in each condition twice as a target and twice as a prime (i.e., 160 trials in 
total). The trial-sequence was randomized with the constraint that target and prime 
picture were always different on any given trial, and neither target nor prime 
picture was repeated in immediately successive trials. 
In the evaluative priming task of Experiment 2b, small procedural changes 
were necessitated due to the use of words instead of pictures. Target words were 
presented at the center of the screen, while prime words appeared as two flankers 
just over and under the target word. The flankers appeared 50 ms after target 
onset, resulting in a negative SOA of -50 ms. Target and flankers together stayed 
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on the screen for 100 ms. Participants were instructed to categorize the centrally 
presented word as quickly and accurately as possible according to the semantic 
categories persons and animals, while ignoring the words that appeared just over 
and under the centrally presented word. Each word was presented in each 
condition once as a target and once as a prime (i.e., 160 trials). Twenty warm-up 
trials (i.e., five trials per condition) preceded the experimental trials. After 
finishing Experiment 2b, participants rated the valence of all experimental stimuli. 
 
FIGURE 2. 
Example trial of the evaluative priming task (semantic categorization task) in Experiment 2a. In 
the actual experiment, pictures from the International Affective Picture System (IAPS) were used; 
comparable pictures were selected for illustrative purposes in Figure 2. 
 
2.2.2 Results 
Experiment 2a. The average error rate across participants was 3.7 %. 
Mean RTs were derived from correct responses, and RTs shorter than 200 ms or 
longer than 1,500 ms were discarded (0.1 % of trials). Mean RTs and error rates 
for all conditions are shown in Table 2. 
A 2 (semantic condition: compatible vs. incompatible) × 2 (evaluative 
condition: congruent vs. incongruent) ANOVA on RTs yielded a significant main 
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effect of semantic condition, F(1,29) = 11.71, p < .01, MSE = 393, and a 
significant interaction, F(1,29) = 4.12, p = .05, MSE = 358. The main effect of 
evaluative condition was not significant, F < 1. The interaction can be interpreted 
from two different points of view. (a) It marks a significant difference in S–R-
based semantic priming effects: As expected, in the case of evaluative 
congruency, the S–R-based semantic priming effect of M = 19 ms (SD = 31 ms) 
was significantly above zero, t(29) = 3.42, p < .01, dz = 0.63. In the case of 
evaluative incongruency, however, the S–R-based semantic priming effect of M = 
5 ms (SD = 23 ms) was not significantly above zero, t(29) = 1.27, p = .22, dz = 
0.23. (b) It marks a significant difference in S–S-based evaluative priming effects: 
As expected, semantic compatibility yielded a positive effect (M = 7 ms, SD = 24 
ms) and semantic incompatibility yielded a negatively signed effect (M = -7 ms, 
SD = 28 ms); however, both failed to reach significance, t(29) = 1.57, p = .13, dz 
= 0.29, given semantic compatibility, and t(29) = -1.40, p = .17, dz = -0.25, given 
semantic incompatibility. 
 
TABLE 2. 
Mean RTs (in ms) as a Function of Semantic Condition and Evaluative Condition (Errors in % in 
Parentheses); Priming Effects for RTs (in ms; Standard errors in Brackets) (Experiment 2a) 
   Valence  
 Congruent Incongruent 
S–S-based Evaluative 
Priming effect 
Semantic    
Compatible 515 (2.8) 522 (2.4) 7 [4] 
Incompatible 535 (5.0) 527 (4.4) -7 [5] 
S–R-based Semantic 
Priming effect 
19** [6] 5 [4]  
Note: Priming scores (evaluative and semantic) are calculated by subtracting mean RTs for 
congruent/compatible priming from mean RTs for incongruent/incompatible priming. Slight 
inconsistencies between the left and the right part of the table are due to rounding. 
** p < .01 
 
An analogous ANOVA on error rates yielded a significant main effect of 
semantic condition, F(1,29) = 12.80, p < .01, MSE = 0.001, corresponding to a 
positive S–R-based semantic priming effect of M = 2.1 % (SD = 3.2 %), t(29) = 
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3.58, p = .001, dz = 0.65. Neither the main effect of evaluative condition, F(1,29) 
= 1.12, p = .30, MSE = 0.001, nor the interaction reached significance, F < 1. 
 
Experiment 2b. The average error rate across participants was 5.4 %. 
Preliminary item analyses showed that the negative animal word Aasgeier (in 
English, vulture) led to outlier values in mean error rate as well as mean RTs. 
Moreover, some participants reported difficulties in unequivocally categorizing 
the word Aasgeier as an animal, as it is also used for a person in a figurative 
manner. Therefore, I discarded all trials with the target Aasgeier.4 Mean RTs were 
derived from correct responses, and RTs shorter than 200 ms or longer than 1,500 
ms were discarded (0.4 % of trials). Mean RTs and error rates for all conditions 
are shown in Table 3. 
 
TABLE 3. 
Mean RTs (in ms) as a Function of Semantic Condition and Evaluative Condition (Errors in % in 
Parentheses); Priming Effects for RTs (in ms; Standard errors in Brackets) (Experiment 2b) 
 Valence  
 
Congruent Incongruent 
S–S-based Evaluative 
Priming effect 
Semantic    
Compatible 564 (3.9) 569 (4.0) 6 [6] 
Incompatible 589 (6.9) 578 (6.6) -11* [5] 
S–R-based Semantic 
Priming effect 
26*** [6] 9 [6] 
 
Note: Priming scores (evaluative and semantic) are calculated by subtracting mean RTs for 
congruent/compatible priming from mean RTs for incongruent/incompatible priming. Slight 
inconsistencies between the left and the right part of the table are due to rounding. 
* p < .05, *** p < .001 
 
A 2 (semantic condition: compatible vs. incompatible) × 2 (evaluative 
condition: congruent vs. incongruent) ANOVA on RTs yielded a significant main 
effect of semantic condition, F(1,33) = 17.05, p < .001, MSE = 591, but no main 
effect of evaluative condition, F < 1. Most important, the interaction was 
significant as well, F(1,33) = 4.87, p < .05, MSE = 520. As hypothesized, the S–
                                                 
4
 Including the trials with the target Aasgeier essentially yielded the same 
effects in all analyses. 
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R-based semantic priming effect was significant in the case of evaluative 
congruency, M = 26 ms (SD = 34 ms), t(33) = 4.40, p < .001, dz = 0.76, but failed 
to reach significance in the case of evaluative incongruency, M = 9 ms (SD = 32 
ms); t(33) = 1.55, p = .13, dz = 0.26. Given semantic incompatibility, I found a 
significant negatively signed S–S-based evaluative priming effect of M = -11 ms 
(SD = 26 ms), t(33) = -2.50, p < .05, dz = -0.43. Given semantic compatibility, the 
S–S-based evaluative priming effect was positively signed but non-significant, M 
= 6 ms (SD = 33 ms); t(33) = 1.04, p = .30, dz = 0.18. 
An analogous ANOVA on error rates yielded a significant main effect of 
semantic condition, F(1,33) = 19.35, p < .001, MSE = 0.001, corresponding to a 
positive S–R-based semantic priming effect of M = 2.8 % (SD = 3.6 %), t(33) = 
4.40, p < .001, dz = 0.75. Neither the main effect of evaluative condition nor the 
interaction reached significance, both Fs < 1. 
2.2.3 Discussion 
The results from the semantic categorization task with pictures and words 
as prime and target stimuli confirm my theoretical rationale. The significant 
interaction between semantic and evaluative factors demonstrates the dependence 
of the S–R-based semantic priming effect on the evaluative congruency between 
prime and target: Only if prime and target had the same valence was there a 
significant S–R-based semantic priming effect. This suggests that given evaluative 
congruency, the target helps maintain the prime activation. If the prime is 
associated with the same response as the target, the response is (relatively) 
facilitated; if the prime is associated with the competing response, the response is 
(relatively) delayed. However, if prime and target are evaluatively incongruent, 
the S–R-based semantic priming effect breaks down, supposedly because the 
activation of the prime is too weak to trigger the corresponding response. Note 
that in case of evaluative incongruency, the target may even have inhibited the 
prime activation. As I did not include neutral primes, I am not able to test whether 
maintained prime activation given evaluative congruency, suppressed prime 
activation given evaluative incongruency or both raised the larger impact of 
evaluatively congruent compared with incongruent primes on the target response. 
The fact that such a reliable effect like the S–R-based priming effect (see Banaji 
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& Hardin, 1996; Klauer & Musch, 2002; 2003; Klinger et al., 2000) depended on 
the evaluative congruency between prime and target indicates the prioritized 
processing of the evaluative dimension. 
Regarding the S–S-based evaluative priming effect, semantic 
incompatibility led to a significant reduction and reversion of the effect as 
compared with semantic compatibility. Admittedly, the pattern of S–S-based 
evaluative priming effects was more convincing in Experiment 2b than in 
Experiment 2a. (I will discuss this point later.) In Experiment 2b, incompatible 
prime-target pairs led to a significant negatively signed S–S-based evaluative 
priming effect. This suggests that the response conflict was prolonged given 
evaluative congruency or that it was resolved more readily given evaluative 
incongruency. In contrast, if prime and target were associated with the same 
categorization response, the prime had no distracting influence, independently of 
evaluative congruency or incongruency. Therefore, no S–S-based evaluative 
priming effect emerged for compatible prime-target pairs. 
In Experiment 2a, the S–S-based evaluative priming effect given semantic 
incompatibility was only negatively signed but failed to reach the conventional 
level of significance. However, the significant reduction in the incompatible 
condition (compared to the compatible one) is the more important point here, for 
the following reason: Note that, even if there was no significant S–S-based 
evaluative priming effect in the compatible condition, the effect was positively 
signed in both experiments. If this positively signed effect is due to residual 
target-encoding facilitation by an evaluatively congruent prime (despite its 
presentation after target onset), this facilitative effect might exist in the 
incompatible condition as well, hence minimizing the negatively signed S–S-
based evaluative priming effect due to prime maintenance and response conflict. 
The remaining question is why residual target-encoding facilitation was more 
pronounced in Experiment 2a than in Experiment 2b. Possibly, prime pictures are 
associated with a larger target-encoding facilitation than prime words; a 
consideration that is in line with the findings of Spruyt and colleagues (2002), as I 
discussed in Section 1.3.2. 
Both S–R-based semantic and S–S-based evaluative priming effects 
support the assumption that an evaluatively congruent target helps maintain the 
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prime activation, which in turn may yield a prolonged response conflict if prime 
and target are associated with competing responses. 
Despite the replicated finding of a significant interaction of evaluative 
congruency and semantic compatibility in the S–S-based evaluative priming 
variant with the semantic categorization task, the cognitive processes accountable 
for this interaction are still unknown. Since behavioral measures like RTs and 
errors just indicate the end product of all cognitive processes until response (Luck, 
2005), an additional measurement is necessary that provides rather on-line 
information about the cognitive processing of prime and target during the 
evaluative priming task. Thus, in Experiment 3 I replicated Experiment 2b with an 
additional recording of the temporally fine-grained, electrical brain activity that is 
evidenced by the electroencephalogram (EEG). Within the EEG, I was interested 
in the ERP reflecting the voltage deflections that are related to external or internal 
events.  
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3 Electrophysiological corroboration 
The crux of behavioral measures is that they are not sufficiently suited to 
gather the cognitive processes underlying experimental effects, as they reflect the 
end product of all processes preceding the response execution. In contrast, the 
EEG provides continuous information about neural processing with a highly 
temporal resolution and represents, thereby, an useful and informative 
measurement in combination with the behavioral data. Within the EEG, the ERP 
can be extracted which depicts the electrical brain activity that is correlated with 
external or internal events. Since several ERP components (positive and negative 
voltage deflections) have been associated with specific information-processing 
operations (see, e.g., Luck, 2005; Rugg & Coles, 1995), I was able to derive clear 
hypotheses with regard to the ERP components expected in Experiment 3. Before 
I describe Experiment 3, I briefly outline the ERP technique and the ERP 
components that were of primary interest for my purpose. 
3.1 The event-related potential (ERP) technique and relevant 
components 
The ERP reflects the electrical brain activity within the continuous and 
spontaneous EEG that is associated with the cognitive processes in relation to an 
external (e.g., the stimulus onset in an experiment) or internal event (e.g., the 
semantic stimulus processing). The primary advantage of the ERP technique over 
behavioral measures and other neurocognitive methods (e.g., the functional 
magnetic resonance imaging [fMRI]) is its temporal resolution. The ERP provides 
a temporally precise stream of neural activity that can be used to make inferences 
about the cognitive processes involved in a task. The ERP consists of a sequence 
of components that are characterized according to their polarity, timing, scalp 
distribution, responsiveness to experimental variables, as well as assumed neural 
generators (see Donchin, Ritter, McCallum, 1978; Fabiani, Gratton, & 
Federmeier, 2007). For my purpose, three ERP components, namely, the N2 
component, the P3 component, and the lateralized readiness potential (LRP), were 
of particular interest. In the following, I will briefly characterize these 
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components. On the basis of their empirical evidence and their interpretation with 
cognitive processes, I will derive the hypotheses for Experiment 3. 
3.1.1 The N2 component 
The N2 component reflects a negative deflection that arises around 200-
500 ms after stimulus onset with a maximum over fronto-central locations (see 
Folstein & van Petten, 2008). It has typically been associated with conflict 
detected and monitored by the anterior cingulate cortex (e.g., van Veen & Carter, 
2002a) and has been reported in different cognitive paradigms (see Folstein & van 
Petten, 2008 for a review). For example, N2 amplitude differences were 
associated with the flanker effect in the flanker paradigm (e.g., Kopp, Rist, & 
Mattler, 1996; van Veen & Carter, 2002b) and the evaluative priming effect in the 
evaluation task (see Bartholow et al., 2009; Zhang, Lawson, Guo, & Jiang, 2006). 
As the N2 component is sensitive for response conflict, S–R-based evaluative 
priming effects in N2 amplitudes corroborate the response explanation account of 
S–R-based evaluative priming, as proposed by different authors (see De Houwer 
et al., 2002; Klauer et al., 1997; Rothermund & Wentura, 1998; Wentura, 1999; 
2000). 
In Experiment 3 (i.e., the replication of Experiment 2b), N2 mean 
amplitudes were expected to reflect semantic categorization conflicts, evidenced 
in S–R-based semantic priming effects. As―according to the claim by the three-
process model and in line with the results in Experiment 2―the S–R-based 
semantic priming effect was predicted to depend on evaluative congruency, I 
hypothesized a significant interaction of semantic compatibility and evaluative 
congruency in N2 mean amplitudes. That is, in the case of evaluative congruency 
a significant S–R-based semantic priming effect should arise that should decrease 
to a null effect given evaluative incongruency. 
3.1.2 The P3 component 
The P3 component―supposedly generated by the locus-coeruleus 
norepinephrine (LC-NE; see Nieuwenhuis, Aston-Jones, & Cohen, 
2005)―represents a positive deflection around 300-600 ms after stimulus onset 
that arises maximally over parietocentral locations (see Donchin et al., 1978; 
Picton, 1992; Pritchard, 1981). The P3 component has been associated with 
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different cognitive processes (see, e.g., Duncan-Johnson & Donchin, 1982; 
Picton, 1992). Of relevance for the present purpose is the finding that the P3 
latency has been shown to be sensitive for the effort required by categorization 
responses (see, e.g., Kutas, McCarthy, & Donchin, 1977; Liu, Xin, Jin, Hu, & Li, 
2010; Magliero, Bashore, Coles, & Donchin, 1984; McCarthy & Donchin, 1981). 
The P3 latency typically increases when stimulus categorization becomes more 
difficult. In the flanker task, for example, slower P3 latencies have been reported 
in the incompatible compared with the compatible condition (see Coles, Gratton, 
Bashore, Eriksen, & Donchin, 1985; Gehring, Gratton, Coles, & Donchin, 1992; 
Smid, Mulder, & Mulder, 1990). 
Thus, in Experiment 3, I expected slower P3 peak latencies given semantic 
incompatibility than compatibility. As―considering the rationale of the three-
process model―only an evaluatively congruent prime should be activated enough 
(due to prime maintenance) to have the potential to interfere in the target 
categorization, thereby yielding categorization facilitation or conflict, I predicted 
a significant interaction of semantic compatibility and evaluative congruency in 
P3 peak latencies. 
3.1.3 The lateralized-readiness potential (LRP) 
The LRP represents the lateralized part of the readiness potential (see 
Vaughan Jr., Costa, & Ritter, 1968) and is at least partly generated in the primary 
motor cortex (see Coles, 1989; Miller & Hackley, 1992). The LRP is seen as an 
index of selective response preparation (e.g., Coles, 1989; Gratton, Coles, 
Sirevaag, Eriksen, & Donchin, 1988; Miller & Hackley, 1992) and arises 
maximally over central scalp locations contralateral to the hand that is responsible 
for the movement (thereby reflecting the contralateral organization of the motor 
cortex; see Brunia, 1988). The LRP onset indicates the beginning of side-specific 
response preparation (e.g., Coles, 1989). Typically, the LRP has been determined 
at locations near the electrode positions C3 and C4, as these locations are assumed 
to capture the activation of the motor cortex (see Eimer, 1998; Sommer, Leuthold, 
& Ulrich, 1994). Among others, several studies reported LRP effects in the 
flanker task with larger negativities (e.g., Kopp, Rist, & Mattler, 1996; Kopp, 
Mattler, Goertz, & Rist, 1996) or shorter latencies (e.g., Carrillo-de-la-Peña, 
Lastra-Barreira, & Galdo-Alvarez, 2006) in the response-compatible compared 
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with the incompatible condition. Recently, evaluative priming effects in the 
evaluation task have been found in LRP onset latencies with shorter latencies 
given evaluative congruency compared with incongruency (Eder et al., 2011). 
Thus, LRP onset occurs earlier when prime and target elicit the same compared 
with the opposite response. 
In Experiment 3, LRP onset latencies were analyzed with regard to 
categorization facilitation or conflict, respectively, between prime and target. I 
expected faster onset latencies in the case of semantic compatibility compared 
with incompatibility, resulting in a positive S–R-based semantic priming effect. In 
alignment with the results in Experiment 2a/b and analogous to the hypotheses for 
the N2 component, this priming effect was expected to depend on evaluative 
congruency. 
3.2 ERP correlates of evaluative priming in the semantic 
categorization task (Experiment 3) 
In Experiment 3, I replicated Experiment 2b with an additional analysis of 
ERP correlates. Up to now, ERP correlates of the S–S-based evaluative priming 
effect were not yet reported; therefore, the purpose of this experiment was to 
search for ERP correlates of S–S-based evaluative priming in an explorative 
manner. N2 mean amplitudes and LRP onset latencies were analyzed with respect 
to semantic compatibility between prime and target. As the semantically 
incompatible condition was associated with categorization conflict, while the 
compatible condition was associated with categorization facilitation, positive S–
R-based semantic priming effects were expected to emerge in N2 mean 
amplitudes and LRP onset latencies. On the analogy of the results in Experiment 
2a/b, this effect should depend on evaluative congruency, yielding a significant 
interaction of semantic compatibility and evaluative congruency. P3 peak 
latencies were analyzed in regard to the effort required for target categorization. 
This categorization effort was expected to be influenced by an interaction of 
semantic compatibility and evaluative congruency. Thus, a significant interaction 
of the semantic and evaluative factors was predicted for the three ERP 
components as well as for mean RTs (thereby replicating the results from 
Experiment 2a/b). This interaction should result in S–R-based semantic priming 
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effects that were moderated by the evaluative dimension and S–S-based 
evaluative priming effects that were moderated by the semantic dimension. 
3.2.1 Method 
Participants. 30 participants (15 women, 15 men) completed the 
experiment. Their median age was 25 years (range from 19 to 32 years). 26 
participants were right-handed and four participants were left-handed. None of 
them reported any neurological impairment. 
Design, Materials, Procedure. Design, materials, and procedure were the 
same as in Experiment 2b with the following exceptions: As the ERP measure 
requires a larger amount of trials per condition, the number of stimuli used as 
primes and targets was increased from ten to fifteen exemplar names per category 
in order to avoid an increase of stimulus repetitions. A list of stimuli can be found 
in Appendix B. Mean valences—as rated on a scale from 1 to 9 by the participants 
after the experiment—were M = 7.57 (SD = 0.73) and M = 6.76 (SD = 0.75) for 
positive person and animal words, respectively, and M = 2.69 (SD = 1.11) and M 
= 3.47 (SD = 1.18) for negative person and animal words, respectively. Ratings 
for positive and negative words differed significantly, t(14) = 24.43, p < .001 for 
person and t(14) = 17.45, p < .001 for animal words. The sets of person and 
animal words did not differ with regard to mean valence, t(29) = 0.07, p = .95. 
Word length was balanced as closely as possible. All words were written in 
capital letters (black 18-point Courier New font). 
Participants were individually tested in an electrically shielded and sound-
attenuated chamber. They were seated in front of a 22’’ LCD monitor in a 
viewing distance of approximately 0.8 m. Instead of the fixation period that was 
applied in all other experiments reported in this thesis, the fixation cross appeared 
at the beginning of each trial for a jittered time interval (i.e., 250 ms, 500 ms, or 
750 ms). Similarly, the intertrial interval was jittered (i.e., 1,250 ms, 1,500 ms, or 
1,750 ms). The learning phase comprised 60 trials in a random sequence with 
each word displaying once. If more than 15 errors occurred, the whole learning 
phase was repeated. In the evaluative priming task, each word was presented in 
each condition once as target and once as prime, that is, the whole task comprised 
240 trials. After every 60 trials, the participants were required to take a rest period 
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and to continue the task in a self-paced manner. 16 warm-up trials (i.e., four trials 
per condition) preceded the experimental trials. 
EEG Recording and Analyses. EEG signals were continuously recorded 
from 60 Ag/AgCl active scalp electrodes mounted in a preconfigured elastic cap 
(Brain Products) and labeled according to the extended 10-20 system 
(Sharbrough, Chatrian, Lesser, Lüders, Nuwer, & Picton, 1991). Signals were 
referenced on-line to the left-mastoid electrode. The electrode at position Fp1 and 
an electrode placed below the left eye monitored vertical eye movements. 
Electrodes placed at the outer canthi of the eyes measured horizontal eye 
movements. All channels were amplified with BrainAmp DC amplifiers (Brain 
Products). EEG signals were sampled at a rate of 500 Hz and on-line band-pass 
filtered (0.1-250 Hz). Impedances for all electrodes were kept below 20 kOhm (a 
value that corresponds to good level according to the default setup of the actiCAP 
Control Software, Brain Products). Data were recorded with the BrainVision 
Recorder (Brain Products) and offline data processing was performed with the 
Brain Vision Analyzer 2.0.1 (Brain Products). Electrodes were re-referenced off-
line to averaged mastoids. Data were filtered off-line with a low-pass filter of 40 
Hz (slope 24 dB) and eye movements were corrected using the independent 
components analysis. After forming individual epochs of 1700 ms (including a 
baseline of 200 ms before target onset), epochs still containing artifacts in any 
EEG channel (i.e., maximum amplitude in the recording epoch ± 200 µV; 
maximum difference between two successive sampling points 0.5 µV; maximum 
difference 150 µV in successive intervals of 200 ms; lowest allowed activity-
change 50 µV in successive intervals of 100 ms) were rejected. Data were 
baseline-corrected with respect to the time interval from 200 ms before target 
onset to target onset. For each participant, ERPs were averaged for each condition 
and each response key. Grand average ERPs for each condition were computed by 
averaging the ERPs across participants and response keys. 
Based on visual inspection, the N2 occurred in the time window from 300 
to 380 ms after target onset at midline electrodes from frontal to parietal positions. 
The N2 was quantified as the mean amplitude in the time interval from 300 to 380 
ms posttarget onset. Based on topographic voltage distributions, the priming 
effects in N2 mean amplitudes were determined at the CPz electrode. Based on 
visual inspection, the P3 arised in the time window from 380 to 680 ms after 
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target onset and was largest at centro-parietal and parietal electrodes (particularly, 
at the Pz electrode). P3 latency was defined as the time interval between target 
onset and the time point of maximal positivity at the Pz electrode in a search 
window from 380 to 680 ms posttarget onset, using a computerized peak-picking 
procedure. Major statistical analyses on N2 mean amplitudes and P3 peak 
latencies comprised 2 × 2 ANOVAs involving the within-subjects factors 
semantic condition (compatible vs. incompatible) and evaluative condition 
(congruent vs. incongruent). 
I determined the LRP at the C3 and C4 electrodes (see, e.g., Smulders, 
Kok, Kenemans, & Bashore, 1995) and applied the averaging method introduced 
by Coles (1989). For each participant and each condition, ERP activation at the 
ipsilateral side in regard to the correct response hand (i.e., activation at the C3 
electrode for trials requiring left-hand responses and activation at the C4 electrode 
for trials requiring right-hand responses) was subtracted from ERP activation at 
the respective contralateral side (i.e., activation at the C4 electrode for required 
left-hand responses and activation at the C3 electrode for required right-hand 
responses). The resulting differences were averaged across hands in order to 
eliminate any influence of the response side and response-unspecific activation 
(see Coles, 1989). Grand average LRPs for each condition were obtained by 
averaging the LRP waveforms across participants. Grand average LRPs were low-
pass filtered at 17 Hz (24 dB/octave). To determine LRP onset latencies and 
estimate LRP onset latency differences, the method recommended by Miller, 
Patterson, and Ulrich (1998) was applied. In the grand average LRPs, I specified 
the time point at which 50 % of the maximal negativity was reached, using a 
computerized peak-picking procedure. The time point at which 50 % of the peak 
amplitude was first exceeded and the immediately preceding time point were 
interpolated5. This value was taken as LRP onset latency. S–R-based semantic as 
                                                 
5
 The exact formula for the LRP onset latency estimate is according to 
Miller and colleagues (1998): 
 
 = 	  	+ 			–	 ×	
 −	
 −	
	 
 
Note: c is the 50 % LRP peak amplitude, ti is the first time point exceeding 
the 50 % peak amplitude, vi is the LRP amplitude at this time point, and ti-1 and vi-1 
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well as S–S-based evaluative priming effects were calculated by subtracting the 
respective LRP onset latencies. Standard errors (SEM) of the priming effects were 
estimated applying the jackknife-based procedure (see Miller et al., 1998). Here, 
30 different grand average LRPs for each condition were calculated by omitting 
the data of a different participant from each grand average. With this procedure, 
subsets of the total sample instead of individual data sets are compared, increasing 
the signal-to-noise ratio (Miller et al., 1998). The t value of every priming effect 
in LRP onset latencies was calculated as the quotient of the onset latency 
difference (based on the grand average LRPs) and the respective SEM (based on 
the jackknifed LRPs). 
In some previous studies, the LRP has also been time-locked to the 
response (e.g., Eder et al., 2011). The response-locked LRP informs about the 
duration of the pure motoric response process (i.e., the process after LRP onset), 
while the stimulus-locked LRP indicates the duration of the cognitive processes 
before LRP onset (e.g., Leuthold, Sommer, & Ulrich, 1996). Since in the 
evaluative priming task, the required motoric responses did not vary with the 
evaluative or semantic factors, but―independent from the experimental 
condition―all responses were given via key presses, I did not expect any priming 
effects in the response-locked LRPs and constrained the LRP analysis on the 
stimulus-locked LRPs. 
3.2.2 Results 
Behavioral data. The average error rate across participants was 3.7 %. 
Mean RTs were derived from correct responses. Furthermore, trials with RTs that 
were 1.5 interquartile ranges below the first or above the third quartile with 
respect to the individual distribution (see Tukey, 1977), were shorter than 200 ms 
or longer than 1,500 ms were discarded (1.7 % of trials). Mean RTs and error 
rates for all conditions are shown in Table 4. 
A 2 (semantic condition: compatible vs. incompatible) × 2 (evaluative 
condition: congruent vs. incongruent) ANOVA on RTs yielded a significant main 
effect of semantic condition, F(1,29) = 19.77, p < .001, MSE = 329, but no main 
effect of evaluative condition, F < 0.01. Although the interaction missed the 
                                                                                                                                     
are the immediately preceding time point and the corresponding LRP amplitude, 
respectively. 
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conventional level of significance, F(1,29) = 2.15, p = .08 (one-tailed)6, MSE = 
359―as hypothesized―the S–R-based semantic priming effect was significantly 
positive given evaluative congruency, M = 20 ms (SD = 18 ms), t(29) = 5.89, p < 
.001, dz = 1.07, but was not significant given evaluative incongruency, M = 10 ms 
(SD = 32 ms), t(29) = 1.64, p = .11, dz = 0.30. Both S–S-based evaluative priming 
effects pointed to the expected direction but failed the conventional level of 
significance: the effect was positively signed given semantic compatibility, M = 5 
ms (SD = 26 ms), t(29) = 1.12, p = .27, dz = 0.20, and negatively signed given 
semantic incompatibility, M = -5 ms (SD = 22 ms), t(29) = -1.23, p = .23, dz = -
0.22. 
An analogous ANOVA on error rates yielded a significant main effect of 
semantic condition, F(1,29) = 5.51, p < .05, MSE = 0.001, which corresponded to 
a positive S–R-based semantic priming effect of M = 1.7 % (SD = 3.9 %), t(29) = 
2.35, p < .05, dz = 0.43. Neither the main effect of evaluative condition, F(1,29) = 
1.75, p = .20, MSE = 0, nor the interaction reached significance, F < 1. 
 
TABLE 4. 
Mean RTs (in ms) as a Function of Semantic Condition and Evaluative Condition (Errors in % in 
Parentheses); Priming Effects for RTs (in ms; Standard errors in Brackets) (Experiment 3) 
 Valence  
Congruent Incongruent 
S–S-based Evaluative 
Priming Effect 
Semantic    
Compatible 630 (2.6) 635 (3.3) 5 [5] 
Incompatible 650 (4.5) 645 (4.7) -5 [4] 
S–R-based Semantic 
Priming Effect 
20*** [3] 10 [6]  
Note: Priming scores (evaluative and semantic) are calculated by subtracting mean RTs for 
congruent/compatible priming from mean RTs for incongruent/incompatible priming.  
*** p < .001 
 
                                                 
6
 Note: given the specific prediction and the equivalence of an F-test with 
one numerator df to a two-tailed t-test, an one-tailed test is allowed even for F-
tests (see, e.g., Maxwell & Delaney, 1990). 
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ERP data. After the exclusion of trials due to artifact rejection and due to 
the application of the same exclusion criteria as applied to the behavioral data, the 
mean numbers of included trials were M = 89.7 % (SD = 5.9 %) in the 
semantically compatible and evaluatively congruent condition, M = 88.5 % (SD = 
5.4 %) in the compatible and incongruent condition, M = 87.5 % (SD = 6.2 %) in 
the incompatible and congruent condition, and M = 85.6 % (SD = 5.1 %) in the 
incompatible and incongruent condition. In a 2 (semantic condition) × 2 
(evaluative condition) ANOVA on the numbers of valid trials, the main effect of 
semantic condition, F(1,29) = 9.28, p < .01, as well as the main effect of 
evaluative condition, F(1,29) = 6.22, p < .05, reached significance. The interaction 
was not significant, F < 1. Both main effects resulted from more errors in 
semantically incompatible than compatible conditions, and more errors in the case 
of evaluative incongruency compared with congruency (see Table 4). Importantly, 
the differently large number of excluded trials in the experimental conditions did 
not occur due to differences in the amount of artifacts. The event-related 
potentials at midline electrodes are shown in Figure 3. 
N2 mean amplitudes. N2 mean amplitudes at the CPz electrode for all 
conditions are shown in Table 5. A 2 (semantic condition: compatible vs. 
incompatible) × 2 (evaluative condition: congruent vs. incongruent) ANOVA on 
N2 mean amplitudes yielded no significant main effect, F(1,29) = 1.67, p = .21, 
MSE = 3.31, for the factor semantic condition and, F < 1, for the factor evaluative 
condition, respectively. Due to outliers in the priming effects, I analyzed the 
interaction effect and the priming effects in Wilcoxon rank tests. The interaction 
reached significance, Z = -1.62, p = .05 (one-tailed). In simple effect tests, the S–
R-based semantic priming effect was significantly negative given evaluative 
congruency, M = -0.86 µV (SD = 2.72 µV), Z = -2.07, p < .05, φ = 0.38, but did 
not emerge given incongruency, M = 0 µV, Z = -0.03, p = .98, φ = 0. Both S–S-
based evaluative priming effects missed the conventional level of significance, M 
= -0.60 µV (SD = 2.04 µV), Z = -1.47, p = .14, φ = 0.27 in case of semantic 
compatibility, and M = 0.26 µV (SD = 2.27 µV), Z = -0.73, p = .47, φ = 0.13 in 
case of incompatibility. Difference waveforms at the CPz electrode reflecting the 
S–R-based semantic priming effects are shown in Figure 4. Figure 5 displays the 
corresponding topographic voltage distributions.  
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FIGURE 3.  
Grand average ERP waveforms at midline electrodes from frontal to parietal positions for all 
experimental conditions (Experiment 3). 
Note: black lines = semantically compatible and evaluatively congruent, red lines = semantically 
compatible and evaluatively incongruent, blue lines = semantically incompatible and evaluatively 
congruent, and green lines = semantically incompatible and evaluatively incongruent. 
The electrode positions at which the N2 component and the P3 component, respectively, were 
analyzed are indicated by arrows.  
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TABLE 5. 
N2 mean amplitudes (in µV) of the grand average ERPs at the CPz electrode within the time 
interval 300 – 380 ms posttarget onset as a Function of Semantic Condition and Evaluative 
Condition (Standard deviations in Parentheses); Priming Effects (in µV; Standard errors in 
Brackets) (Experiment 3) 
 Valence  
Congruent Incongruent 
S–S-based Evaluative 
Priming Effect 
Semantic      
Compatible 3.68 (4.40) 3.08 (5.18) -0.60 [0.37] 
Incompatible 2.82 (4.89) 3.08 (4.65) 0.26 [0.42] 
S–R-based Semantic 
Priming Effect 
-0.86* [0.50] 0.00 [0.39]  
Note: Priming scores (evaluative and semantic) are calculated by subtracting mean amplitudes for 
congruent/compatible priming from mean amplitudes for incongruent/incompatible priming. 
* p < .05 
 
P3 peak latencies. P3 peak latencies at the Pz electrode for all conditions 
are shown in Table 6. A 2 (semantic condition: compatible vs. incompatible) × 2 
(evaluative condition: congruent vs. incongruent) ANOVA on P3 peak latencies 
yielded no significant main effect, either for the factor semantic condition, F < 1, 
or the factor evaluative condition, F(1,29) = 2.28, p = .14, MSE = 2312. Due to 
outliers in the priming effects, I again analyzed the interaction effect and the 
priming effects in Wilcoxon rank tests. The interaction reached significance, Z = -
1.64, p = .05 (one-tailed). Both S–R-based semantic priming effects were not 
significant, M = 10 ms (SD = 63 ms), Z = -0.98, p = .33, φ = 0.18, given 
evaluative congruency, and M = -18 ms (SD = 60 ms), Z = -1.86, p = .06, φ = 
0.34, given incongruency. The S–S-based evaluative priming effect was 
significantly negative in case of semantic incompatibility, M = -27 ms (SD = 74 
ms), Z = -2.10, p < .05, φ = 0.38, while it did not significantly differ from zero in 
case of compatibility, M = 1 ms (SD = 64 ms), Z = -0.22, p = .83, φ = 0.04. 
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FIGURE 4. 
Mean ERP difference waveforms at the CPz electrode reflecting the S–R-based semantic priming 
effect given evaluative congruency (black line) and incongruency (red line); N2 time interval (i.e., 
300-380 ms after target onset) coloured blue. 
 
 
FIGURE 5. 
Topographic voltage maps of mean ERP difference waveforms reflecting the S–R-based semantic 
priming effect given evaluative congruency (left) and incongruency (right) in the N2 time interval 
(i.e., 300-380 ms after target onset). 
73 
TABLE 6. 
P3 peak latencies (in ms) of the grand average ERPs at the Pz electrode within the time interval 
380 – 680 ms posttarget onset as a Function of Semantic condition and Evaluative condition 
(Standard deviations in Parentheses); Priming Effects (in ms; Standard errors in Brackets) 
(Experiment 3) 
 Valence  
Congruent Incongruent 
S–S-based Evaluative 
Priming Effect 
Semantic      
Compatible 516 (60) 517 (63) 1 [12] 
Incompatible 526 (68) 499 (61) -27* [13] 
S–R-based Semantic 
 Priming Effect 
10 [12] -18 [11]  
Note: Priming scores (evaluative and semantic) are calculated by subtracting mean latencies for 
congruent/compatible priming from mean latencies for incongruent/incompatible priming. 
* p < .05 
 
LRP onset latencies. The LRP waveforms for all conditions are shown in 
Figure 6 and mean LRP onset latencies are shown in Table 7. The priming effects 
pointed to the expected directions, even though they were not significant in simple 
effect tests. The S–R-based semantic priming effect was positively signed given 
evaluative congruency, M = 16 ms (SEM = 28 ms), t < 1, while it was negatively 
signed given incongruency, M = -30 ms (SEM = 16 ms), t(29) = -1.88, p > .05. 
The S–S-based evaluative priming effect was positively signed in case of 
semantic compatibility, M = 37 ms (SEM = 30 ms), t(29) = 1.23, p > .05, and 
negatively signed in case of incompatibility, M = -10 ms (SEM = 12 ms), t < 1. 
The interaction of semantic and evaluative factors failed to be significant in a 
paired t-test, t(29) = 1.42, p > .05.  
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FIGURE 6. 
Grand average LRP waveforms at the C3 and C4 electrodes for the experimental conditions. 
Note: black lines = semantically compatible and evaluatively congruent, red lines = semantically 
compatible and evaluatively incongruent, blue lines = semantically incompatible and evaluatively 
congruent, and green lines = semantically incompatible and evaluatively incongruent. 
 
TABLE 7. 
50%-peak latencies (in ms) of the grand average LRP as a Function of Semantic condition and 
Evaluative condition; Priming Effects (in ms; Standard errors in Brackets) (Experiment 3) 
 Valence  
Congruent Incongruent 
S–S-based Evaluative 
Priming Effect 
Semantic      
Compatible 361 398 37 [30] 
Incompatible 378 368 -10 [12] 
S–R-based Semantic  
Priming Effect 
16 [28] -30 [16]  
Note: Priming scores (evaluative and semantic) are calculated by subtracting mean latencies for 
congruent/compatible priming from mean latencies for incongruent/incompatible priming (see 
Methods for further description). Slight inconsistencies between the left and the right part of the 
table are due to rounding.  
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3.2.3 Discussion 
The priming effects in mean RTs replicated the findings in the previous 
experiments; even though, I have to admit that the interaction of the semantic and 
evaluative factors missed the conventional level of significance. However, the 
dependence of the S–R-based semantic priming effect on evaluative congruency, 
which was evidenced by a significant effect in case of evaluative congruency but 
no effect in case of incongruency, implicates that only an evaluatively congruent 
prime was activated enough to interfere with the target response to an observable 
extent. Similarly, the semantic factor influenced the sign of the S–S-based 
evaluative priming effect, yielding a negatively signed effect given semantic 
incompatibility which, however, did not significantly differ from zero. The reason 
for this non-significance might be that―despite the negative SOA―an 
evaluatively congruent prime still facilitated target encoding, reducing the 
negative effect due to prime maintenance and response competition. Even more 
corroborated is the assumption of a residual target-encoding facilitation by the 
positively signed S–S-based evaluative priming effect in case of semantic 
compatibility. 
In the ERP components, the interaction of the semantic and evaluative 
factors tended to the expected direction, as well, and reached significance in N2 
mean amplitudes and P3 peak latencies. The S–R-based semantic priming effect 
in N2 mean amplitudes equaled the effect in mean RTs: Given evaluative 
congruency, larger N2 mean amplitudes arised in case of semantic incompatibility 
as compared to compatibility. In contrast, if prime and target were evaluatively 
incongruent, the S–R-based semantic priming effect did not differ from zero. As 
the N2 component has typically been associated with conflict detection or 
cognitive control (see Folstein & van Petten, 2008; van Veen & Carter, 2002a), 
the significant influence of evaluative congruency on the S–R-based semantic 
priming effect corroborates the assumption that the prime’s potential to conflict 
with the target response depended on its evaluative congruency with the target. 
N2 mean amplitudes did not significantly differ with regard to evaluative 
congruency or incongruency, yielding no significant S–S-based evaluative 
priming effects.  
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In P3 peak latencies, the significance pattern of the single priming effects 
differed from the pattern in mean RTs and N2 mean amplitudes. While the S–R-
based semantic priming effects only numerically pointed to the expected 
directions, the negatively signed S–S-based evaluative priming effect given 
semantic incompatibility reached the conventional level of significance. That is, if 
prime and target competed for response resources, P3 peak latencies were delayed 
in case of evaluative congruency as compared to incongruency. This latency 
difference can be interpreted in the way that evaluative congruency increased the 
effort required for the response conflict resolution in case of semantic 
incompatibility (Kutas, et al., 1977; Liu et al., 2010; Magliero et al., 1984; 
McCarthy & Donchin, 1981). The reason for the different significance pattern of 
the priming effects in P3 peak latencies compared to the priming effects in mean 
RTs and N2 mean amplitudes might lie in the main effect of semantic 
compatibility in P3 peak latencies: P3 peak latencies were delayed in the case of 
semantic compatibility as compared to incompatibility. Since the task required a 
semantic categorization of the target, participants might have tried to separate 
prime and target information in order to avoid confusion. Semantic compatibility 
might have hampered this separation, whereby the effort to categorize the target 
increased. I have to admit that this post-hoc interpretation is highly speculative 
and does not conclusively explain why the main effect of semantic compatibility 
emerged in P3 peak latencies only, but not in mean RTs and N2 mean amplitudes. 
As―so as I know―this experiment was the first study examining ERPs in an S–
S-based evaluative priming paradigm, the interpretation of the single ERP 
components is at the very beginning and further research is essentially necessary 
to gain more knowledge about the ERP correlates of S–S-based evaluative 
priming. The priming effects in LRP onset latencies also tended to the expected 
directions and resembled the priming effects in mean RTs. Yet, the S–R-based 
semantic priming effect was not just reduced in case of evaluative incongruency, 
but it was even negatively signed. Due to the failure of significance, however, I 
refrain from interpreting the pattern of priming effects in LRP onset latencies. 
It might surprise that I did not find any priming effects in the N400 
component. Since effects in the N400 component have typically been reported in 
semantic priming studies with larger amplitudes for unrelated compared with 
related prime-target pairs (e.g., Anderson & Holcomb, 1995; Deacon et al., 1998; 
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Deacon, Hewitt, Yang, & Nagata, 2000; see Kutas & Van Petten, 1988 for a 
review) or in evaluative priming experiments with larger amplitudes for 
incongruent in comparison with congruent prime-target pairs (e.g., Eder et al., 
2011; Morris, Squires, Taber, & Lodge, 2003; Zhang, Li, Gold, & Jiang, 2010; 
Zhang et al., 2006). In line with the spreading activation explanation of priming 
effects, the N400 component has been associated with the mechanism of 
facilitated target encoding due to the activation of a related/congruent prime (e.g., 
Deacon et al., 2000; Franklin, Dien, Neely, Huber, & Waterson, 2007) or the 
integration of semantic information in a given context (e.g., Brown & Hagoort, 
1993; Brown, Hagoort, & Chwilla, 2000). As I applied a negative SOA-procedure 
with the aim to minimize the process of target-encoding facilitation, I did not 
predict any priming effects in the N400 component. 
Generally, the effects in N2 mean amplitudes, P3 peak latencies, as well as 
LRP onset latencies resembled the pattern of priming effects in mean RTs. Thus, 
the ERP data provided a more fine-grained measurement of the cognitive 
processes involved in this particular S–S-based evaluative priming design with a 
negative SOA. While the effects in N2 mean amplitudes suggest that conflict 
detection and cognitive control were influenced by an interaction of semantic 
compatibility and evaluative congruency, the effects in P3 peak latencies 
corroborate the assumption that evaluative congruency influenced the amount of 
categorization effort which was necessary for semantic target categorization. The 
pattern of effects in LRP onset latencies implicate that an interaction of semantic 
compatibility and evaluative congruency influenced the prime’s influence on the 
target response preparation. When prime and target were associated with different 
key presses (as they belonged to opposite semantic categories), the target response 
preparation was expected to be hampered. This, however, depended on evaluative 
congruency between prime and target. 
The experiments, reported so far, provided behavioral and 
electrophysiological evidence for the idea that evaluative congruency of prime 
and target is not associated with facilitated target encoding only, but may maintain 
the prime activation as well. This latter component of the mutual facilitation 
process was largely neglected in evaluative priming research. Based on the 
assumption that evaluatively congruent prime and target support their activation in 
a mutual manner, specific parameters, like the temporal sequence of prime and 
78 
target onset, are expected to affect the relative size of facilitated target encoding 
and maintained prime activation due to evaluative congruency. As I was mainly 
interested in exploring the facilitative component of maintained prime activation 
given evaluative congruency, I used an experimental setting with the aim to 
maximize the supportive influence of an evaluatively congruent target on prime 
maintenance and to simultaneously minimize the facilitation of an evaluatively 
congruent prime on target encoding. Therefore, I applied a negative SOA-
procedure. 
In comparison with the mainly positive (e.g., Bargh et al., 1996; De 
Houwer, Hermans, & Spruyt, 2001; De Houwer & Randell, 2002; 2004; Everaert 
et al., 2011; Giner-Sorolla et al., 1999; Hermans et al., 1994; 2001; Spruyt & 
Hermans, 2008; Spruyt et al., 2009; Spruyt, De Houwer et al., 2007; Spruyt et al., 
2002; Spruyt, Hermans, De Houwer, & Eelen, 2004; Spruyt, Hermans, et al., 
2007) or null (see, e.g., De Houwer et al., 2002; Klauer & Musch, 2001; Klinger 
et al., 2000; Spruyt, Hermans, Pandelaere et al., 2004) S–S-based evaluative 
priming effects in previous S–S-based evaluative priming studies with a positive 
SOA-procedure, the effects in Experiments 1 to 3 were shifted to the negative 
direction, evidenced by negatively signed effects in case of response competition 
between prime and target. The crux of these comparisons, however, lies in the fact 
that they are made across different studies. As―beyond the SOA-
procedure―much more experimental parameters (e.g., the stimulus material, the 
amount of stimuli, and the size of stimuli on the screen) may differ between the 
previously reported studies and my experiments, the SOA-procedure may not be 
primarily responsible for the differently signed S–S-based evaluative priming 
effects. As a consequence, I aimed to vary the relative impact of target-encoding 
facilitation and prime maintenance in the S–S-based evaluative priming paradigm. 
For this, I applied a manipulation of the SOA in the same experiment and tested 
the influence of this manipulation on the sign of the S–S-based evaluative priming 
effect (see Experiment 4). 
Another critical point of the experiments, reported so far, consists of the 
question whether the finding of mutual facilitation by evaluative congruency 
characterizes a phenomenon that is specific for the evaluative dimension or 
whether it may be reproducible with any other shared semantic feature of prime 
and target. I examined this issue in Experiment 5.  
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4 Testing the limits 
In this Section, my objective was to explore and discuss two crucial 
questions that stayed unanswered so far. First (Experiment 4), I more thoroughly 
considered the process of mutual facilitation of evaluatively congruent concepts, 
as it is postulated by the three-process model of evaluative priming. For this, I 
manipulated the relative size of the facilitative components in the evaluative 
priming paradigm, that is, facilitated target encoding and maintained prime 
activation, within the same experiment. Second (Experiment 5), I explored in how 
far the findings in my experiments reported until now are specific for the 
evaluative connotations of semantic concepts. For this, I alternated the assignment 
of the evaluative and semantic categories to the task-irrelevant (i.e., S–S-based) 
and task-relevant (i.e., S–R-based) dimension. That is, the semantic categories 
became task-irrelevant, while the evaluative connotations became task-relevant. 
By this variation, I was able to test the effect of same semantic category 
membership of prime and target on the evaluative categorization process. 
4.1 Mutual facilitation manipulated (Experiment 4) 
In Experiments 1 to 3; I applied a negative SOA-procedure in order to 
strengthen prime maintenance while weakening target-encoding facilitation. The 
usefulness of this operationalization was evidenced by the negative shift of the S–
S-based evaluative priming effect, resulting in an observable negatively signed 
effect if the maintained prime interfered with the target response. I have to admit, 
however, that a direct inference from the negatively signed S–S-based evaluative 
priming effect to the influence by the SOA-procedure is only allowed if the SOA 
is manipulated within the same experiment and―ideally―within-participants. I 
realized such a SOA-manipulation in Experiment 4. Replicating Experiment 2a 
concerning design, material, and procedure, I varied the SOA across blocks, 
keeping all other parameters constant: While in one block a negative SOA-
procedure was used (just like in Experiment 2a), in the other block a positive 
SOA-procedure was applied. 
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Comparing the study by Wentura and Frings (2008) and the present 
Experiment 1 (both studies examining evaluative priming in the naming task) may 
provide an indication which effects to expect in Experiment 4: Whereas in the 
former study (i.e., an experiment with positive SOA), the S–S-based evaluative 
priming effect was positively signed in case of no response conflict, it dropped to 
a null effect in case of response conflict. In the latter study (i.e., an experiment 
with negative SOA), the effects shifted to the negative direction: Even though, 
there was still some positive S–S-based evaluative priming effect in case of no 
response conflict, the effect was negatively signed in case of response conflict. 
Thus, the SOA did not moderate the interaction of evaluative congruency vs. 
incongruency and the presence vs. absence of response conflict. The positive 
SOA-procedure simply added a positive component to the S–S-based evaluative 
priming effect. That means―in line with the rationale of the three-process 
model―the amount of target-encoding facilitation was increased with a positive 
SOA. 
Thus, for the negative SOA-block I expected to replicate the results of 
Experiment 2a/b, that is, a significant interaction of evaluative and semantic 
factors arising from maintained prime activation in case of evaluative congruency 
with an increased potential to interfere with the target response. In terms of the 
priming effects, this means a significantly more positive S–R-based semantic 
priming effect given evaluative congruency compared with incongruency, and a 
significantly more negatively signed S–S-based evaluative priming effect given 
semantic incompatibility compared with compatibility. 
For the positive SOA-block, I expected the same interaction between 
evaluative and semantic factors. Due to enhanced facilitation of evaluatively 
congruent primes on target encoding, I predicted a positive shift of the S–S-based 
evaluative priming effect (compared with the negative SOA-block): In the case of 
semantic compatibility, I expected a positive S–S-based evaluative priming effect; 
in the case of semantic incompatibility, I expected this positive effect significantly 
decreased due to the opposite influences of response conflict and target-encoding 
facilitation. Concerning the S–R-based semantic priming effects, I analogously 
hypothesized a significantly more positive effect in the case of evaluative 
congruency compared with incongruency as evaluative congruency was expected 
to increase the prime’s potential to interfere with the target response. 
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Moreover, a preceding prime should have more potential to interfere with 
the target response than a following prime. Thus, I predicted a significantly larger 
S–R-based semantic priming effect averaged for evaluative congruency and 
incongruency in the positive SOA-block than in the negative SOA-block. 
4.1.1 Method 
Participants. 60 students (42 women; 18 men) participated in the 
experiment; their median age was 22 years (range from 18 to 30 years). 
Design, Materials, and Procedure. Design, materials, and procedure 
were the same as in Experiment 2a with the following exceptions: The factor SOA 
was added, resulting in a 2 (SOA) × 2 (prime semantic) × 2 (target semantic) × 2 
(prime valence) × 2 (target valence) within-participants design. The evaluative 
priming task consisted of two blocks (each consisting of 160 trials) that differed in 
SOA only. While the negative SOA-block was identical to the evaluative priming 
task in Experiment 2a, in the positive SOA-block, the prime appeared first for 100 
ms and was followed by the target, that remained on the screen until a response 
was given (i.e., SOA = 100 ms). The block sequence was counterbalanced across 
participants. 
4.1.2 Results 
The average error rate across participants was 3.9 % (i.e., 3.6 % in the 
negative SOA-block and 4.2 % in the positive SOA-block). Mean RTs were 
derived from correct responses, and RTs shorter than 200 ms or longer than 1,500 
ms were discarded (0.4 % of trials in the negative SOA-block and 0.3 % of trials 
in the positive SOA-block). Mean RTs and error rates for all conditions and both 
SOA-blocks are shown in Table 8. 
A 2 (SOA: negative vs. positive) × 2 (semantic condition: compatible vs. 
incompatible) × 2 (evaluative condition: congruent vs. incongruent) ANOVA on 
RTs yielded a significant main effect of semantic condition, F(1,59) = 266.12, p < 
.001, MSE = 603. This effect was qualified by a significant interaction between 
SOA and semantic condition, F(1,59) = 36.48, p < .001, MSE = 587. The S–R-
based semantic priming effect was significantly more positive in the positive, M = 
50 ms (SD = 24 ms), as compared with the negative SOA-block, M = 23 ms (SD = 
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24 ms), t(59) = 6.04, p < .001, dz = 0.78. Thus, as expected, the preceding prime 
in the positive SOA-block exerted a larger influence on the target response than 
the following prime in the negative SOA-block. 
 
TABLE 8. 
Mean RTs (in ms) as a Function of Semantic Condition and Evaluative Condition (Errors in % in 
Parentheses), separately for the negative and the positive SOA-block; Priming Effects for RTs (in 
ms; Standard errors in Brackets) (Experiment 4) 
Note: Priming scores (evaluative and semantic) are calculated by subtracting mean RTs for 
congruent/compatible priming from mean RTs for incongruent/incompatible priming. Slight 
inconsistencies between the left and the right part of the table are due to rounding. 
* p < .05, *** p < .001 
 
Most important, the predicted interaction of semantic and evaluative 
condition was significant as well, F(1,59) = 7.61, p < .01, MSE = 322. The S–S-
based evaluative priming effect was significantly more positive given semantic 
compatibility, as compared to incompatibility and―analogously―the S–R-based 
semantic priming effect was significantly more positive given evaluative 
congruency in comparison with incongruency, t(59) = 2.02, p < .05, dz = 0.26, for 
the negative SOA-block and t(59) = 1.96, p < .05, dz = 0.25, for the positive SOA-
block. All other effects failed the significance level, F < 1 for the main effect of 
SOA as well as the interaction of SOA, semantic, and evaluative condition, 
negative SOA-block 
Valence  
Congruent Incongruent 
S–S-based Evaluative 
Priming effect 
Semantic    
Compatible 531 (2.2) 536 (2.2) 5 [3] 
Incompatible 560 (5.2) 554 (4.9) -6 [4] 
S–R-based Semantic 
Priming effect 
28*** [5] 18*** [3]  
positive SOA-block   
 
 
Semantic    
Compatible 516 (1.5) 524 (1.4) 8* [3] 
Incompatible 570 (6.8) 570 (7.0) 0 [3] 
S–R-based Semantic 
Priming effect 
54*** [4] 46*** [3]  
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F(1,59) = 1.21, p = .28, MSE = 260 for the main effect of evaluative condition, 
and F(1,59) = 1.29, p = .26, MSE = 425 for the interaction of SOA and evaluative 
condition. 
The pattern of the single priming effects in the negative SOA-block 
replicated the effects in Experiment 2a/b: The S–S-based evaluative priming 
effect was positively signed in the case of semantic compatibility, M = 5 ms (SD = 
23 ms), and significantly decreased to a negatively signed effect in the case of 
semantic incompatibility, M = -6 ms (SD = 30 ms). Albeit, I have to concede that 
both effects did not significantly deviate from zero, t(59) = 1.54, p = .13, dz = 
0.20, given semantic compatibility and t(59) = -1.44, p = .16, dz = -0.18, given 
semantic incompatibility. Even if the S–R-based semantic priming effect was 
significantly positive in the case of evaluative congruency, M = 28 ms (SD = 36 
ms), t(59) = 6.16, p < .001, dz = 0.80, and incongruency, M = 18 ms (SD = 26 
ms), t(59) = 5.31, p < .001, dz = 0.69, the significant reduction given evaluative 
incongruency as compared to congruency was the crucial replication. 
In the positive SOA-block, the S–S-based evaluative priming effect was 
significantly positive in case of semantic compatibility, M = 8 ms (SD = 24 ms), 
t(59) = 2.44, p < .05, dz = 0.32, but significantly decreased to a null effect in case 
of semantic incompatibility, M = 0 ms (SD = 24 ms), t < 1. Both S–R-based 
semantic priming effects were significantly positive, M = 54 ms (SD = 32 ms), 
t(59) = 13.18, p < .001, dz = 1.70, in the case of evaluative congruency, and M = 
46 ms (SD = 26 ms), t(59) = 13.81, p < .001, dz = 1.78, in the case of 
incongruency. Here, again, the significant difference of the effects was the most 
important finding. 
As predicted, the priming effects were shifted to the positive direction with 
a positive as compared to a negative SOA-procedure: For the S–R-based semantic 
priming effect, this shift was significant, M = 27 ms (SD = 34 ms), t(59) = 6.04, p 
< .001, dz = 0.78, while it was not significant for the S–S-based evaluative 
priming effect, M = 4 ms (SD = 29 ms), t(59) = 1.13, p = .26, dz = 0.15. 
An analogous ANOVA on error rates yielded a significant main effect of 
semantic condition, F(1,59) = 107.51, p < .001, MSE = 0.002. This effect was 
qualified by a significant interaction of SOA and semantic condition, F(1,59) = 
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16.12, p < .001, MSE = 0.001. The S–R-based semantic priming effect was 
significantly more positive in the positive SOA-block, M = 5.5 % (SD = 4.7 %), 
than in the negative SOA-block, M = 2.9 % (SD = 3.2 %), t(59) = 4.02, p < .001, 
dz = 0.52. All other effects failed to reach significance: F(1,59) = 3.74, p = .06, 
MSE = 0.001 for the main effect of SOA and F < 1 for the main effect of 
evaluative condition and any other interaction. 
4.1.3 Discussion 
The results of Experiment 4 clearly corroborate the hypotheses: There was 
a significant interaction of evaluative congruency and semantic compatibility that 
was, in turn, influenced by the temporal sequence of prime and target onset. As 
expected and in line with the claim of the three-process model, evaluative 
congruency was associated with facilitated target encoding as well as maintained 
prime activation, whereas the respective SOA determined whether the first or the 
second component of the mutual facilitation process predominated. 
The results in the negative SOA-block replicate the findings of 
Experiments 2 and 3: The S–S-based evaluative priming effect decreased 
significantly to a negatively signed effect from the semantically compatible to the 
incompatible condition; just like the S–R-based semantic priming effect decreased 
significantly from the evaluatively congruent to the incongruent condition. I have 
to concede that the negatively signed S–S-based evaluative priming effect given 
semantic incompatibility was not significant, which may be attributed―as 
considered previously―to a residual effect of target-encoding facilitation by an 
evaluatively congruent prime (despite its posttarget onset). This post hoc 
explanation becomes even more plausible by the small positive S–S-based 
evaluative priming effect in the case of semantic compatibility, which was found 
in all previous experiments as well. 
In the positive SOA-block, the interaction of semantic and evaluative 
factors was also significant. Here, however, the S–S-based evaluative priming 
effect was significantly positive in the semantically compatible condition and 
decreased significantly to a null effect in the incompatible condition. Thus, 
compared with the negative SOA-block (and the previous experiments), the effect 
was generally shifted to the positive direction; this was due to a larger facilitation 
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of target encoding (and less prime maintenance) in the case of evaluative 
congruency. Independent from evaluative congruency, the preceding prime, in 
comparison with the following prime, had a higher potential to interfere with the 
target response, thus, yielding a significantly larger S–R-based semantic priming 
effect in the positive compared with the negative SOA-block. 
The present results can easily be reconciled with the positive S–S-based 
evaluative priming effect reported by Spruyt, De Houwer, and colleagues (2007), 
that corroborated the assumption of target-encoding facilitation in the case of 
evaluative congruency. The three-process model’s corollary that the target 
supports the activation maintenance of an evaluatively congruent prime is of no 
consequence for their results because the authors used primes that were neutral in 
regard to the response categories. In addition, Spruyt, De Houwer, and colleagues 
found a positive S–S-based evaluative priming effect only, if the evaluative 
dimension was attended to. I yet found valence-dependent effects, even though 
this precondition was not met. Clarification of this slight discrepancy can be left 
to future research: The assumptions derived from the present results and those of 
Spruyt, De Houwer, and colleagues focus on different facets of the overall process 
and are not contradictory. 
In order to clarify the purpose of Experiment 5, it is necessary to interpret 
the findings of the Experiments 2, 3, and 4 at a more abstract level. In these 
experiments, I orthogonally varied two broad categorical dimensions A and B, 
and found that the S–R-based priming effect for the task-relevant dimension A 
was moderated by the prime-target congruency on dimension B. Up to now, I 
implicitly hypothesized that this moderation depends on dimension B being the 
evaluative dimension (in line with theoretical ideas of prioritized evaluative 
processing; see, e.g., Bargh, 1997; Öhmann et al., 2001; Zajonc, 1980). This was, 
however, not explicitly tested. Thus, I aimed to examine in Experiment 5 whether 
the results in the preceding experiments reflected a valence-specific phenomenon 
or a more general effect caused by the common categorical membership of prime 
and target. For this, I replicated Experiment 2a/b but changed the task-relevant 
dimension: Instead of a semantic categorization task, I used an evaluation task in 
which the evaluative dimension was (obviously) task-relevant. Thus, in terms of 
De Houwer’s (2003) terminology, I examined S–S-based semantic priming effects 
with the materials embedded in an S–R-based evaluative priming design. If the 
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evaluative dimension is crucial for the findings from the preceding experiments, I 
should find a clear S–R-based evaluative priming effect without any moderation 
by semantic congruency as well as no S–S-based semantic priming effect. By 
contrast, if the findings in Experiments 2 to 4 reflect a general phenomenon due to 
common semantic category membership, I should find a similar interaction of 
evaluative and semantic factors in Experiment 5. That is, I would expect a clear 
positive S–R-based evaluative priming effect in case of semantic congruency and 
no effect in case of semantic incongruency; additionally, I should find a 
negatively signed S–S-based semantic priming effect in case of evaluative 
incompatibility. 
4.2 Mutual facilitation as valence-specific phenomenon 
(Experiment 5a/b) 
I replicated Experiment 2a/b using the evaluation task with the evaluative 
categories (obviously) being the task-relevant dimension. Mean RT differences 
between evaluatively compatible and incompatible prime-target pairs were taken 
to reflect S–R-based evaluative priming effects; mean RT differences between 
semantically congruent and incongruent pairs were taken to reflect S–S-based 
semantic priming effects. 
4.2.1 Method 
Participants. In Experiment 5a, 37 students (26 women; 11 men) 
participated; their median age was 21 years (range from 17 to 29 years). In 
Experiment 5b, 31 students (25 women; 6 men) participated, their median age was 
20 years (range from 19 to 27 years). 
Design, Materials, and Procedure. Design, materials, and procedure 
were comparable to those of Experiment 2a/b with the following exceptions: I 
used the evaluation task instead of the semantic categorization task, meaning that 
participants were instructed to evaluate each picture (Exp. 5a) or word (Exp. 5b) 
as positive or negative, as quickly and accurately as possible. Additionally, I 
replaced the word Aasgeier (vulture in English) with the word Schnake (crane fly 
in English) in Experiment 5b (due to the ambiguity of the word Aasgeier with 
regard to the semantic categories persons and animals; see Experiment 2b). Mean 
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valences—as rated on a scale from 1 to 9 by the participants after Experiment 
5b—were M = 7.88 (SD = 0.56) and M = 7.19 (SD = 0.83) for positive person and 
animal words, respectively, and M = 1.82 (SD = 0.49) and M = 3.35 (SD = 1.15) 
for negative person and animal words, respectively. Ratings for positive and 
negative words differed significantly, t(9) = 22.56, p < .001, for person words and 
t(9) = 9.12, p < .001, for animal words. The sets of person and animal words did 
not differ with regard to mean valence, t(19) = -1.19, p = .25. 
4.2.2 Results 
Experiment 5a. The average error rate across participants was 4.3 %. 
Mean RTs were derived from correct responses, and RTs shorter than 200 ms or 
longer than 1,500 ms were discarded (0.4 % of trials). Mean RTs and error rates 
for all conditions are shown in Table 9. 
 
TABLE 9. 
Mean RTs (in ms) as a Function of Semantic Condition and Evaluative Condition (Errors in % in 
Parentheses); Priming Effects for RTs (in ms; Standard errors in Brackets) (Experiment 5a) 
 Valence  
 
Compatible Incompatible 
S–R-based Evaluative 
Priming effect 
Semantic    
Congruent 557 (2.2) 569 (5.5) 11* [4] 
Incongruent 551 (3.2) 570 (6.5) 19*** [5] 
S–S-based Semantic 
Priming effect 
-6 [4] 2 [5] 
 
Note: Priming scores (evaluative and semantic) are calculated by subtracting mean RTs for 
compatible/congruent priming from mean RTs for incompatible/incongruent priming. Slight 
inconsistencies between the left and the right part of the table are due to rounding. 
* p < .05, *** p < .001 
 
A 2 (evaluative condition: compatible vs. incompatible) × 2 (semantic 
condition: congruent vs. incongruent) ANOVA on RTs yielded a significant main 
effect of evaluative condition, F(1,36) = 20.82, p < .001, MSE = 400, but neither a 
main effect of semantic condition, F < 1, nor a significant interaction, F(1,36) = 
1.42, p = .24, MSE = 378. The S–R-based evaluative priming effect was 
significantly positive both in the case of semantic congruency, M = 11 ms (SD = 
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27 ms), t(36) = 2.54, p < .05, dz = 0.44, and incongruency, M = 19 ms (SD = 29 
ms), t(36) = 3.96, p < .001, dz = 0.65. However, there was no S–S-based semantic 
priming effect, either for evaluatively compatible, M = -6 ms (SD = 26 ms), t(36) 
= -1.37, p = .18, dz = 0.22, or incompatible prime-target pairs, M = 2 ms (SD = 32 
ms), t < 1. 
An analogous ANOVA on error rates yielded a significant main effect of 
evaluative condition, F(1,36) = 49.63, p < .001, MSE = 0.001, corresponding to a 
positive S–R-based evaluative priming effect of M = 3.3 % (SD = 2.9 %), t(36) = 
7.05, p < .001, dz = 1.16. Neither the main effect of semantic condition, F(1,36) = 
3.35, p = .08, MSE = 0.001, nor the interaction reached significance, F < 1. 
 
Experiment 5b. The average error rate across participants was 6.6 %. 
Mean RTs were derived from correct responses, and RTs shorter than 200 ms or 
longer than 1,500 ms were discarded (0.4 % of trials). ). Mean RTs and error rates 
for all conditions are shown in Table 10. 
 
TABLE 10. 
Mean RTs (in ms) as a Function of Semantic Condition and Evaluative Condition (Errors in % in 
Parentheses); Priming Effects for RTs (in ms; Standard errors in Brackets) (Experiment 5b) 
 Valence  
 
Compatible Incompatible 
S–R-based Evaluative 
Priming effect 
Semantic    
Congruent 586 (5.2) 612 (8.0) 26*** [7] 
Incongruent 589 (4.8) 618 (8.1) 28*** [6] 
S–S-based Semantic 
Priming effect 
4 [8] 6 [6] 
 
Note: Priming scores (evaluative and semantic) are calculated by subtracting mean RTs for 
compatible/congruent priming from mean RTs for incompatible/incongruent priming. Slight 
inconsistencies between the left and the right part of the table are due to rounding. 
*** p < .001 
 
A 2 (evaluative condition: compatible vs. incompatible) × 2 (semantic 
condition: congruent vs. incongruent) ANOVA on RTs yielded a significant main 
effect of evaluative condition, F(1,30) = 31.96, p < .001, MSE = 712, but neither a 
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main effect of semantic condition nor a significant interaction, both Fs < 1. The 
S–R-based evaluative priming effect was significantly positive for both 
semantically congruent, M = 26 ms (SD = 40 ms), t(30) = 3.58, p < .001, dz = 
0.64, and incongruent conditions, M = 28 ms (SD = 36 ms), t(30) = 4.38, p < .001, 
dz = 0.79. However, there was no S–S-based semantic priming effect, either for 
evaluatively compatible, M = 4 ms (SD = 42 ms), or incompatible prime-target 
pairs, M = 6 ms (SD = 34 ms), both ts < 1. 
An analogous ANOVA on error rates yielded a significant main effect of 
evaluative condition, F(1,30) = 14.08, p = .001, MSE = 0.002, corresponding to a 
positive S–R-based evaluative priming effect of M = 3.1 % (SD = 4.5 %), t(30) = 
3.75, p < .01, dz = 0.67. Neither the main effect of semantic condition nor the 
interaction reached significance, both Fs < 1. 
4.2.3 Discussion 
The results indicate that the moderation of S–R-based priming effects by 
S–S-based congruency of prime and target is a phenomenon that is not easily 
reproducible by using ‘cold’ semantic categories (e.g., the categories persons and 
animals) for the S–S-based variation. Thus, tentatively, I decide for the 
assumption that the results in Experiments 1 to 4 reflect a valence-specific 
phenomenon. Since there was no interaction of evaluative and semantic factors, 
but there were significant S–R-based evaluative priming effects both in case of 
semantic congruency and incongruency, the semantic category had no obvious 
potential to affect the evaluative categorization process. In contrast—as the results 
from Experiments 1 to 4 suggest—the evaluative dimension is processed almost 
automatically (i.e., even if it is task-irrelevant) and has the potential to interfere 
with the current task. 
Of course, I have to admit caveats. First, one might argue that the 
categorization of stimuli as belonging to the categories persons versus animals is 
not as salient as the evaluative categorization. There is clear evidence that 
differences in category-specific salience modulate S–S-based evaluative and 
semantic priming effects (see Everaert et al., 2011; Spruyt, De Houwer et al., 
2007; Spruyt et al., 2009). Nummenmaa, Hyönä, and Calvo (2010, Exp. 4 and 5), 
however, compared the evaluative categories with the semantic categories persons 
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and animals with regard to their a priori salience and provided some evidence for 
a highly salient status of the semantic categories in comparison with the 
evaluative categories. Categorizing the same positive and negative pictures 
displaying persons and animals according to either the evaluative categories or the 
semantic categories yielded significantly less errors and faster RTs for the 
semantic compared with the evaluative categorizations. Moreover, successful 
semantic categorizations required significantly shorter exposure durations of the 
pictures than successful evaluative categorizations. Thus, the findings by 
Nummenmaa and colleagues suggest that the person and animal categories are at 
least equally (or even more) accessible than the evaluative categories. 
Furthermore, the person and animal categories are quite distinct and frequently 
used categories; a fact which makes the assumption rather implausible that the 
semantic categories of the experimental stimuli used in my experiments are less 
salient than the evaluative categories. Thus, salience effects of the evaluative and 
semantic categories may not explain the asymmetric results in the semantic 
categorization task (Experiments 2 to 4) and the evaluation task (Experiment 
5a/b). 
Second, arbitrary members of the person and animal categories, 
respectively, might not have the same semantic overlap as arbitrary members of 
the evaluative categories, allowing for S–S-based priming effects. This 
asymmetry is difficult to resolve: There is no independent criterion for the choice 
of the ‘cold’ semantic categories than plausibility. If one argues that it is a priori 
implausible that, for example, blackbird primes dolphin due to semantic (i.e., 
categorical) relatedness, I can only argue that it is a priori equally implausible 
that, for example, baby primes dolphin due to evaluative congruency. I chose the 
semantic categories persons and animals, since these are quite salient and distinct 
categories, and expected to achieve a most possible comparability with the 
evaluative categories. Furthermore, several previous studies used the person and 
animal categories in direct comparison with the evaluative categories (see, e.g., 
Calvo & Nummenmaa, 2007, Exp. 6; De Houwer et al., 2002; Nummemnmaa et 
al., 2010, Exp. 4 and 5). 
Thus, the asymmetric results of a significant moderation of S–R-based 
priming effects by the evaluative dimension in the semantic categorization task 
(Experiments 2 to 4) and no moderation of S–R-based priming effects by the 
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semantic dimension in the evaluation task (Experiment 5a/b) are tentatively best 
explained with the valence-specificity interpretation. The reasons for this 
specificity remain, however, an open question: It might have something to do with 
the evaluative dimension being one of the most prominent dimensions structuring 
the semantic space (see Osgood, 1976). Or affective qualities of the evaluative 
dimension might play any role, increasing a prioritized processing of the 
evaluative features (see, e.g., Bargh, 1997; Öhmann et al., 2001; Zajonc, 1980). 
On the basis of salience effects on the S–S-based evaluative priming effect (see 
Everaert et al., 2011; Spruyt, De Houwer et al., 2007; Spruyt et al., 2009), Spruyt 
and colleagues (2009) concluded that the affective dimension may be processed in 
a favored manner due to its extraordinary relevance, but that this affective 
processing bias may easily be attenuated, as soon as current goals and task 
demands require the selective attention to other stimulus dimensions. 
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5 General Discussion 
In the last Chapter of my thesis, I first sum up the findings of all reported 
experiments. Thereafter, I discuss the relevance of my findings concerning 
theoretical interpretations of evaluative priming and the memory representation of 
the evaluative connotations. In this regard, I characterize the three-process model 
as integrative account for evaluative priming effects in different variants of the 
evaluative priming paradigm and compare this model with alternative 
explanations of evaluative and negatively signed priming effects. Afterwards, I 
describe the consequential requirements for the memory representation of the 
evaluative connotations. Finally, I discuss considerable limitations of my studies, 
and end with a short conclusion of the theoretical ideas on evaluative priming and 
the memory representation of valence. 
5.1 Résumé of results 
In five experiments, I could provide evidence for the mutual facilitation of 
evaluatively congruent stimuli that is not easily reproducible for (nonevaluative) 
semantic categories. Since in prior research the facilitation of an evaluatively 
congruent prime on target encoding was usually taken into account for the 
interpretation of S–S-based evaluative priming effects, whereas the supportive 
impact of an evaluatively congruent target on the prime activation was largely 
ignored, one of my main objectives was to explore this latter effect of evaluative 
congruency. For this, I applied an S–S-based evaluative priming design with a 
negative SOA-procedure (i.e., the prime onset followed the target onset) in order 
to maximize the facilitative effect of evaluative congruency on prime 
maintenance, while minimizing the same effect on target encoding. Indeed, mean 
RT data of different experiments provided conclusive evidence for prolonged 
prime activation in case of evaluative congruency, yielding an increased response 
conflict for response-incompatible primes and targets. In the naming task 
(Experiment 1), maintained activation of evaluatively congruent primes was 
reflected in a negatively signed S–S-based evaluative priming effect for response-
bound primes. Similarly, in the semantic categorization task (Experiments 2 to 4), 
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prolonged prime activation by an evaluatively congruent target was indicated by 
the significant moderation of the S–R-based semantic priming effects by 
evaluative congruency (nonsignificant in Experiment 3) as well as the negatively 
signed S–S-based evaluative priming effects in case of semantic incompatibility 
(significant in Experiment 2b only). 
Furthermore, the behavioral results received corroborative evidence by the 
ERP correlates in Experiment 3. Just like the pattern of priming effects in mean 
RTs indicated, a significant interaction of evaluative congruency and semantic 
compatibility arised in several ERP components, specifically, in N2 mean 
amplitudes and P3 peak latencies. The N2 component which has typically been 
associated with the amount of conflict between stimuli (e.g., Kopp et al., 1996; 
van Veen & Carter, 2002a, 2002b) featured an S–R-based semantic priming effect 
in mean amplitudes that significantly depended on evaluative congruency (thereby 
corroborating the results in mean RTs). Even though in P3 peak 
latencies―reflecting the effort for semantic target categorization―the same 
interaction of evaluative congruency and semantic compatibility significantly 
arised, the effect pattern differed from the pattern in mean RTs and N2 mean 
amplitudes. Since the single effects were shifted to the negative direction, the 
negatively signed S–S-based evaluative priming effect given semantic 
incompatibility was the only significant effect. In LRP onset latencies, the picture 
of both S–R-based semantic and S–S-based evaluative priming effects tended to 
the expected directions but did not reach the conventional level of significance. 
Adding a block with a positive SOA-procedure to the negative SOA-block 
in order to relatively enhance the facilitative effect of evaluative congruency on 
target encoding and to relatively decrease the same effect on prime activation 
(Experiment 4) resulted in a positive shift of the S–S-based evaluative priming 
effect in the positive as compared to the negative SOA-block. This finding speaks 
for the assumption that both facilitative effects due to evaluative congruency (i.e., 
target-encoding facilitation and prime-activation maintenance) are potentially 
existent in any evaluative priming task and that the specific experimental setting 
determines the relative magnitude of both effects on the prime-target processing. 
The failure to find S–S-based semantic priming effects or any moderation of the 
S–R-based evaluative priming effect by semantic compatibility in the evaluation 
task (Experiment 5a/b) corroborates the assumption that mutual activation is a 
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phenomenon that is not equally valid for cold semantic just like for evaluative 
categories. These asymmetric findings with regard to the S–S based priming 
effects in the semantic categorization and the evaluation task corroborate the 
assumption that the evaluative content of semantic concepts is preferentially 
processed (see, e.g., Bargh, 1997; Bargh et al., 1996; Murphy & Zajonc, 1993; 
Öhmann et al., 2001; Zajonc, 1980). 
One of the main purposes of my experiments was to improve the 
understanding of the cognitive processes involved in evaluative priming tasks and 
to develop a theory that is able to account for S–R-based and S–S-based 
evaluative priming effects. In the next Section, I discuss the implications and 
requirements of my results and prior empirical findings on a conclusive theory of 
evaluative priming. 
5.2 Integrative account on evaluative priming 
One of the main objectives of the present thesis was to unify the 
conflicting interpretations of evaluative priming in an S–R-based and an S–S-
based design. S–R-based evaluative priming effects are typically explained by 
response processes: an evaluatively congruent prime facilitates the evaluative 
categorization of the target, while evaluatively incongruent prime and target call 
for opposite evaluative categorizations. S–S-based evaluative priming effects are 
explained by processes at stimulus encoding level in that an evaluatively 
congruent prime is assumed to facilitate target encoding. Since both the S–R-
based and the S–S-based variant of the evaluative priming paradigm differ with 
regard to the required target response only, while all other parameters are 
comparable, it is dissatisfying to accept that a process assumed to be causally 
responsible for the evaluative priming effect in one variant of the paradigm should 
not be considered for the interpretation of the evaluative priming effect in the 
other variant. Thus, a general theory of evaluative priming needs to provide 
mechanisms for all processes that are in principle involved in evaluative priming 
tasks. 
Hence, a plausible model of evaluative priming must account for the 
parallel activation of two distinct evaluatively connoted concepts, as it is required 
by the response-based explanation of S–R-based evaluative priming. Furthermore, 
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such a model must allow for the mutual facilitation of evaluatively congruent 
concepts, as it is required by the encoding facilitation explanation of S–S-based 
evaluative priming. In this respect, I will refer to the considerations by Wentura 
and Rothermund (2003; see also Wentura & Frings, 2008) with respect to the 
processes involved in the S–S-based evaluative priming paradigm. They first 
stated the idea of mutual facilitation of evaluatively congruent concepts, in that 
the effect of evaluative congruency between prime and target may not be limited 
to facilitated target encoding but may even be associated with maintained prime 
activation. This prime maintenance may, in turn, prolong existing response 
conflicts between prime and target. In the three-process model, this consideration 
is further elaborated with the aim to account for both S–R-based and S–S-based 
evaluative priming effects. Basically, the three-process model claims an 
interaction of mutual facilitation, parallel activation, as well as response-related 
processes between evaluatively congruent prime and target, whereby the relative 
magnitude of the single processes is expected to depend on the respective 
evaluative priming task. 
The results in my experiments corroborate the assumptions of the three-
process model. Applying a negative SOA-procedure, I could show that evaluative 
congruency may be even disadvantageous for the target responding, since the 
maintained activation of an evaluatively congruent, but response-incompatible 
prime intensified the existing response conflict. This was evidenced by negatively 
signed S–S-based evaluative priming effects given response-incompatibility (Exp. 
1 and 2b) and positively signed S–R-based semantic priming effects that 
depended on evaluative congruency (Exp. 2, 3, and 4). Thus, my findings are best 
explained with the idea that mutual facilitation given evaluative congruency may 
effect on prime activation as well as on target encoding, while the relative 
magnitude of both components can be manipulated by experimental parameters 
(e.g., the SOA). In alignment with this explanation, a positive SOA-procedure led 
to a positive shift of the whole pattern of priming effects, since target-encoding 
facilitation by an evaluatively congruent prime was the more pronounced effect of 
mutual facilitation due to evaluative congruency. 
As a focus of my considerations was on processes reducing and eventually 
reversing S–S-based evaluative priming effects, I would like to discuss two 
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prominent theories dealing with negatively signed priming effects, in order to see 
whether they offer plausible alternative explanations for my results.7 
First, I would like to characterize the psychophysical account (or 
evaluation window account), as it was introduced by Klauer and colleagues 
(2009). The authors conclusively specify mechanisms which yield positively or 
negatively signed evaluative priming effects with an S–R-based design. The 
account supposes separate counters for positive and negative valence, while the 
amount of activation in a counter increases when positive or negative input (e.g., 
stimuli, thoughts, or actions), respectively, is processed. Without additional input, 
the amount of activation in the respective counter decreases to zero. The current 
state of each valence counter and the change of the counter state over the last 
hundreds of milliseconds are assumed to be consciously accessible. Thus, in order 
to evaluatively categorize a specific stimulus, either the absolute activational state 
of the respective counter at a given point in time or the relative increase of 
activation within a certain time window can be applied. Since evaluative decisions 
based on absolute values largely depend on the initial state of the respective 
counter that may be influenced by preceding, evaluatively connoted stimuli, they 
are rather problematic: While a conservative criterion (i.e., high activation 
required) diminishes the influences of preceding stimuli but is associated with 
slow categorizations, a liberal criterion (i.e., little activation required) leads to 
rather error-prone decisions, since the current activational state largely reflects the 
impact of preceding stimuli. In contrast, evaluative decisions based on recent 
increases of activation are independent from the initial activation in the respective 
counter. The basic idea to explain positively as well as negatively signed S–R-
based evaluative priming effects is that participants base their evaluative decision 
not on the absolute values of the counters at a given point in time but on the 
relative increase within a certain time window. With this strategy, positive effects 
would be expected if the activation increase was considered within the period 
from prime onset until target evaluation (i.e., with an evaluation window that 
includes the prime event), whereas negatively signed effects would be expected if 
the increase was considered only from target onset onwards (i.e., with an 
evaluation window that excludes the prime event). 
                                                 
7
 I refrain from discussing theories that focus on negative masked priming 
effects (e.g., Dagenbach, Carr, & Barnhardt, 1990; Kahan, 2000). 
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The following simple example demonstrates this logic (see Klauer et al., 
2009): Assume the positive counter has an (arbitrary) activation level of c = 15 at 
prime onset. If the prime is neutral, activation stays at c = 15 until target onset; if 
the prime is positive, it rises to c = 20 until target onset. A positive target lets 
activation in the positive counter further increase by ∆c = 10 until the end of the 
decision window. If the onset of the decision window is at prime onset, the 
(decision-relevant) relative increase within the window is I = (25-15)/15 = 0.67 in 
case of a neutral prime and I = (30-15)/15 = 1.00 in case of a positive prime. Thus, 
the relative increase of activation in the positive counter is higher with a positive 
than a neutral prime. Consequently, a positive target evaluation is facilitated by a 
positive as compared to a neutral prime, resulting in a positive S–R-based 
evaluative priming effect. If, however, the onset of the decision window is at 
target onset, the (decision-relevant) relative increase within the window is I = (25-
15)/15 = 0.67 in case of a neutral prime and I = (30-20)/20 = 0.50 in case of a 
positive prime. Thus, a positive target evaluation is facilitated by a neutral as 
compared to a positive prime, resulting in a negatively signed S–R-based 
evaluative priming effect. In order to broaden the scope of the psychophysical 
account, Klauer and Dittrich (2010) reported corroborative evidence for the 
applicability of the main assumptions to masked arrow priming. Thus, they could 
show that the account is not restricted to evaluative priming but applies for a wide 
range of different S–R-based priming paradigms. 
Since in Experiments 2 to 4 with the negative SOA-procedure I used a 
fixed temporal stimulus sequence, which made target and prime onset completely 
predictable, an evaluation window from target onset seems to be most plausible. 
In alignment with the rationale of the psychophysical account, the appearance of a 
person target, for example, should increase the activation in the person-category 
counter that would either be additionally boosted (in case of a person prime) or 
not (in case of an animal prime). This would result in a positive S–R-based 
semantic priming effect. There are two obvious possibilities to account for the 
conditional S–R-based semantic priming effects of Experiments 2 to 4 within this 
framework. First, I can return to my assumption that the impact of the prime 
(here: on the counter of the respective semantic category) depends on its 
activation, and that an evaluatively congruent prime is activated to a larger extent 
as compared to an incongruent one, since it is supported by the target activation. 
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In this case, the psychophysical account would provide a more sophisticated 
mechanism of maintained prime activation due to evaluative congruency and 
resulting response interference, as it is suggested in the three-process model. That 
means, both accounts would be compatible. An alternative theory would arise if 
one would assume that the window on- and offset of the semantic category 
counter is a consequence of evaluative congruency. In case of evaluative 
congruency, the counter window would include the prime stimulus (thereby 
causing an S–R-based priming effect), whereas the detection of evaluative 
incongruency would be a signal to close the counter window (thereby delimiting 
the impact of the prime on target response and resulting in no S–R-based priming 
effect). However, beyond the ad hoc character of this assumption, differences in 
the offset of the counter window between evaluatively congruent and incongruent 
conditions should be associated with differences in general response speed. I did, 
however, not observe such RT differences. 
As mentioned previously, an application of the psychophysical account 
(Klauer et al., 2009) to the results in the naming task (Experiment 1) seems to be 
even more problematic. First, a response-relevant activation counter would be 
necessary for each single target concept. Second, whether the prime information 
would be in- or excluded from the target response process would be influenced by 
the response binding of the prime: while a response-bound prime would be a 
signal to close the decision-relevant window, a nonresponse-bound prime would 
be taken into account during the target response preparation. Third, an 
evaluatively congruent prime would support the activation increase in the 
activation counter for target naming to a larger extent than an incongruent prime. 
While the last condition may illustrate a more elaborated specification of the 
encoding facilitation explanation of S–S-based evaluative priming effects, the first 
two conditions are not empirically corroborated. 
A further prominent account that deals with negatively signed priming 
effects is the ROUSE theory, as it was introduced by Huber, Shiffrin, Lyle, and 
Ruys (2001). ROUSE stands for Responding Optimally with Unknown Sources of 
Evidence. The theory describes mechanisms which mainly explain positively and 
negatively signed, perceptual priming effects (i.e., prime and target are 
perceptually similar or identical). The theory assumes that participants attempt to 
correct for possible source confusion between prime and target events. Therefore, 
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if some activated features are attributed to the prime event, they receive less 
weight in the target analysis (i.e., they are discounted). As a consequence, positive 
priming effects are the result of too little discounting, whereas negatively signed 
effects are the result of too much discounting. 
In order to apply this principle to my findings in the experiments with the 
semantic categorization task (i.e., Experiments 2 to 4), it is necessary to assume 
ad hoc that evaluative congruency vs. incongruency moderates the discounting of 
the prime’s response-relevant features (i.e., the semantic category). According to 
that, if prime and target are evaluatively congruent, there is too little discounting 
of the prime’s features (including the semantic category) and the prime either 
triggers the target-compatible or incompatible response, resulting in a positive S–
R-based semantic priming effect. In contrast, if prime and target are evaluatively 
incongruent, there is adequate discounting of the prime’s features, resulting in no 
(or a smaller) S–R-based semantic priming effect. The problem with this 
application is the ad hoc character of the assumptions as well as its implicit 
inconsistency: The congruency or incongruency of one feature of the prime with 
the corresponding feature of the target (i.e., the evaluative category) determines 
whether another feature of the prime (i.e., the task-relevant semantic category) is 
insufficiently or optimally discounted. However, this interaction does not hold if 
the evaluative categories are task-relevant, since no moderating influence of 
semantic congruency on the S–R-based evaluative priming effect emerged (see 
Experiment 5a/b). Furthermore, the results of Experiment 1 are not easily 
explainable with the assumptions of the ROUSE theory (Huber et al., 2001): It 
would be necessary to claim that (a) manipulating the response-binding of the 
prime pictures moderates the discounting process on a trial-by-trial basis and (b) 
too little (in case of nonresponse-bound primes) or too much (in case of response-
bound primes) discounting of the prime’s evaluative features affects target 
naming.  
In summation, I do not see how both theories, the psychophysical account 
(Klauer et al., 2009) and the ROUSE theory (Huber et al., 2001), that are well 
suited to explain the occurrence of negatively signed priming effects, may explain 
the results in the present S–S-based evaluative priming studies. 
Recently, Giesen and Rothermund (2011) tested the moderating influence 
of evaluative matching between target and distractor on binding processes of 
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stimulus and response in a variant of the negative priming paradigm. Sequentially 
presented prime and probe displays each consisted of simultaneously appearing, 
evaluatively connoted target and distractor. RT analyses of the probe display led 
to a significant three-way interaction: mean responses were facilitated if the 
response as well as the distractor repeated from the prime to the probe display and 
if―in addition―target and distractor in the prime display were evaluatively 
congruent. If, however, target and distractor in the prime display were of opposite 
valence, the two-way interaction of response relation and distractor relation failed 
to be significant. The authors interpreted their results in the sense that evaluative 
congruency in the prime display enabled the binding of the distractor, the target, 
and the corresponding response to a specific episodic memory structure, so that in 
case of response repetition additional distractor repetition yielded response 
facilitation. Such an integration of the target and the distractor information did not 
emerge if they were evaluatively incongruent. 
The main theoretical assumption, that is, a match of two concepts with 
regard to a specific feature supports the binding of these concepts, reminds on the 
general idea of compound cue theories (see McKoon & Ratcliff, 1989; 1992; 
Ratcliff & McKoon, 1994, 1995). Developed to account for priming effects in 
recognition tasks (i.e., the target is categorized as old or new) and lexical decision 
tasks, these theories assume that currently activated concepts join together in 
short-term memory and form a compound. This compound is passively matched 
against information in long-term memory, while the result of this matching 
process determines a certain value of familiarity of the compound. Thus, in a 
specific trial of a priming task, the compound serves as a cue to search for the 
long-term memory entry of the target. The more familiar the compound, the more 
accessible is the long-term memory entry corresponding to the target. Since the 
familiarity of the compound positively correlates with the associative relation of 
prime and target that, in turn, depends on the frequency of prime-target co-
occurrence, semantic priming effects beyond associative relatedness are hardly 
explainable with compound cue models (see Lucas, 2000). 
Consequently, the interpretation of S–S-based evaluative priming effects 
might also pose a problem for compound cue theories, since evaluative 
congruency between semantic concepts does not per se be associated with a 
frequent co-occurrence of these concepts. This may be even implausible, since the 
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amount of evaluatively connoted stimuli is probably by far too high (see Neumann 
et al., 2003; Zajonc, 1980). Even if one would assume that a compound formed by 
evaluatively congruent prime and target is highly familiar and facilitates the 
search for the long-term memory entry associated with the target, an application 
of the compound cue account to the present findings is still problematic. Given 
evaluative congruency, the target response is not generally facilitated; instead, 
target response facilitation or interference depends on the prime-target response 
relation. Such response-related processes between prime and target are, however, 
not considered by the compound cue theories. Therefore, I do not see how these 
models could account for the reported interaction of evaluative congruency and 
response-compatibility in S–S-based evaluative priming tasks. 
Since a further objective of my experiments was to elaborate the 
requirements of evaluative priming phenomena on memory models with a 
prioritized, representational status of the evaluative connotations, in the following 
Section I discuss the implications of my results on the representation of valence in 
the semantic memory. 
5.3 Implications on the memory representation of valence 
As mentioned previously, the evaluative priming paradigm is an implicit 
measure to explore the processing of the evaluative features of prime and target 
stimuli, whereby it provides information about the representation of the evaluative 
connotations in the semantic memory. For this, it is crucial to remind that 
evaluative priming effects caused by stimulus-response compatibility are 
interpreted in a largely different way than evaluative priming effects within an S–
S-based priming design. In principle, these diverging interpretations pose no 
severe problem, since the evaluative content is just differently processed in the 
evaluation task compared with any nonevaluative task (e.g., naming or semantic 
categorization task). However, a problem arises when the different interpretations 
of evaluative priming effects implicate conflicting memory representations of the 
evaluative connotations. While the response-based explanation of S–R-based 
evaluative priming requires a parallel activation of prime and target responses, the 
encoding facilitation explanation of S–S-based evaluative priming requires the 
facilitative encoding of one concept due to the pre-activation of the shared, 
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evaluative features. The three-process model and the findings in my experiments 
suggest specific implications for a model of the memory representation of 
valence. First, a plausible model should provide a mechanism for mutual 
facilitation of evaluatively congruent stimuli (as it is necessary to explain S–S-
based evaluative priming effects), thereby, it should enable target-encoding 
facilitation as well as prime-activation maintenance. Second, parallel activation of 
target and prime representations (including unshared features) should be possible 
in order to allow for S–R-based evaluative priming effects. 
Regarding the dominating encoding facilitation theories of evaluative 
priming―as characterized earlier―illustrates a dilemma. On the one hand, 
parallel distributed memory models (e.g., Masson, 1995) provide the most elegant 
implementation of facilitated encoding of evaluatively congruent concepts: Each 
semantic concept is represented by a specific pattern of activation across 
processing units, including units that code for the evaluative connotations (see 
Spruyt et al., 2002; Wentura, 1999; 2000). Priming is explained by the ease of the 
transition between activation vectors that share part of their pattern (e.g., the 
evaluative category). Parallel activation of related concepts is implemented by 
overlapping activation units that correspond to the shared semantic features. 
Since, however, the response-based account of S–R-based evaluative priming 
demands the parallel activation of prime and target response features―even if 
these features are not shared in case of response-incompatibility―the parallel 
distributed memory model does not provide a conclusive mechanism for S–R-
based evaluative priming. 
On the other hand, traditional semantic network models (e.g., Bower, 
1991) are still well suited to implement the boundary conditions for the memory 
representation of valence to account for evaluative priming effects; since these 
models provide a mechanism for both spreading of activation between 
evaluatively congruent concepts and parallel activation of several semantic 
concepts. However, as noted earlier, such semantic network models are burdened 
with other problems. Most importantly, if the activation is widely distributed 
among many evaluatively congruent concepts, each single concept is activated to 
a very low extent that, in turn, highly decreases the probability of observable 
priming effects (see Anderson, 1974). Thus, a spreading activation account needs 
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constraints with regard to the amount of activation to prevent a collapse of the 
system. 
To overcome this dilemma, it might be of help to broaden the 
considerations about a plausible model for the memory representation of valence 
to research areas beyond the field of priming research. In this context, it is 
interesting to note that the research on working memory per se deals with the 
question of how different semantic concepts can be kept active for cognitive 
processing at the same time; this concern corresponds to the parallel activation of 
prime and target concepts, as it is crucial for the interpretation of S–R-based 
evaluative priming effects. A prominent perspective on working memory is to 
regard its contents as the activated part of the long-term memory (see Cowan, 
1999; Oberauer, 2002). In his embedded-processes model of working memory, 
Cowan characterizes the focus of attention as the structure within the activated 
part of the long-term memory that is able to keep around three to five unrelated 
long-term memory entries in a highly accessible state at the same time. In a 
comparable way, Oberauer (2002) defines the working memory as a framework 
with three embedded components. Besides the activated part of the long-term 
memory, he determines the region of direct access that can hold a limited number 
of information units available for cognitive processing; thus, this region nearly 
corresponds to the focus of attention in Cowan’s model. The focus of attention in 
Oberauer’s model is able to keep only the currently selected object activated. 
However, Oberauer and Bialkova (2009) reported that the number of 
simultaneously activated elements in the focus of attention can be increased from 
one to two by a process of ad-hoc chunking. As a consequence, not the single 
elements but just the chunk is activated in the focus of attention. 
To account for parallel activation of more than one concept at once, 
working memory models with an organizational structure of parallel distributed 
models were considered, while the activation units that belong to the same 
concept are assumed to fire synchronously (e.g., Raffone & van Leeuwen, 2001; 
Raffone & Wolters, 2001; Vogel, Woodman, & Luck, 2001; Wolters & Raffone, 
2008). Since―as a result―the activation patterns of simultaneously activated, 
distinct semantic concepts can unambiguously and completely emerge, 
synchronous firing may provide an elegant mechanism for the parallel activation 
of several concepts within the distributed memory model of priming (Masson, 
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1991, 1995). With this amendment, the distributed memory model is able to 
account for S–R-based evaluative priming. 
In order to provide an explanation for S–S-based evaluative priming as 
well, such working memory models need the implementation of a mechanism that 
enables feature overlap of simultaneously maintained concepts, as it is assumed 
for evaluatively congruent prime and target. In this context, Raffone and van 
Leeuwen (2003) considered that the activation units which belong to different, 
simultaneously activated patterns may alternate their synchronizations between 
the rhythms of the respective activation patterns. Referring to the objective of 
evaluative priming, such alternations in synchronism are specifically crucial for 
the evaluative features of evaluatively congruent prime and target. 
What is yet to be solved, however, is the question of how mutual 
facilitation of overlapping (e.g., evaluatively congruent) concepts can be enabled 
in these sophisticated models. In this regard, the question arises whether there is 
an empirical link between priming and working memory studies. Indeed, not at 
first sight, but at the second: In several working memory studies, similarity of to-
be-remembered items was associated with detrimental effects, that is, rather the 
opposite of mutual facilitation was observed. It is, for example, well known that 
phonological similarity of sequentially presented words typically leads to 
impaired serial recall compared to the recall of phonologically dissimilar words 
(e.g., Baddeley, 1966; Henson, Norris, Page, & Baddeley, 1996). Oberauer (2009; 
see also Oberauer & Kliegl, 2006, 2010) explained this impaired performance for 
similar in comparison to dissimilar test items with a mechanism called feature 
overwriting. Feature overwriting means that different, currently held items in 
working memory, which share certain features, compete for these features, while 
only one item can gain this competition. It is important to note that Oberauer 
(2009; see also Oberauer & Kliegl, 2006) suggests that each feature unit is able to 
fire only once per phase and, thereby, belong to only one of all currently activated 
elements in working memory at the same time. 
In this regard, it is yet interesting to see that, even though phonological 
similarity of the to be remembered items was detrimental for serial recall, it was 
beneficial for the recall of the single items, irrespective of the specific positions in 
the list (see Watkins, Watkins, & Crowder, 1974). Furthermore, no detrimental 
effects of semantic similarity (i.e., the to-be-remembered words belong to the 
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same semantic category) were found (e.g., Cowles, Garnham, & Simner, 2010). 
Some studies even reported improved recall for semantically related words as 
compared to unrelated ones (see Cowles et al., 2010; Poirier & Saint-Aubin, 1995; 
Saint-Aubin, Ouellette, & Poirier, 2005). Of course, beneficial similarity effects 
can be explained with easier retrieval of the memory representations in case of 
semantic similarity because a shared category or a common theme can provide an 
additional retrieval cue (e.g., Poirier & Saint-Aubin, 1995; Saint-Aubin & Poirier, 
1999) or because the elements from the same semantic category are bound to 
chunks (McElree, 1998). However, such advantageous effects of semantic 
similarity were also interpreted as reflecting the mechanism of spreading 
activation (e.g., Stuart & Hulme, 2000). Thus, working memory studies provide 
some evidence that semantic overlap of simultaneously activated patterns is 
associated with benefits (in terms of mutual facilitation) rather than costs (in terms 
of interference). These findings go in line with the assumptions of the three-
process model. 
Thus, developing a model of the memory representations of the evaluative 
connotations that accounts for both S–R-based and S–S-based evaluative priming 
effects, one might think about an amendment of parallel distributed models of 
priming that allows for parallel activation of several concepts, even in their non-
overlapping parts. Such a model should have implemented a mechanism of 
synchronous firing of all features belonging to one concept (thereby allowing for 
parallel activation of several concepts) as well as a mechanism of feature overlap 
of related concepts (thereby allowing for mutual facilitation of evaluatively 
congruent concepts). A theoretical combination of priming and working memory 
models seems to be a fruitful way to arrive at an explanation model of evaluative 
priming effects that allows for parallel activation of several (at least two) concepts 
as well as mutual facilitation of evaluatively congruent concepts. 
In the next Section, I aim to discuss some considerable limitations of the 
experiments reported in this thesis that are important to keep in mind while 
interpreting the present findings. 
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5.4 Limitations of the present experiments 
One might wonder that I used rather few stimuli as primes and targets in 
my experiments. The stimulus set sizes in evaluative priming studies are in 
general much smaller in comparison with the set sizes in semantic priming studies 
(see Klauer & Musch, 2003). One reason for this may lie in the rather limited 
number of clearly valenced stimuli. Klauer and Musch (2001) examined 
evaluative priming in the naming task with different set sizes of prime and target 
stimuli and did not report significant influences of the stimulus set size; 
however―as discussed earlier―they failed to find any significant priming effects 
in this series of experiments. 
I have to admit that the magnitude and the robustness of S–S-based 
evaluative priming effects in my experiments were rather weak. Regarding the 
effect sizes of S–S-based evaluative priming effects in prior studies, the effect 
seems to be rather small and was associated with medium (see, e.g., Glaser & 
Banaji, 1999; Hermans et al., 1994; Spruyt, De Houwer et al., 2007; Spruyt et al., 
2002) or even small (see, e.g., Everaert et al., 2011; De Houwer & Randell, 2004; 
Spruyt & Hermans, 2008) effect sizes. Only Bargh and colleagues (1996) reported 
large effect sizes for the positive evaluative priming effect with the naming task 
(but see Klauer & Musch 2001, for a failure to replicate). 
One of the main and most important findings in my experiments was the 
prolonged response conflict between response-incompatible prime and target 
given evaluative congruency as compared to incongruency. Applying the rationale 
of the three-process model, I interpreted this result in the way that the activation 
of an evaluatively congruent prime is supported by the target, leading to a parallel 
activation of prime and target, and―as a direct consequence―resulting in a larger 
interference of the target response by a response-incompatible prime. Following 
this logic, an evaluatively incongruent prime is not sufficiently activated and does, 
thereby, not have the potential to disturb the target response. I must, however, 
admit that the finding of an increased target response interference given 
evaluative congruency as compared to incongruency also allows for an alternative 
interpretation. Taking the idea of distributed concept representation―as suggested 
in the distributed memory model by Masson (1991, 1995)―into account and 
applying this idea to my experiments, the activation of the target was necessarily 
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accompanied by the activation of an evaluatively congruent prime because the 
activation units corresponding to the evaluative connotations of prime and target 
overlapped. According to the rationale of the distributed memory model, however, 
the parallel activation of evaluatively congruent prime and target is restricted to 
their overlapping parts. The non-overlapping features, by contrast, may impede 
each other and mutually inhibit the formation of the complete activation pattern of 
either the prime or the target concept. Since, thus, also the response-related 
features of response-incompatible prime and target may impede each other, an 
increased response conflict given evaluative congruency in comparison with 
incongruency may occur. 
Both interpretations, that is, the parallel activation of the prime and the 
target concept in case of evaluative congruency (as suggested by the three-process 
model) versus a parallel activation that is restricted to the overlapping, evaluative 
features of the prime and the target pattern with a mutual interference of the 
remaining prime and target features (as implemented by Masson’s [1991, 1995] 
distributed memory model), are compatible with the finding of increased target 
response interference by an evaluatively congruent compared with an incongruent 
prime. In order to test the explanation derived from the three-process model 
against the alternative interpretation, it is necessary to examine the 
representational status of the prime concept in case of evaluative congruency. An 
elegant and reasonable operationalization would be to employ prime and target 
stimuli from (at least) three response categories with a specific analysis of the 
erroneous target responses. If―in case of response-incompatibility and evaluative 
congruency―the response associated with the prime would interfere with the 
target response more frequently than expected by chance, one could conclude that 
evaluatively congruent prime and target representations are simultaneously 
activated and that the prime activation is maintained by an evaluatively congruent 
target. Thus, such a finding would corroborate the interpretation according to the 
three-process model. Otherwise, if the erroneous target responses would equally 
often arise due to all available responses without a significantly more frequent 
interference by the prime-associated response, the increased target response 
conflict given evaluative congruency would be caused by a mutual inhibition of 
the activation patterns corresponding to the prime and the target concept, 
impeding the formation of the entire target activation pattern. Such a result would 
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rather corroborate an interpretation in line with the explanation of priming effects 
by the distributed memory model. 
Since I examined evaluative priming in sequential priming tasks with one 
target and a single prime per trial, my considerations concerning the interaction of 
evaluatively congruent concepts and the representation of the evaluative 
connotations in the semantic memory are restricted to two concepts. It may be 
interesting and a matter of future research to broaden the applicability of the 
three-process model on priming task settings with more than two stimuli. The 
memory models with mechanisms of synchronously firing activation patterns and 
activation units that alternate their rhythm between patterns should in principle 
allow for the simultaneous activation of more than two concepts, as well. 
Furthermore, I did not explore in how far the three-process model is able to 
account for S–S-based evaluative priming effects with nonconsciously perceptible 
primes. For this, similar S–S-based evaluative priming studies should be 
examined with masked prime presentations. 
5.5 Conclusions 
The main purpose of the present thesis was to introduce and 
experimentally test a theory of evaluative priming that accounts for evaluative 
priming effects in the S–R-based as well as the S–S-based variant of the 
paradigm. I would like to emphasize that both variants of the evaluative priming 
paradigm originated from largely different traditions. While the S–R-based 
evaluative priming variant illustrates an evaluative modification of the response 
priming paradigm, the S–S-based variant is structurally rather comparable with 
the semantic priming paradigm. Thus, the implications of evaluative priming 
effects on (a) the cognitive processes involved in the evaluative priming task and 
(b) the memory representations of the evaluative connotations of semantic 
concepts largely differ. With the three-process model, I aimed to propose an 
integrative explanation for both S–R-based and S–S-based evaluative priming 
effects. Thus, this model provides implementations of mutual facilitation of (at 
least two) evaluatively congruent concepts, parallel activation of (at least two) 
concepts as well as response-related interactions between the currently activated 
concepts.  
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7 Appendix 
Appendix A: Pictorial material used in Experiments 1, 2a, 4, and 5a 
 
Appendix B: Word material used in Experiments 2b, 3, and 5b 
APPENDIX A 
Appendix A 
 
IAPS pictures used in Experiment 1 
IAPs numbers for target pictures 
Positive: 1440, 1710, 2070, 5010 
Negative: 1220, 1280, 6190, 9440 
IAPs numbers for prime pictures 
Positive: 2091, 2092, 2360, 2391, 4700, 5621, 5910, 8120 
Negative: 2810, 2900, 6313, 9220, 9404, 9421, 9570, 9810 
 
 
 
IAPS pictures used in Experiments 2a, 4, and 5a 
IAPS numbers for pictures displaying persons 
Positive: 2010, 2030, 2340, 2360, 4700 
Negative: 2120, 2900, 6313, 9404, 9800 
IAPS numbers for pictures displaying animals 
Positive: 1440, 1460, 1610, 1710, 1920 
Negative: 1050, 1220, 1280, 1300, 1930.
APPENDIX B 
Appendix B  
 
Exemplar Names from the Persons and Animals Categories Used as Primes and 
Targets 
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